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This is for Uncle Ro.  
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I’m still trying to fill them.  
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thing they ask is where the other one is. This will frustrate you both to no end. But it is 
reflective of how close the two of you become on this journey. From traversing 
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engaging in deep conversation late into the night at Denny’s, to arguing over everything 
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brother to you within the Brotherhood. The two of you become each other’s cross bearers. 
You share in the afflictions. You share in the heartache. You share in the triumphs, few 
and far between as they seem to come. And you share incredulous laughs at the 
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As you near the end of your journey through grad school, you anticipate with faith and 
thanksgiving his coming to a near end as well. Dust off the old blazer.  
1 Peter 2:17. Honor all men. Love the brotherhood. Men like these are easy to 
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xi 
 
 Now pay extra attention to this part. November 2008 will change your life. Not 
because of the election, although that is a big deal. This month will change your life 
because at Café Habana on a typical autumn evening in Ann Arbor, you’ll meet Adriana 
Aldana. The woman who will eventually make you thank God every morning you get to 
wake up beside her. The woman with whom you’ll spend the rest of your life.   
After a few weeks of hanging out, you’ll laugh when you ask what she wants to 
do with her life and she replies without missing a beat “just keep doin’ what I do.” You’ll 
be charmed and a bit taken back by the raw confidence she exudes. But the moment 
lingers with you. Hold on. Soon enough you’ll want to devote everything you’ve got to 
supporting her as she does what she do, so to speak.  
It may sound like a bit much right now, but the moment will come when Adri 
becomes essential—indeed vital—to your completion of this graduate journey. Foremost, 
she models the diligence, perseverance and humility needed to endure the dissertation 
process, and she does it with a grace at which you can only marvel. When you find 
yourself in the 11th hour, staring at a white computer screen scrambling to make sense of 
that mediating effect from the experiment data, you’ll say a prayer and think of how Adri 
got through it. Be grateful that she allowed you to share in her journey. In so many ways, 
it paved the way for you to complete yours. 
But she gives you so much more than that. She opens you up to new experiences 
and tastes. She dares you to challenge yourself. She encourages you to give more of 
yourself. Simply put, she extracts the best out of you. And you reap so many of the 
benefits. The sushi. The transformative IGR experience. Broadening your circle of close 
friends to include the group affectionately known as The Townies—Mina & Ari, Nicole, 
Shayna, Charles and Laura, Adrienne and Janelle, and Becca and Bel. And then there’s 
Nena. I say with conviction that only Adriana Aldana could make you a dog person. 
Adriana is the gateway that connects you to some of your favorite things, favorite 
people, and your favorite qualities about yourself. As if that’s not enough, she is 
legitimately hilarious. Absolutely beautiful. Ridiculously smart. A culinary genius. And a 
little off-kilter…in a sometimes charming, sometimes super-sweet, sometimes mysterious 
kind of way. These things become evident early on in your first few dates (which she 
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remains adamant weren’t really dates, but hold firm; you’re right on this. Just maybe 
don’t spend too much time working on choreographed dance moves with your friends). 
And as you spend more time with her, you’ll become aware that with Adri, the whole 
adds up to something even greater than the sum of its incredible parts.  
You’ll count yourself richly blessed and highly favored of God to ultimately bring 
Adriana into your family upon the conclusion of your Michigan journey. In a way, this 
brings things full circle, because your journey ultimately begins with family. With the 
love, adoration and chastisement of your godparents, Mrs. Gloria and Mr. Smith, who 
have been positive forces in your life from year 1. The warmth and affection of your 
Auntie Ann, and your cousins Gina and Neete. The auspices of Grandma and the example 
set by your Uncle Ro, who both continue to look down on you from Heaven. The 
shepherding in your youth by Pastors Jeff and Carol at The Agape House. The continued 
shepherding into your adulthood by Bishop Fransisco and Pastor Nat at C3. The Christ-
like care and affection shown by Mother Naomi, and the valued friendship of Nicole 
Francisco. 
And finally, there’s mom. You already know that God smiled on you when He 
entrusted you to her. And you’ll continue to feel His smile and her presence as you 
endure the journey. For this Michigan journey began long before you enrolled in the 
program. This journey began with you and her. When she cradled you in your lap and 
taught you to read at 3. When she rose every morning before the sun, put on her fatigues 
and put in sweat equity for Uncle Sam so you would never be in lack. When she imposed 
a strict no-TV policy (with the exception of Knick games) during your senior year in high 
school, so you would devote time to applying for college and scholarships. When she first 
comes to visit in Michigan and the two of you spend the entire time in Target and Home 
Goods, so she can redecorate your studio apartment to make it feel more like home. And 
when she threatens, on numerous occasions, to fly down to Michigan and personally kick 
somebody’s butt whenever you vented about your struggles. Time and again throughout 
your journey, she’ll prove herself to be the absolute, unequivocal best. As I stand on the 
other side of this journey today, I can only think of a fitting Dark Knight quote for her 
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(that’s an amazing movie that comes out in 2008—yet another great thing happening in 
08). She isn’t always the mom you deserve, but she’s always the one you need.  
Everyone I list here—and a few not listed here but not far from my heart—is a 
part of your journey, and owns a piece of this accomplishment. You will forever be in 
their debt. 
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Abstract 
Messaging that communicates policy threats—that is, signals of developments in 
the political environment that will restrict or deny a valued political good—are a constant 
element of American discourse. The understanding shared by practitioners and scholars 
alike is that these policy threat messages will propel people to take up political action by 
making them “mad as hell” over the prospect of the relevant loss. This notion makes 
intuitive sense, and it is supported by a myriad of political studies.  
But I argue that policy threat cues are not effective at stimulating political action 
across all groups. Existing work exploring the linkage of emotion and behavior has not 
fully contended with the influential role played by race in determining how individuals 
respond to cues of policy threat in the political environment. This project aims to fill what 
I argue is a gap in the literature. I use affective intelligence and cognitive appraisal 
theories as frameworks for understanding how receipt of varying cues can engender 
distinct affective and behavioral responses. Integrating this literature with the work on 
black attitudes, I theorize that the respective interpretative lenses employed by blacks and 
whites to inform their broader perceptions of the political system—and their respective 
roles within it—inform and constrain their emotional responses to cues of policy threat in 
a systematically distinct manner. 
Informed by the tenets of American liberalism, the modal ideological worldview 
of white Americans breeds a sense of personal agency and belief that the political system 
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is responsive to citizen input. From this broader disposition arises the immediate 
appraisal of policy threat cues that engenders anger. This anger consequently propels 
whites to take political action in response to the threat. In contrast, the black ideological 
narratives shaping the general worldview of African Americans breed an overarching 
skepticism regarding the responsiveness of the system to the collective demands of blacks.  
I conceptualize this skepticism as racial resignation, and argue it has the potential 
to constrain the response of blacks to policy cues in one of two ways. One, racial 
resignation can be primed by the threat cue and suppress anger from being aroused 
among blacks in the first place. Alternately, resignation can be activated after anger has 
already been aroused. Once activated, this resignation overrides the mobilizing effects of 
anger by signaling to the threat cue recipient the ineffectiveness of his potential action. 
Whether racial resignation inhibits the emergence of anger among blacks or its positive 
effect on action post-emergence, the subsequent effect is the same. African Americans 
will not take up greater action in response to the policy threat, leading to a critical 
participation disparity relative to whites. In essence, anger has been mismanaged as a 
mobilizing force for African Americans in the policy sphere. Going further, I argue the 
same racialized ideological worldview that causes anger to be mismanaged among 
African Americans also make blacks more responsive to cues of policy opportunity 
relative to whites.  
I conduct two studies exploring whether racial differences emerge in individuals’ 
responsiveness to cues of policy threat and opportunity. Of particular note is how anger is 
operating differently for each group. Neither study allows for tests of the precise 
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mechanism through which black and white Americans register varying responses to 
policy threat and opportunity messages. Nevertheless, they uncover compelling trends 
that raise critical questions informing future inquiry, and furthering the development of 
the theory introduced here. 
Study 1 consists of analysis of American National Election Studies (ANES) data 
between the years 1980 and 2008. Analyzing a sample of white and black self-identified 
Democrats under a climate of policy threat, I find strong evidence of an anger deficit on 
the part of the black Democratic respondents. Despite expressing more pessimistic 
assessments of the national economy and greater disapproval of incumbents during these 
threat years, black Democrats are significantly less likely than their white Democratic 
counterparts to express anger toward the incumbent. Black Democrats also exhibit a 
positive hope differential relative to white Democrats, but such expressions of hope do 
not translate to political activity nearly as effectively as do expressions of anger—for 
either group. Overall, this study produces evidence consistent with the notion that blacks’ 
worldview inhibits the arousal of anger in response to policy threat cues.  
Study 2 is a survey experiment conducted in the Detroit metro area from May 
2013 to May 2014. The data from the experiment revealed black subjects were just as 
likely as white subjects to express anger when exposed to the threat condition, if not more 
so. Yet, black subjects’ anger exhibited a null effect on their political action across most 
model specifications. In contrast, anger engendered among white subjects was a strong 
motivator of their participation. Finally, black subjects were most effectively mobilized 
by feelings of satisfaction, which produced a null effect on the participation of white 
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subjects. Overall, the experiment yielded evidence suggestive of race differences 
emerging not in the arousal of anger, but in its mobilizing effects on action. 
In sum, the studies suggest more than one pathway through which race constrains 
the translation of emotional responses—particularly anger—to political action in 
response to cues of policy change. Together, they serve as key building blocks in the 
construction of a theory of racialized emotional and behavioral responses to policy cues. 
This theory provides critical illumination of the manner in which the narratives attached 
to relevant social group identifications such as one’s race influence how individuals 
navigate their political environment.  
This project offers valuable contributions to a number of scholarly fields. It adds 
to an ongoing discourse in the emotions field regarding of how both immediate and 
longstanding cognitive perceptions of the environment intersect with affect to govern 
people’s emotional and behavioral responses to policy cues. It highlights how race 
influences political behavior, not by serving as a proxy for resource disparities, but rather 
by acting as a heuristic tool actively communicating signals to individuals about the 
utility of their action. Finally, this work adds meaningfully to political communications 
literature by exploring the means through which two groups can have dramatically 
different responses to the same messaging. 
More broadly, this project has something of note to contribute to the exploration 
of American politics both empirically and normatively. The mismanagement of anger as 
a mobilizing force among African Americans constitutes a potential barrier to 
participation in precisely the times during which black Americans may be most 
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vulnerable. Finding ways to eradicate this barrier, through identifying either the 
conditions in which anger consistently animates black action, or the alternative emotions 
that mobilize African Americans, is a critical step in alleviating racial participation 
disparities in key policy domains. Scholars and practitioners alike who are concerned 
with the challenge of mobilizing members of politically vulnerable groups to advance 
their interests in the polity should find value in the insight yielded by this project.
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
“I’m mad as hell and I’m not going to take this anymore!” This quote from the 
classic 1976 satire film Network continues to hold iconic status in mainstream American 
discourse. While often invoked in tongue-in-cheek fashion, it undeniably primes an 
image that resonates within the American narrative—one of everyday people, fueled by 
indignation stemming from failed expectations, rising up to challenge a system plagued 
by injustice and bureaucratic inefficiency.  
This image of the American body politic being stirred to action by a sense of 
indignation also resonates with an emergent body of empirical work in political behavior. 
Responding to Campbell’s (2003, p. 29) charge that “issue motivation deserves greater 
attention” in studies of citizen participation, numerous scholars have begun examining 
the relationship between people’s perceptions of the political environment, their feelings 
about prospective changes to that environment, and their subsequent patterns of behavior. 
The findings from these studies appear to reach a consensus that when people are angered 
by perceived threats in the political environment, they will be motivated to take up 
political action to counteract the threat. This work suggests, therefore, that getting people 
“mad as hell” over a political issue is an effective means of mobilizing them for political 
action.  
A number of empirical works have revealed a linkage between facing a threat of 
material or political loss and increased political action. Examining longitudinal trends 
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in the volume of letters written by senior citizens to Congress, Campbell (2003) finds 
that public Congressional deliberations of cuts to Social Security are consistently met 
with surges in letters. Miller and Krosnick (2004) conduct an experiment in which they 
alter the content of letters soliciting donations and volunteer time from Ohio-area 
members of NARAL. Members receiving letters highlighting the threat of undesirable 
policy change on reproductive rights made financial contributions to NARAL at 
significantly higher rates than did those who received letters highlighting opportunities 
for desirable policy changes. Finally, work by Valentino, Gregorowicz and Groenendyk 
(2009) and Valentino, Brader, Groenendyk, Gregorowicz, and Hutchings (2011) 
provides evidence that anger is the emotional state translating perception of threat to 
increased political action. Among people facing the prospect of the un-favored partisan 
winning the presidential election, those who respond with anger are generally more 
likely to take up political action than those who express other emotions—notably fear.   
These studies employ various operationalizations of the threats in the political 
environment that motivate increased citizen action. But a common theme can be 
discerned in their underlying conceptualization of the threat. Whether the threat under 
examination is the prospect of loss of social security benefits, restrictions on 
reproductive rights, or more broadly a four-year period during which the national 
political climate is adverse to the individual’s policy preferences, it carries the risk of 
loss of something currently (or formerly possessed) by the individual that he values, 
feels entitled to, and believes is conferred or denied by the political system.  
These political goods relate to individuals’ material, physiological and mental 
well-being. Thus, people take seriously the prospect of these goods being diminished or 
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removed at the hands of key actors and institutions within the political environment. 
Indeed, much of the policy output from all levels of government can be conceptualized 
as either preserving, expanding or restricting access to such political goods for various 
factions of the populace.  
I conceptualize as policy threats the prospect of changes to the policy 
environment that carry the risk of restricting or denying a valued political good to a 
relevant population. Policy threats are to be distinguished from other types of threats—
particularly threats to life and limb. The risk of suffering physical harm at the hands of 
an entity (regardless of whether that entity is sanctioned by or affiliated with the state, 
i.e. police and military officers, or outside the bounds of the state, i.e. terrorism) carries 
a different type of visceral resonance and set of calculations than the risk of suffering 
loss to a political good (see Gadarian 2010 for examination of how terror threat 
influences citizen political thinking).  
The imposition of threat to one’s physical well-being is generally expected to 
engender fear among people. Their enhanced sense of vulnerability precludes them 
from engaging in most forms of political action (Gadarian 2010; Marcus, Neuman and 
Mackeun 2000). In contrast, policy threats, which emphasize the potential loss of 
political goods, carry the potential to motivate people to take up political action. It is 
policy threats that are most commonly found in political discourse.   
Examples of such communications are highlighted in the three figures below. 
Each image is intended to mobilize political action among the target audience by: (1) 
highlighting a relevant threat to them, (2) identifying or implying the actor within the 
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policy environment who is the source of the threat, and (3) suggesting the proper course 
of action for counteracting the threat. 
Figure 1.1 
 
The mailer shown in Figure 1.1 above has an intended audience of Republican 
identifiers. It highlights the threat of a policy landscape dominated by Democratic 
members of Congress—one in which the interests of Republicans are so subjugated 
they cannot even recognize their own country. While certainly dramatic, this threat 
indeed carries resonance for partisans in a political environment increasingly 
characterized by inter-party hostility and zero-sum competition for influence. Finally, 
the mailer suggests the course of action to stave off the threat it invokes—registering to 
vote in the upcoming election.  
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Figure 1.2 below invokes a more specific threat while pinpointing an individual 
political actor as the source of the threat. But the intent—mobilizing political action—is 
the same. 
Figure 1.2 
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The intended audience for this campaign advertisement is senior citizens in Ohio. 
This message highlights the threat to their healthcare that emanates from the policy 
agenda of Congressional Representative John Boccieri (a Democrat who supported 
President Obama’s Affordable Care Act). The flyer raises the specter of higher 
premiums, loss of coverage, and longer wait times—all amounting to serious 
diminishment in the quality of care seniors value and feel entitled to receive. The 
implied course of action to get the trajectory of health care back on its proper track is to 
vote Boccieri out of office in the next election.  
 As Figure 1.3 on the following page illustrates, the tactic of threatening people 
with the prospect of loss or reduction of key political good as a means of mobilization is 
not limited to either political party or ideology; nor is it limited to the realm of electoral 
and campaign politics. 
This Occupy Atlanta poster is aimed at disaffected out-of-work locals. It 
emphasizes the persistent and particularly dire employment situation in Atlanta compared 
to the rest of the country. Unlike the other communications I highlighted, this flyer 
identified the loss of a political good—in this case, employment security—but did not 
attribute it to a particular actor or institution. This lack of attribution is consistent with the 
overarching nebulousness of the Occupy movement, which broadly targeted the capitalist 
infrastructure and political and financial ecosystems, and was often criticized for failing 
to articulate a coherent set of concrete goals of the movement (Stewart 2011). 
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Figure 1.3 
 
Despite this alleged lack of clarity or focus, the movement engaged in a 
concerted effort to mobilize people by making them feel threatened with the prospects of 
prolonged joblessness, poverty, and lack of opportunities for upward mobility. Further, 
implicit in the “don’t cry, occupy!” pitch on the flyer is a call for Atlanta residents to 
respond to the economic threat not with despondency, but rather, anger. This reflects a 
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pragmatic knowledge on the part of mobilizers of the idea for which Valentino and 
colleagues find empirical evidence—that the key to getting people to take up political 
action in the face of policy threats to valued political goods is to make them angry. 
Indeed, the concept of people being “mad as hell” and rising up to “not take it 
anymore” is one that resonates both in scholarly examinations of citizen motivation and 
political behavior and in the on-the-ground realm of political messaging and organizing.  
But what if not everyone in the body republic is getting mad as hell when 
threatened with the loss of valued political goods? What if history points to instances of a 
specific sub-group within that body not being mobilized by policy threats as predicted by 
scholars and practitioners? 
Anger MISmanagement among African Americans? 
A number of historical and contemporary examples point to African Americans 
generally not responding to relevant policy threats with increased political action—even 
in instances in which whites are apparently being mobilized by the imposition of the 
same threat. For example, Williams (2003) chronicles the neglect on the part of civil 
rights and poverty advocate organizations to coordinate any major mobilization effort in 
response to Congressional deliberations over welfare reform in the mid-1990s.  
The negotiations between a Republican-held Congress and President Clinton, 
which led to the passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) in 1996, focused on punitive measures such as denying 
eligibility for federal assistance to unwed mothers under 18, imposing two-year limits on 
receipt of aid, and cutting the federal funding for programs such as food stamps. As 
Williams  (p. 252) notes using previously unpublished data from a Hart-Teeter poll, 
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substantially higher proportions of blacks than whites believed these measures 
represented policy steps in the wrong direction, with racial divides in opinion, ranging 
from 21 to 30 percentage points. Further, Williams (p. 221) notes that then-candidate 
Bill Clinton’s pledge on the campaign trail to ‘end welfare as we know it’ “was viewed 
by many African Americans as a race-coded message that the Democrats were breaking 
from supporting programs and policies that could be seen as beneficial to them.”  
The conflation of race with the notion of the underserving poor has been 
inextricably linked to national discourses on poverty throughout American history (see 
Gilens 1999). The public deliberations on welfare reform in the 1990s conformed to this 
norm: 
Despite the fact that children composed roughly three of every four 
welfare beneficiaries and that blacks composed fewer welfare beneficiaries in 
1993 than at any time since 1960, the stereotypical image of a welfare recipient 
continued to be that of a poor black woman living in a big city, abusing drugs, 
and spawning a criminal class (Williams 2003, p. 248).  
 
If African Americans generally both opposed the policy direction being outlined 
in national deliberations on welfare reform, and felt unfairly portrayed in the national 
discourse on the issue as being irresponsible freeloaders abusing the system, prevailing 
scholarship predicts there would be concerted efforts mounted or led by African 
Americans to oppose the impending legislation, or at least hold accountable those 
championing it. For an analogous example of people taking up political action in 
opposition to the prospect of an unfavorable major policy change, one need look no 
further than the conservative opposition to the Affordable Care Act. Derisively labeled 
“Obamacare” by detractors, opposition to Obama’s landmark health care reform 
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legislation has spawned fierce political and electoral activism, through outlets such as 
the Tea Party movement. 
 Yet, Williams observes a Congressional Black Caucus that at the time was 
rendered virtually powerless by a combination of organizational incapacity and disunity 
of interests, thus leaving it incapable of either mounting an effective legislative 
challenge to the PRWORA or rallying sympathetic opinion against it. Further, she 
asserts prominent activist organizations working on behalf of minorities and women had 
“little to no visibility in the welfare reform debate” (p. 262). It is worth contrasting this 
state of inactivity in the policy domain of welfare reform with the successful 
mobilization of hundreds of thousands of black men gathered in Washington for the 
Million Man March.  
That Nation of Islam leader Louis Farrakhan engaged in such an effective mass 
mobilization of black men during this very time period only emphasizes the readiness of 
rank and file blacks to be activated and positioned to take up collective action. Yet, on 
welfare reform—a policy domain in which a majority of blacks opposed the direction of 
the impending legislation, and felt targeted by the discourse surrounding it—no such 
action-induction took place. Was this lack of action in response to the policy threat 
solely attributable to a failure of black or liberal leadership? This would be too simple an 
interpretation of events, especially in light of the fact that this instance of black inaction 
in the face of a relevant policy threat is not a unique phenomenon.  
The entire period characterizing President George. W. Bush’s presidency 
can be characterized as one rife with relevant policy threats for African Americans.1 
                                                 
1 Although to be fair, this statement may generally hold true for the majority of black Americans under any 
Republican administration over the course of the past 35 years. 
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Dawson (2011, p. 7) summarizes the ways in which the political climate since the 
turn of the century has been inimical to black interests: 
In the first several years of the 21st century, African Americans became 
increasingly despondent about the potential for achieving racial justice in 
the nation as they saw their views on the country’s central issues—such as 
the 2000 presidential election, the Iraq War, the legitimacy of anti-war 
protest, and their evaluation of the Katrina disaster—overwhelmingly 
rejected, ridiculed and demonized by white Americans. 
 
 
 
Dawson describes an almost uninterrupted string of severe political defeats 
for African Americans, beginning with the hotly contested 2000 Presidential 
election outcome—viewed by many blacks as illegitimate (Avery 2007; Dawson 
2011)—and perhaps culminating with the substantial loss of black life and 
property in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina—viewed by a majority of blacks as 
being exacerbated by a governmental response clouded by racial bias (White, 
Philpot, Wylie, and McGowan 2007).  
Again, prevailing scholarship predicts that the general collective response of 
blacks to the deluge of policy threats in this period would be greater mobilization and 
activism. Yet, Dawson (2011) notes that self-reports by African Americans of 
membership in organizations working on black issues declined by a substantial amount 
between 2005 and 2008. In fact, the percentage decline during this four-year period was 
a greater magnitude than the percentage decline in the entire decade between 1990 and 
2000.  
Taking a closer look at the political action among blacks in the post-recession 
period beginning in 2009 paints a more finely tuned image of African Americans 
responding to relevant policy threats in a manner distinct from their white counterparts. 
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For many rank and file citizens, frustrations with a stagnant economy, rampant 
unemployment, and rising income inequality seemed to reach their breaking point. 
During this time. If any one group was to lead the charge of people mad as hell about 
the present economic and political system, one might expect it to be African Americans.  
There is no shortage of indicators that in the aftermath of the recession and 
housing collapse, African Americans generally faced a uniquely threatening economic 
outlook, relative both to whites during this time, and to African Americans in the time 
period preceding the collapse. For example, from 2005 to 2009, the median net worth of 
black households decreased by more than half, from $12,124 to $5,677. Meanwhile, the 
decline in white median wealth during this same time period was only from $134,992 to 
$113,149. During this year the percentage of blacks living under the federal poverty line 
was 25.8%, compared to just 9.4% of non-Hispanic whites. Additionally, the percentage 
of blacks without health insurance reached 21% in 2009, whereas the percentage of 
whites without health insurance reached only 12% (Kochhar, Fry and Taylor 2011). 
Finally, during the summer of 2011—just before the Occupy movement began—the 
black unemployment rate reached 16.1%, double the white unemployment rate of 8% 
(Bureau of Labor Statistics 2011).  
Yet, despite being disproportionately vulnerable to potential loss of political 
goods such as job security and sufficient income, African Americans were not leading 
the charge to rail against the economic and political system that rendered them 
vulnerable. To the contrary, blacks were virtually absent from many of the public 
domains of activism responding to the economic climate. This absence is perhaps most 
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dramatized by the Occupy Movement. Despite comprising about 12% of the population, 
blacks only made up 1.6% of the Occupy ranks nationally (Patton 2011).  
To dismiss the Occupy movement as “too white” to serve as a viable outlet 
through which blacks could voice their frustration with the system overlooks the fact 
that a range of prominent voices among the black elite attempted to rally blacks to join 
the movement. Civil Rights trailblazer Rep. John Lewis hailed the movement as 
“grassroots democracy at its best” (Walsh 2011). Additionally, hip hop mogul Russell 
Simmons engaged rap impresario Sean “Jay-Z” Carter in a public debate about the merit 
of the movement, touting its accomplishments and crediting it for opening up a critical 
national conversation on economic inequality in America (Lopez 2012).  
Further, both rank and file black citizens and black indigenous institutions 
attempted to cultivate black-specific strands of the occupy movement. This includes 
“Occupy the Hood,” spearheaded by two black Occupy Wall Street participants from 
New York and Detroit (Ross 2011). Additionally, “Occupy the Dream” was the name 
given to a partnership between Occupy Movement national leaders and a number of 
black churches and civic organizations, brought together under the leadership of 
Benjamin Chavez, former Executive Director of both the NAACP and the Million Man 
March (Carmichael 2011).  
These grassroots movements represented attempts by blacks to expand the space 
created by the initial Occupy movement to allow for inclusion of more uniquely black 
perspectives. This method of expanding existing political mobilization spaces to better 
integrate black interests is not uncommon. One need only think of the partnership 
between hip hop record label executives and the NAACP to create the “rap the vote” 
  
 14 
campaign as a complement to the “rock the vote” campaign intended to mobilize youth 
voters. Indeed, when Congressional Black Caucus Chair Emanuel Cleaver bemoaned the 
lack of black activism in the post-recession period, claiming that if a white President had 
been in office rather than Obama during such high black unemployment figures, blacks 
would “probably be marching on the White House” (Cohn 2011), he could have pointed to 
any number of these black indigenous movements providing black with opportunities to 
raise their voices alongside the majority-white Occupy protestors.  
Lest one mistakenly believe that the post-recession period (or the decade of the 
2000s generally) was simply a time marked by black political dormancy, consider that 
among whites, blacks, Hispanics and Asians, African Americans were the only racial or 
ethnic group to increase its turnout rate from the 2006 to 2010 midterm elections (Lopez 
2011). Once again, we observe blacks exhibiting heightened political activity during the 
time period under which they find valued political goods under duress. Yet, generally 
blacks appear to be absent from the domains of action directly countering the policy threat.  
What is the significance of these instances of apparent black inaction during times 
in which when relevant political goods are threatened by the policy landscape? These 
instances become especially striking when contrasted with instances of intensified black 
activism when the distinct threat of loss of black life and limb is made salient (evidenced 
by the “Black Lives Matter” movement in response to police violence in the fall of 2014, 
and national marches and sit-ins in response to the Trayvon Martin slaying in 2012). The 
apparent dichotomy between the extensive history of African Americans political activism 
across a range of activities (see McAdam 1982; Dawson 2001; Lee 2002) and their 
reticence to mobilize in direct response to policy threats raises questions that challenge the 
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broad applicability of conventional wisdom on the motivating impact of policy threats on 
citizen behavior.   
The body of work establishing policy threat as an effective mobilizer of political 
action considered neither theoretically nor empirically the potential racial differences in 
how people respond to such threats. This project, therefore, asks the question, do African 
Americans generally exhibit distinct participation patterns from whites when made 
angry by the imposition of policy threats? Or alternatively, is it the case that policy 
threats fail to make blacks mad as hell as effectively as they make whites?  
The following passage, taken from a 2011 commentary by Stacy Patton of The 
Washington Post titled “Why Blacks Aren’t Embracing Occupy Wall Street,” provides 
an indication of how African Americans may be responding to policy threats very 
differently from whites: 
Blacks have historically suffered the income inequality and job 
scarcity that the Wall Street protesters are now railing against. 
Perhaps black America’s absence is sending a message to the 
Occupiers: “We told you so! Nothing will change. We’ve been here 
already. It’s hopeless. 
This passage invokes a narrative familiar to African Americans, one that 
emphasizes the historical unresponsiveness of the political environment to black 
demands. The entrenched vulnerability of blacks to a myriad of political and economic 
forces throughout U.S. history has conditioned them to view impending threats to their 
political goods not as temporary departures from a satisfactory norm, but rather, as the 
norm itself. Thus, calls to action to defend such goods against the latest threat to them 
emanating from the policy environment are likely to be ignored by many African 
Americans, even as they stimulate many whites to action. Whereas the response of white 
participants to the types of messaging displayed in the images found above can be 
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described as “I’m mad as hell, and I’m not going to take this anymore!” the response of 
black non-participants is largely a collective sigh, and the refrain “same old song.”  
Understanding the Relationship between Race and Affective Responses to Policy 
Cues  
A new theoretical framework is necessary to explain the distinct factors that 
condition the responses of whites and blacks to policy threats in their environment. This 
dissertation begins the construction of that framework. This project also employs two 
studies that provide evidence indicating policy threat cues effectively mobilizing action 
among whites are not increasing political activity among blacks. Expanding on existing 
frameworks for understanding how people respond emotionally to cues of change in their 
policy environment2, I consider the influence of individuals’ socialized racial experiences 
and beliefs about their roles in the political system on their emotional and behavioral 
responses to cues of policy change.  
The respective racialized perspectives of whites and blacks condition them to 
perceive threats to their political goods in systematically distinct ways. From these 
distinct perceptions come distinct emotional responses to the threat. These divergent 
emotional responses in turn lead whites and blacks to take distinct participatory responses 
to the threat. The general affective response of whites to policy threat cues is anger, 
which motivates them to take up action.  
But the response of African Americans is either an emotion other than anger, or a 
type of anger with a diminished influence on their subsequent political activity. As I 
argue, key to both what emotion emerges among black Americans in response to threat 
                                                 
2 Specifically, Marcus, Neuman and Mackuen’s (2000) affective intelligence theory and Lerner and 
Keltner’s (2000) cognitive appraisal theory 
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cues and the impact of that response on their political behavior is the persistent sense of 
resignation that characterizes blacks’ interaction with the political system. This 
resignation effectively causes anger to be mismanaged as an effective tool of mobilizing 
black action in the domain of policy threats, by either impeding the arousal of anger in 
response to the threat, or impeding the translation of anger to political action.  
In addition to offering a new framework for understanding racial differences in 
individuals’ affective and behavioral responses to policy threats, this dissertation 
provides a new framework for understanding racial differences in the responses to policy 
opportunity. Reviewing the history of black political activism in the U.S.—from the 
incubation and election of a small class of black elites during Reconstruction to the 
student-organized sit-ins and economic boycotts throughout the Jim Crow-era south, to 
the electoral mobilization around the Jackson and Obama presidential campaigns—there 
is an unmistakable current of hope and optimism undergirding the efforts of blacks 
throughout these periods.  
These historical and contemporary examples potentially serve as indicators of the 
motivating impact of cues of opportunity in the policy environment on the behavior of 
African Americans. Thus, I explore the potential both that policy threats fail to mobilize 
blacks as effectively as whites, and that policy opportunities mobilize blacks more 
effectively than they do whites. Ultimately, the dissertation’s exploration of these race 
differences provides a more refined and comprehensive account of issue motivation and 
political behavior.  
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Contributions of the Dissertation 
This project is notable for incorporating a diverse range of literatures, each of 
which holds a significant place in the social science field, but does not often engage the 
others. I integrate insights from areas within psychology (such as social identity theory 
and literature on affect) with insights from scholarship on black attitudes and behavior 
that spans fields ranging from political science to cognitive sociology. Culling from a 
wide range of literatures results in the development of a theoretically rich account 
detailing the critical interaction of race, attitudes, affect and behavior in response to 
changes in the political environment. From this account emerge novel means of thinking 
about familiar concepts such as ideology. These new ways of thinking about such 
concepts advances scholarly understanding of unique contours of black thought and 
behavior, allowing for more accurate predictive models for this relevant political sub-
constituency.  
This project also adds a new layer to the resource and civic voluntarism 
models (see Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995) to add further clarity to our 
understanding of the conditions under which citizens are more or less likely to 
engage in conventional forms of participation. Such models allow us to pinpoint 
the individual-level factors that foster or inhibit participation. Complementing 
those models, I demonstrate how individual’s emotional responses to their political 
environment can be operationalized as an additional resource that may either boost 
or hinder participation.  
By taking into consideration the motivational impacts of various emotional 
states alongside the traditional resource and engagement variables in participation 
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models, we can better pinpoint and understand why individuals who possess the 
resources associated with political action nonetheless may choose not to take up 
political action. Additionally, by paying theoretical and empirical attention to the 
policy environment in which individuals are making political decisions, I account 
for context in a meaningful way, paving the way ultimately for scholars to make 
more nuanced and stronger predictions of the conditions under which individuals 
will and will not take up political action, based not only on what they have, but 
also what they hear, what they perceive, and what they feel about the policy 
environment.  
Finally, this project yields insights significant insight both to scholars and 
practitioners. Insights from this inquiry can aid the work of individuals and groups 
charged with mobilizing diverse community groups around relevant political issues. By 
increasing their understanding of how the framing of their political messaging can 
systematically mobilize some communities while simultaneously turning others off from 
politics, these groups can more effectively tailor their messaging to motivate all 
communities to take action on matters of importance to them. 
Understanding differences in how people process and respond to cues of policy 
change has both practical and normative implications. It is important to understand how 
the policy cues constantly swirling about in the political environment can inadvertently 
create motivational barriers that hinder members of marginalized groups from entering 
the political playing. Further, it is important to identify the means to remove those 
barriers, as a modal state of inaction in the face of policy threat only leads to perpetuation 
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of policies that further marginalize the material and immaterial well-being of those group 
members. 
Order of Dissertation  
Chapter Two reviews and integrates the relevant literature in order to develop a 
new theoretical framework for understanding the impact of race on individuals’ 
emotional and participatory responses to policy threats and opportunities. The chapter 
begins with review of the extant models for understanding how cues of threat or 
opportunity translate to affective states, which result in varying courses of action. I then 
explore literature on the political attitudes and beliefs of African Americans to explore 
how African American’s distinct political dispositions affect their cognitive and affective 
responses to cues of threat and opportunity. I create models illustrating the possible 
pathways through which racial ideological narratives influence African Americans’ 
emotional and behavioral responses to cues of policy threat and opportunity. These 
models account for how the broader perceptions of the political system possessed by 
whites and blacks respectively condition them to respond to cues of policy threat and 
opportunity in systematically distinct manners. 
 Chapter Three presents testable hypotheses arising from the theoretical models 
established in Chapter Two. The hypotheses are tested via empirical analyses of data 
from the American National Election Studies (ANES) data. The existence of both an 
anger deficit and a positive hope differential are found among black respondents relative 
to their white counterparts. This and other significant findings from the analyses are 
discussed in terms of their relation to the hypotheses and their broader implications for 
the model of racialized responses to cues of policy threat and opportunity. 
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 Chapter Four describes the design and administration of a survey experiment 
created by me to further explore key tenets of the racial ideology pathway models. This 
chapter describes the treatments and the content of the pre and post-test questionnaire, as 
well as the unique characteristics of the sample collected. Additionally, this chapter lays 
out the expectations of analyses of the experiment data. 
 Chapter Five presents the major findings from the experiment. Proposed 
structural equation models reveal significant differences in how emotions associate with 
actions for black and white subjects The emotion that drives action most consistently for 
whites subjects is very distinct for the emotion producing the most consistent mobilizing 
effects for black subjects. This chapter explores the implications of the key findings, 
while also addressing limitations of the experiment, and lingering and arising questions 
from the empirical examinations. 
 Chapter Six concludes the dissertation with a discussion of how the findings 
from the project better inform our understanding of the current political environment. 
Against the backdrop of the Black Lives Matter movement, I discuss the troubling 
implications of black inaction in the domain of policy threat, which often leads to black 
action in response to crises emanating from the unfavored policy.   
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Chapter 2  
Literature Review and Theory 
In the pages that follow, I build upon and revise the current scholarship on affect, 
emotion and behavior to consider the role played by race in shaping individuals’ 
emotional responses to cues of change in the political environment. In this chapter, I 
connect literatures from diverse fields in order to build a theoretical model illustrating the 
distinct manner in which emotional responses to cues of both policy threat and policy 
opportunity are generated among blacks and whites, respectively. This model also reveals 
the implications for participation of these race-moderated emotional responses. 
The aims of this model are twofold. One, it provides a more comprehensive 
framework than what is currently available for understanding the interaction of micro- 
and macro-level factors that influence how individuals process and generate emotional 
responses to cues of prospective change in their political environment. Whether an 
individual responds to a prospective policy threat with anger, fear, sadness or another 
emotion is not predicated solely on her immediate calculation of the threat—i.e. its 
likelihood of becoming a reality, its potential impact on her well-being, and the means at 
her disposal to counter it. That reaction is also founded on her long-run assessment of her 
role and agency in the broader political sphere—i.e. her beliefs about her value to the 
polity and her capacity to change to political environment.  
Whites and blacks differ systematically in the conclusions they draw from both 
these immediate and long-run calculations. How they view the impact of prospective 
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policy changes on their well-being, the resources at their disposal to respond to them, and 
their relationship to the political system writ large will translate to differences in the 
emotional and participatory—responses of whites and blacks to cues of these changes. 
The model I present here illustrates both the translation of these micro- and macro-level 
considerations to emotional responses, and the translation of affect to differing behavioral 
responses. It therefore provides an accurate lens through which to view the critical 
influence of racial identity and its accompanying socialized norms on individuals’ 
emotional and behavioral responses to cues of changes in the political environment. 
Additionally, the model presented here lays the groundwork for development of 
testable hypotheses that examine its central tenets. The empirical tests presented in this 
dissertation cannot test all of key components of this new model. But they provide 
support for many of the expected “outputs” of the model, by uncovering evidence of 
substantial racial differences in both the emotional responses of whites and blacks to 
policy change cues, and the translation of their expressed emotions to participation.  
The studies also raise many questions and reveal elements of the model in need of 
revision. Viewed as pilot explorations of the interaction of race, emotion and behavior, 
these studies effectively lay groundwork for further development of the burgeoning 
theory of racialized responses to cues of policy threat and opportunity. This theory 
integrates and builds upon scholarship on race, affect, social identity, motivation and 
participation to further our understanding of the intangible factors that systematically 
encourage or inhibit participation among various key groups in U.S. politics.  
This chapter begins with in-depth integration of the relevant literatures on the role 
of emotions in political behavior, and the motivational effects of policy change cues on 
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individual action. The focus of this section is identifying both the individual-level and 
broader social forces underpinning peoples’ sense of motivation when they process cues 
of prospective political changes. I provide visual models illustrating what conventional 
literature contends is the processes by which cues of policy threat and opportunity 
translate to particular emotional and participatory responses.  
I then turn to literature on black political attitudes and behavior to highlight the 
unique ideological forces driving the perceptions and responses of African Americans to 
cues of prospective political change. I contrast the salient ideological narratives of 
American liberalism drawn upon by whites when they interact with their political 
environment to the black ideological narratives accessed by African Americans. These 
black ideological narratives are rooted in African Americans’ historic and current senses 
of personal and collective standing within the American system. They provide schema 
that facilitate blacks’ chronicling and contextualizing of the critical incidents that have 
characterized the black experience. These narratives are indicative of a broader black-
specific worldview that influences how African Americans process cues from the 
political environment. This worldview distinguishes itself in many ways from the 
American liberalist that worldview generally influences whites’ interpretation of cues in 
their political environment. 
From critical examination of this contrast in the respective worldviews and 
ideological narratives of blacks and whites emerges the distinct racialized patterns of 
response to cues of policy threat and opportunity. I provide visual models illustrating 
these racial patterns, and highlight their departure from the patterns as laid out by extant 
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understanding. The new visual models provide the basis for empirical analyses carried 
out in the two subsequent studies.   
Translating Cues of Policy Change to Emotion and Action 
Both threat and opportunity imply potential change to an individual’s given 
state. Either, therefore, can move an individual from a state of inaction to one of action. 
Yet, psychological and neurological studies indicate that the motivation to avert threat 
is stronger than the motivation to make good on a potential opportunity. For example, 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979, p. 288) assert that when observing people deciding 
between prospects involving risk, “[they] expect outcomes to be coded as gains or 
losses relative to a neutral reference point, and losses to loom larger than gains.” 
Additionally, Darwinian evolutionary theory posits that the human brain has 
developed a mechanism for detecting and automatically responding to threatening 
stimuli (Gray 1990). This work implies that conditions of threat carry a visceral 
resonance for people, motivating them to exert extra effort to stave off the threat. This 
notion is consistent with the aforementioned findings of Valentino et al (2009), Miller 
and Krosnick (2004), and Campbell (2003) that indicate cues of policy threat are 
effective mobilizers of political action. Connecting this work to the literature 
examining the impact of emotions on behavior provides an understanding of how 
conditions of prospective threat or opportunity translate to different types of actions.  
The initial wave of research into how emotion states translate to action was 
influenced by affective intelligence (AI) theory, which posits that people employ distinct 
cognitive strategies in response to different affective states (Marcus, Neuman and 
MacKuen 2000; MacKuen, Marcus, Neuman & Keele 2007).  
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AI posits that positive affective states such as hope and pride are regulated by the 
brain’s disposition system. This system breeds automaticity and routine. (MacKuen, 
Marcus, Neuman & Keele 2007; Brader, Valentino and Suhay 2008). Positive feelings of 
enthusiasm, deriving from either satisfaction with politics or anticipation of positive 
impending change, reinforce an individual’s existing behavioral patterns and attitudes. 
Feeling enthused, these individuals maintain their existing course of political activity, in 
order to ensure the rewards of participation continue to be reaped. According to this line 
of reasoning then, cues of policy opportunity should elicit no significant increase in 
political activity among cue recipients. The translation of receipt of opportunity cues to 
affect to action is represented visually in Figure 2.1. 
 
Figure 2.1: AI Model—Receipt of Positive Cue to Affect to Behavior 
 
This process laid out by affective intelligence theory is simple. Receiving a cue 
that positive change is on the political horizon produces an emotional state of enthusiasm. 
This enthusiasm makes people feel more secure about their current role in politics, giving 
them more confidence in both their existing political beliefs and values, and their current 
course of action. As a result, the participatory response emanating from this enthused 
state is maintenance of the status quo—people neither dampen nor accelerate their 
political efforts, as they feel assured their current activity level is producing satisfactory 
results. This entire process is governed by the brain’s disposition system. 
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In contrast, negative emotions such as anger and fear are regulated by the 
surveillance system, which alerts the individual to an unsettling change in the 
environment and conditions her to act accordingly. Grouped under the umbrella term of 
anxiety, these negative affective states prompt people to become less reliant on their 
predispositions and pay heightened attention to their political environment (MacKuen, 
Marcus, Neuman & Keele 2007; Brader 2006). Thus, receipt of cues of policy threat is 
expected to elicit more action along the lines of information seeking and evaluation. This 
process is illustrated in Figure 2.2. 
 
Figure 2.2: AI Model—Receipt of Negative Cue to Affect to Behavior 
 
The negative cue activates the surveillance system, which prompts feeling of 
unease over the prospect of an unfavorable change to the political environment. These 
feelings of anxiety compel people to question the veracity of what they know and believe 
about politics. This uncertainty prompts them to seek information and resources that 
provide them with clarity and support. 
 In sum, the AI conception of affect is that it generally falls into the 
categorization of either a positive state that breeds routine or a negative state that triggers 
changes in routine. This perspective of affect can inform expectations regarding how 
blacks and whites may differ in formulating emotional responses to policy threats. If 
black Americans employ a racialized lens to interpret political phenomena, the same 
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policy threat cues that activate the surveillance system and induce anxiety among whites 
may be registered by blacks as simply the latest reinforcement of a long-running narrative 
in which African Americans are marginalized within the political system. Thus, rather 
than triggering the surveillance system, these threat cues are governed by blacks’ 
disposition system, resulting in no behavioral departure from blacks’ status quo. 
As an example, I point to Dawson’s (2011, p. xv) examination of the dissimilar 
reactions of blacks and whites to Hurricane Katrina, which highlights the divergent 
narratives drawn upon by white and blacks in making sense of political and cultural 
phenomena: 
Was it a tragic event in which a large number of citizens proved 
unexpectedly vulnerable to a freak accident? Or was this business as usual? 
That is to say, proof, once again that some Americans count for more than 
others, and that skin color provides a brutally direct indication of who 
does count and who does not. 
 If the racialized norms adhered to by African Americans predisposition them to 
view policy threats not truly as threats (which AI posits would trigger automatic 
responses), but rather as “business as usual,” then they should be expected refrain from 
increased action. This refrain should stand in stark contrast to whites, for whom the 
surveillance system is activated, and who are consequently compelled to take up some 
form of action. 
Subsequent studies of negative affect states produce conclusions that depart from 
those drawn from affective intelligence theory. Exploring these approaches uncover 
additional ways in which black and white Americans’ emotional and behavioral 
responses to policy change cues could vary systematically. Cognitive appraisal theory 
(hereafter CAT; see Lerner and Keltner 2000; 2001), further explores the translation of 
cues of negative prospective change to states of affect. This approach distinguishes itself 
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from AI by emphasizing the deliberative process of evaluating and acting upon one’s 
emotional state. This paradigmatic approach departs from the notion that distinct 
emotional states trigger automatic behavioral patterns. Instead, the focus is on the distinct 
environmental origins of various emotions, and the manner in which individuals 
cognitively process those emotions in a way that informs their subsequent course of 
action.  
The essential premise of CAT is articulated by Scherer (2003, in Spezio and 
Adolphs p. 82): “people evaluate events in terms of the perceived relevance for their 
current needs and goals, including their ability to cope with consequences and the 
compatibility of the underlying actions with social norms and self-ideals.” This synopsis 
emphasizes the interaction of micro and macro-level forces that influence how an 
individual perceives prospective changes to her environment. She interprets the 
significance of the prospective change by assessing both its immediate potential impact 
on her well-being and its fundamental relation to what she believes and values about her 
role in the environment.  
The evaluative process suggested by Scherer is itself influenced by the socialized 
norms and expectations attached to one’s racial identity, as these factors shape the values, 
goals and limitations that constitute one’s sense of self. As Allen (2001, p. 46) states, 
“awareness of self—what constitutes humanness, the ‘shoulds’ of how one feels, acts and 
finds happiness and success, what constitutes failure, and what is valuable or is not—is 
intimately related to the particular cultural, historical and institutional contexts within 
which we live.” Implicit, therefore, in the cognitive appraisal framework for 
understanding emotional responses to threat is an acknowledgement that the process of 
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evaluating the threat and the environment in which it originates may look unique across 
various social group distinctions. Racial identity in particular should impact individuals’ 
processing in predictably distinct ways.  
CAT emphasizes the interaction of cognitive and affective processing, be it 
conscious or subconscious (Just, Crigler and Belt 2007). Prior to one’s emotional 
response to an impending threat is an assessment of the potential effect of the threat on 
one’s ability to achieve desired outcomes, and the resources at one’s disposal to prevent it. 
This perspective is consistent with the contention made in Ladd and Lenz’s (2008) 
critique of AI that reactions to people and events begin in the cognitive area of the brain 
before moving to the emotions-related area.  
The abundant evidence of stark divides in opinion and attitudes between whites 
and blacks (see for example Kinder and Sanders 1996; White, Philpot, Wylie and 
McGowen 2007; Hutchings 2009; Dawson 2011) indicates the existence of systematic 
differences in how members of each racial group cognitively process prospective changes 
to their emotional environment. Although African Americans have been empirically 
demonstrated to not suffer from lower senses of self-esteem or self-worth despite their 
marginalized status in the U.S. (see Rosenberg 1979; Crocker and Major 1989), they 
nonetheless exhibit lower levels of efficacy and political trust relative to whites (see 
Aberbach and Walker 1970, Pierce and Carey Jr. 1971). These disparities reflect blacks’ 
general perceptions that they have fewer resources at their disposal to respond to changes 
in the policy environment, and less agency to influence the political environment 
generally. These differences in perception should produce different emotional reactions 
from blacks relative to whites. 
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CAT draws a clear line of demarcation between the negative emotion states of 
anger and anxiety. According to CAT, the two major determinants of whether one’s 
cognitive assessment of a threatening environment triggers an affective response of anger 
or anxiety are attribution and control. If an individual can attribute the threat of an 
undesirable outcome to a particular source, and feels able to exert control over the 
situation to counteract the source, then the emotional state elicited by the threat is anger. 
If, however, the individual cannot identify the source of harm or feels little capacity to 
change the environment in her favor, she will respond with anxiety (Lerner and Keltner 
2000).   
CAT indicates anxiety works in the same manner as that suggested by AI. 
Defined as a state of nervousness or unease over an uncertain prospective outcome, this 
affective state makes people more likely to engage in behaviors aimed at coping (i.e. 
talking about their anxieties with friends and family) and information seeking (Marcus et 
al 2000; Huddy, Feldman and Cassese 2007). Whereas anxiety does not lead to inaction 
per se, it does not translate to political activism. Anger, in contrast, is expected to serve 
as a short term mobilizing force in the face of threat, transferring people from a modal 
state of inaction into one of activity. 
Two key components of anger distinguish it conceptually from other negative 
emotions. One, anger is a strong feeling of displeasure or belligerence. Two, this feeling 
is aroused by a perceived wrong or slight. Thus, anger is distinct from affective states 
such as frustration, which may either be a mild expression or may not be tied to a sense 
of injustice. Anger is also distinct from disappointment, which is more closely tied to an 
affective state of sadness over unintended and un-favored outcomes. 
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When in a state of anger, people possess a clear sense of agency regarding how to 
deal with the source frustrating one’s desired ends. Further, in a state of anger, people 
will rely less on acquired information in determining their preferred course of action, 
going so far as to downplay the risks associated with those actions (Huddy, Feldman and 
Cassese 2007). For these reasons, anger is believed to be a state of action. Indeed the 
work of Valentino et al (2009, 2011) presents empirical evidence that expressing feelings 
of anger is positively correlated with taking political action for people threatened with an 
unfavorable policy outcome. 
Models illustrating the CAT approach to how threat translates to distinct emotion 
and action states are presented in Figures 2.3 and 2.4 below. 
 
Figure 2.3: CAT—Threat Cue to Anger to Behavior 
 
 
Figure 2.4—Threat Cue to Anxiety to Behavior 
 
The significant addition that distinguishes these models from the AI models is the 
cognitive component, as people assess whether they can identify the source of the threat 
and if they can exert control over it. 
 Following the framework of CAT, anger is the necessary ingredient linking 
receipt of a cue of policy threat to increased political activity to counteract it. The 
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emotional state of anger emanates from a cognitive assessment of the environment that 
provides the individual with a sense of control within the political environment. 
Therefore, racial differences in how people respond emotionally and behaviorally to cues 
of policy threat must originate in differences in their cognitive assessments of the 
environment and their agency within it. Whereas whites generally view the political 
environment through interpretive lenses that augment their sense of control, blacks draw 
view the environment through lenses that emphasize their incapacity to affect change.  
 By identifying the distinct ideological narratives drawn upon by whites and 
blacks to interpret their political environment and their respective roles within it, I 
acknowledge the influential role played by individuals’ macro-level views regarding the 
political system’s responsiveness and fairness when processing cues of policy change. By 
failing to account for the impact of these worldviews on individuals’ reactions to 
potential policy changes, current scholarship cannot provide an accurate framework for 
understanding how African Americans face a unique set of considerations and 
calculations when facing the prospect of threat or opportunity in their policy environment. 
Engaging the literatures on group identity and ideology formation among black 
Americans illuminates the way that African Americans’ emotional and behavioral 
responses to cues of policy change result from their unique perspectives of self, society 
and strategy—perspectives collectively cultivated in the private and public spheres of 
black life.  
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Race, Attitudes and Ideology: Informing Interactions with the Political 
Environment  
The wide gulf separating the opinions of blacks and whites across the full 
spectrum of political issues is no artifact of past generations divided by segregation. Nor 
is it attributable simply to partisan differences. As Hutchings (2009) demonstrates, 
significant rifts in opinion are present even among black and white liberals, as well as 
among blacks and whites from the millennial age cohort. 
The significant divide in black-white opinion reflects fundamental differences 
in how blacks and whites perceive their sociopolitical environment. For instance, 
Dawson (2011) argues whites and blacks have cultivated distinct worldviews that flow 
from divergent patterns of interpreting events in the world around them. As evidence, 
he points to black and white perceptions of the contested 2000 Presidential election. A 
strong majority of African Americans acknowledged cases of voter suppression in 
Florida, and believed it was a “big deal.” In contrast, a majority of whites claimed that 
reports of voter suppression were either no big deal, or an outright fabrication. 
The respective placement of whites and blacks in the sociopolitical 
environment consequently shapes the meaning both groups attach to significant 
political phenomena. This constitutes a fundamental premise of cognitive sociology, 
as stated by Zerubavel (1997; in Young 2004, p. 134); “not only does our social 
environment affect how we perceive the world; it also helps determine what actually 
‘enters’ our minds in the first place.”  
When viewing political phenomena that are disproportionately detrimental to 
minority populations, whites tend to perceive the events as abnormal deviations from 
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a system that normally operates justly. They by and large attribute little to no 
significance to racial factors. In contrast, blacks view these same phenomena as 
further evidence of racial bias in the political system. Blacks generally view these 
events not as deviations, but rather as continuations of a systemic pattern of racial 
subjugation. 
In other words, when blacks see these phenomena, the concept of race as a 
means to order groups in society and systematically disadvantage blacks enters their 
minds “first,” thus shaping their interpretation. Evidence of these racialized patterns 
of interpretation is abundant in Gallup surveys, which consistently reveal 
significantly higher proportions of black respondents than white respondents 
attributing racial disparities in employment, income and housing to discriminatory 
treatment.  
The respective racialized lenses of interpretation employed by whites and 
blacks reflect the broader set of conceptions and beliefs about American democracy to 
which each group adheres. The lenses are not an abstraction; rather they reflect back to 
the people employing them a personal and collective sense of meaning, values and 
strategy. As people align their own self-perceptions and behaviors with the 
prototypical norms of the group with which they identify, the group-centric worldview 
exerts a constraining influence on how the individual interacts with her environment 
(Terry and Hogg 2000). The ideological narratives emanating from these worldviews 
can be viewed as heuristic schema, both informing people of how the cue they 
encounter aligns with their ideological belief structure, and constraining their response 
to the cue in conformity with that structure (Harris-Lacewell 2004).  
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There is much scholarly skepticism regarding the capacity of rank and file 
individuals to possess true ideologies, defined as a tightly organized set of deductive 
beliefs that uniformly and consistently exert constraints on one’s attitudes and 
preferences (see Lane 1962, Converse 1964, Kinder 1983, Zaller 1992). People are 
expected to possess a constellation of belief systems, defined by Converse (1964, p. 
207) as “a configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound 
together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence.” Race-based 
stratification is a driving force shaping the belief systems of various racial groups in 
the U.S. (see Carmines and Stimson 1989, Kinder and Sanders 1996), forcing scholars 
to consider whether belief systems shaped by one’s social identity group are equivalent 
to or deviate from what scholars consider true ideological thinking.  
Dawson (2001, p. 65) explicitly relates the concept of group thinking on the 
part of blacks—wherein they connect their personal lived experiences with the 
prototypical experience of blacks as subjugated minorities in the American racial 
order—to Converse’s concept of ideological thinking: “[t]o use Converse’s language, 
there are a number of linking mechanism between blacks’ social locations, their racial 
identities, and various (generally unsatisfactory) aspects of their social, economic, 
cultural and political worlds.” According to this view, blacks are not only engaging in 
ideological thinking when they rely on the prototypical norms and expectations of the 
collective black identity to ascribe meaning to their experiences; they are actively 
engaged in the construction of black ideologies that flow independently and in 
opposition to the dominant ideologies of white-led mainstream society. Exploring the 
black narratives that inform these oppositional ideologies is critical to understanding 
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the systematic differences in the motivation of African Americans to respond 
emotionally and behaviorally to cues of policy change in their environment.  
Harris-Lacewell’s (2004) exploration of how the political beliefs of African 
Americans are shaped by their everyday discourse with one another is premised on the 
notion that black ideological narratives have long permeated discourses in black spaces, 
from historically black campuses and universities (HBCUs) to churches to black-
owned salons and barbershops. Following in the tradition of Mansbridge (1999) and 
Putnam (2000), she explores these black narratives as a means of uncovering the 
distinct ideological belief systems and strategic frameworks adhered to by African 
Americans as political actors, asserting “black people use their interactions with one 
another in the black counterpublic to develop collective understanding of their political 
interests” (Harris-Lacewell 2004, p. xxi).  
Harris-Lacewell’s work provides a helpful framework for exploring the black 
ideological narratives that inform the decisions and motivations of African Americans 
in the political environment. I will highlight how adherence to various black narratives 
influences blacks to adopt differing sets of political calculations, which in turn should 
produce distinct emotional and behavioral responses to policy cues. But first I discuss 
how the black ideological belief structure primed by these narratives differs 
systematically from the ideological belief structure generally adopted by whites in the 
political environment.  
When whites view the political environment through interpretive lenses that de-
emphasize (or ignore outright) the determinant role of race in shaping one’s 
sociopolitical outcomes, they adopt a view of the world largely consistent with the 
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perspective of American liberalism. The core foundations of this philosophy include 
belief in the existence of unalienable individual rights, and the concept of cultural 
nationalism—the conferral of the rights and privileges of citizenship not bound to any 
particular race, ethnicity or religion (Walzer 1990). Dawson (2001, p. 33) concisely 
summarizes the major tenants of the American liberal tradition as “usually defined in 
such a way as to privilege the autonomy and liberty of the individual, skepticism of 
central state power, and the sanctity of private property.” From this tradition emerge 
the historic narratives that individuals and institutions draw upon to justify the 
hierarchical ordering of groups in U.S. society, including the individualist work ethos 
and manifest destiny.  
The scholarship on symbolic racism (Kinder and Sears 1981, Kinder and 
Sanders 1996) provides an example of how the narratives of American liberalism are 
employed to justify racial stratification in the U.S. This body of work empirically links 
white antipathy for blacks to the belief that blacks do not work hard enough to take full 
advantage of the opportunities for advancement in America. Implicit in this belief is 
adherence to the idea that racial barriers to advancement are an artifact of the past and 
no longer the reason for persistent racial disparities in education, employment, housing 
and legal spheres. Further, the belief that blacks are not meeting the standards of 
individual effort and advancement is correlated with more conservative views on 
social redistributive policies. Thus, subscription to the worldview of American 
liberalism—which emphasizes the capacity for individual triumph and full respect for 
and responsiveness to all across lines of social categorization—is entangled with the 
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racial order in the U.S., leading to policy preferences among whites that limit structural 
intervention to equalize outcomes for racial minorities. 
By privileging the individual over the collective (including, potentially, the 
state), and mythologizing the capacity for individual enterprise and advancement, the 
American liberal worldview provides a solid fit with the extant understanding of how 
individuals should respond to prospective policy changes. To the extent that whites 
generally adhere (consciously or subconsciously) to the American liberal worldview, 
this worldview imparts to them through the narratives of individualism and manifest 
destiny a sense of personal agency and capacity to exert influence over their political 
environment. These longstanding senses of agency and human potential engender 
among whites an immediate sense of control when processing emergent threats, as 
well as an immediate sense of confidence when processing emergent opportunities. 
As noted by Dawson (2001), however, the black ideologies developed in the 
exclusively black intellectual and deliberative spaces that began to take shape in the 
post-Reconstruction era are largely critical of or inimical to the American liberal 
worldview. In contrast to the prioritization of the individual over the collective, 
Dawson (2001, p. 11) observes the emergence of “an African-American worldview in 
which the moral, spiritual and material development of the community is at least as 
important as the development of the individual.” Additionally, Dawson points out that 
the black ideological strand most resembling American liberalism actually values a 
strong central government, as this is viewed as the most effective means of enacting 
and enforcing racial equality. Finally, whereas American liberalism largely asserts that 
with few notable exceptions cultural pluralism has been achieved and maintained (see 
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Walzer 1990), virtually all sets of black ideologies maintain that the polity is 
systematically biased along lines of race.3   
These are some of the key ways in which the most prominent black ideological 
spheres depart from the prominent ideological sphere largely informing the decision 
making of whites. But what are the major tenets of these black ideologies? I have 
identified three narratives emanating from the black ideological sphere that regularly 
inform and are invoked by black discourse (both among everyday citizens and black 
elites) and are instrumental in shaping how blacks interact with their political 
environment. I discuss each of these black ideological narratives—of subjugation, of 
resilience and of salvation—and describe and illustrate how these narratives inform and 
constrain the emotional and behavioral responses of African Americans to cues of policy 
threat and opportunity. 
Black Ideological Narratives and the Black Response to Cues of Policy Change 
The first black ideological narrative, the account of blacks as systematically 
subjugated by the American political system, so permeates the collective understanding 
of the black American experience that it is tempting to overlook it or presume its 
influence without fully engaging it. But the narrative of African Americans as an 
oppressed group is fundamentally tied to the development of collective and personal 
identity among blacks. African Americans’ historical navigation of a sociopolitical 
landscape that simultaneously espouses values of equality and tolerance and denies 
application of these values to blacks has forced them to cultivate a unique sense of 
identity and relation to the state. W.E.B. Du Bois [1903] (2007) articulated the burden 
                                                 
3 Dawson would exempt only the ideology of black conservatism from this categorization. 
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of “double consciousness” that blacks must bear as they confront a barrage of potential 
detriments to both their life outcomes and their sense of self-worth: 
It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always 
looking at one’s self through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by 
the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. One ever 
feels his two-ness—an American, a Negro—two souls, two thoughts, two 
unreconciled strivings, two warring ideals in one dark body, whose 
dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder. The history of the 
American Negro is the history of this strife—this longing to attain self-
conscious manhood, to merge his double self into a better and truer self. 
 
In this passage, Du Bois envisions black people engaging in a conscious effort to 
maintain a positive personal lens through which to view themselves, in spite of their 
perception that they are viewed as inferior through the dominant societal lens. Du Bois’ 
vision continues to have reverberations in contemporary contexts, as blacks persist in 
observing indicators that their collective needs, desires and demands are not valued 
equally by society writ large. As blacks perceive each successive instance of racial bias 
in the political sphere, be it the 2000 Presidential election, the government response to 
Hurricane Katrina or the housing crisis and subsequent economic downturn in 2009, 
these incidents are added to a constantly evolving, easily accessible script in the minds 
of blacks. This script is often disseminated in the messaging exchanged across blacks, 
captured in the common phrases such as blacks have to work twice as hard to get half as 
far, and when whites catch a cold, blacks get a fever. 
What such messaging signifies is an inherent conviction among blacks that 
ceteris paribus, American society does not treat blacks fairly. This internalized 
conviction plays multiple functions for blacks. It increases the salience of blacks’ racial 
identity as the primary means by which they define themselves. Additionally, this 
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conviction moves blacks to seek collective remedies to combat what they perceive to be 
structural barriers to equal treatment of the group.  
This process of linking one’s personal experiences of racial discrimination (or 
ego-deprivation) to the more abstract concept of systematic discrimination that hinders 
the capacity of one’s group (fraternal deprivation) is formally described by relative 
deprivation theory (Runciman 1966, Aberbach & Walker 1970, Crosby 1976, Feagin 
1991, Mummendey, Kessler, Klink and Mielke 1999, Gurin, Miller & Gurin 1980, 
Gurin, Hatchett & Jackson, 1989). This linkage politicizes African Americans’ racial 
identity, making them rely more heavily on the prototypical norms and strategies of the 
racial group to inform their interactions with the political environment (Dawson 1994).  
I identify the narrative of black subjugation, therefore, as a critical root force in the 
development of black consciousness among African Americans. Not surprisingly, blacks 
have been routinely shown to exhibit heightened levels of group consciousness and 
closeness compared to other groups in the U.S. (see Matthews and Prothro 1966; Verba 
and Nie 1972; Gurin et al 1980; Tate 1993; Dawson 1994). Defined by McClain, Johnson, 
Walton, Jr. and Watts (2009, p. 476), group consciousness is:  
in-group identification politicized by a set of ideological beliefs about 
one’s group’s social standing, as well as a view that collective action is 
the best means by which the group can improve its status and realize its 
interests [italics in original] 
An outgrowth of examinations of heightened black consciousness (see Chong and 
Rogers 2005 for review) is exploration of the tenets and contours of the ideological sphere 
of Black Nationalism. Davis and Brown (2002, p. 240) provide a summary of the black 
nationalist belief system: 
At its core, a belief in a black nationalist ideology acknowledges the 
hegemonic position of a dominant culture in American society which 
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imposes unjust limitations on African-American actualization and self-
realization; and it recognizes that for African Americans to survive in 
American society, they need institutions that provide greater control over 
their destinies and resources, even if it is associated with the disaffection 
toward other groups—particularly members of the dominant culture. 
 
Embedded in this definition of Black Nationalism is the narrative of black 
subjugation, as well as a strategic framework for overcoming subjugation.  
Additional explorations of Black Nationalist ideology yield further insights into 
how adherents view their sociopolitical environment. Aberbach and Walker (1970) 
conclude that as blacks’ adherence to Black Nationalist ideology increased, so did both 
their mistrust and their willingness to adopt a “by any means necessary” ethos. 
Additionally, the authors observe that when politically distrustful people are confronted 
with governmental decisions they find unsatisfactory, they not only question the decision 
and particular decision makers, but also the legitimacy of the entire governing institution 
itself. 
In their search for distinct dimensions of nationalism, Brown and Shaw (2002) 
find that adherents to what they term “separatist nationalism” distinguish themselves 
from “community nationalists” by seeking to cultivate political and economic autonomy 
outside of existing mainstream institutions and arrangements. Davis and Brown (2002) 
contend that the distinction between community and separatist nationalism made by 
Brown and Shaw (2002) is better conceptualized as a distinction between blacks who 
simply possess high levels of in-group identification and blacks who strongly adhere to 
Black Nationalist ideology.  
Regardless of how tightly or loosely one defines Black Nationalism, it is evident 
from examinations of its impact on black political strategizing that heightened politicized 
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racial consciousness among blacks governs interactions with their environment in a 
manner that is discernibly distinct from whites. So how would these African Americans 
respond to cues of prospective policy threat?  
The belief in an American anti-black hegemonic system, coupled with strong 
skepticism regarding the democratic responsiveness of the state to black demands, should 
influence politically conscious blacks to reject participation in virtually all forms of  
conventional political action to address potential policy threats. Highly conscious blacks 
largely perceive themselves to be closed off to the benefits reaped by engagement with 
the mainstream sociopolitical system. Consequently, in the presence of policy threat, they 
possess neither agency nor confidence in their ability to influence their political 
environment through conventional political action.  
The perspective of conscious blacks here is starkly opposed to that of whites who 
are informed by the narratives of American liberalism. Whites perceive the policy threat 
to be an anomaly—a temporary glitch in a typically fair and legitimate system. In 
contrast, politically conscious blacks view the threat as the latest addition to the script—
further confirmation of the marginalized status of African Americans and another chapter 
in the long-running narrative on the subjugation of blacks in America.  
A CAT framework suggests that in the absence of anger, these African Americans 
will feel anxiety. But there are certainly additional affective states that can be engendered 
among people in the face of threat. One may expect highly conscious blacks to feel 
emotions that convey their sense of powerlessness in relation to the state, such as sadness 
or shame. Or this subset may feel emotions that reflect their broader disdain for a system 
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from which they feel detached, such as contempt or disgust (see Fischer, Mosquera, van 
Vianen and Manstead 2004 for review of powerful and powerless emotions).  
Finally, the response of African Americans to such threat cues may be no truly 
discernible change in their emotion state. If the policy threat in question simply 
represents for African Americans another line in the long-running script of black 
subjugation, perhaps the most plausible expected response is a virtual non-response. The 
absence of an emotional shift could reflect an ingrained sense of resignation on the part 
of blacks, who have come to expect such threats as a facet of life in a racially stratified 
society. I will return to this concept of resignation in greater detail shortly. 
But I must first address an alternate account of how the emotional response of 
blacks to emergent policy threats may differ from that of whites. Blacks may ultimately 
prove no less likely than whites to express anger over the policy threat; yet the anger 
manifest among African Americans may not translate to action. Anger arising over policy 
threats could fail to mobilize action for blacks the way it does for whites because blacks’ 
anger is targeted more broadly at a system over which they feel they have little control, 
rather than a specific target (such as a particular policy or political actor). Black 
Americans consequently do not have the same obvious outlet for their anger as whites, 
whose anger propels them to take up conventional political acts they believe will preempt 
the threat. Addressing the second black ideological narrative allows me to flesh out this 
point. 
Running concurrent to the stream of cues blacks constantly receive about their 
subjugated status is a narrative of resilience that prevents blacks from translating the 
marginalized collective status of the group to personalized feelings of helplessness. 
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Adherence to the narrative of resilience, then, keeps blacks from responding to policy 
threats with powerless emotions such as despondence and anxiety. This narrative works 
in tandem with the narrative of subjugation to constrain the responses of blacks to policy 
threats to relatively muted emotion states. 
The narrative of resilience invokes the prototypical image of African Americans 
as durable and resolute in the face of cultural, institutional and structural barriers to their 
advancement. This narrative champions those who have overcome these barriers, and 
casts a disapproving gaze on those perceived to succumb to them. This continuous effort 
to highlight the steely determination of the black American as she navigates an unjust 
state is intended to bolster blacks’ collective image of self in the face of detriments to that 
image, thus linking it to Du Bois’ notion of double consciousness. 
Throughout history, the leaders of black intellectual, deliberative and political 
spaces have often used the narrative of resilience to propose and shape the strategic 
frameworks adopted by blacks to counter their collective subjugation. For instance, Du 
Bois (1903) delineated the role of the talented tenth, the one in ten Negroes who would 
be able to take advantage of the opportunity to acquire classical education and become 
public intellectuals and advocates for black advancement. Embedded in Du Bois’ 
description of the talented tenth is both a shrewd critique of a society in which only a 
small percentage of the black community would have access to advanced education, and 
a defiant resolve that black people can work collectively within those limitations to 
produce change.  
More recently, in a 2011 address to the Congressional Black Caucus, Barack 
Obama invoked the narrative of resilience to rally black support for his platform and 
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upcoming re-election race. Obama’s remarks first acknowledge blacks’ dissatisfaction 
with the lack of progress creating jobs for a disproportionately out-of-work black 
populace, while subtly connecting blacks’ current state of socioeconomic disrepair with 
their historical marginalized status—thus, invoking the narrative of subjugation:  
[W]e’ve needed faith over these last couple years. Times have been hard. 
It’s been three years since we faced down a crisis that began on Wall 
Street and then spread to Main Street, and hammered working families, 
and hammered an already hard-hit black community. The unemployment 
rate for black folks went up to nearly 17 percent — the highest it’s been in 
almost three decades; 40 percent, almost, of African American children 
living in poverty; fewer than half convinced that they can achieve Dr. 
King’s dream. You’ve got to be a little crazy to have faith during such 
hard times.  
 
Obama also invoked the history of the black American struggle for 
advancement—specifically the Civil Rights movement. He emphasizes the hard-won path 
to black advancement, and that African Americans earned concessions from the polity 
only after grueling, persistent efforts. He uses this invocation to implore blacks to 
demonstrate the same endurance and diligence: 
Throughout our history, change has often come slowly. Progress often 
takes time. We take a step forward, sometimes we take two steps back. 
Sometimes we get two steps forward and one step back. But it’s never a 
straight line. It’s never easy. And I never promised easy. Easy has never 
been promised to us. But we’ve had faith. We have had faith. We’ve had 
that good kind of crazy that says, you can’t stop marching. 
Even when folks are hitting you over the head, you can’t stop marching. 
Even when they’re turning the hoses on you, you can’t stop. Even when 
somebody fires you for speaking out, you can’t stop. Even when it looks 
like there’s no way, you find a way — you can’t stop. Through the mud 
and the muck and the driving rain, we don’t stop. Because we know the 
rightness of our cause — widening the circle of opportunity, standing up 
for everybody’s opportunities, increasing each other’s prosperity. 
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 Finally, Obama explicitly urges blacks to stop bemoaning the lack of progress 
made toward alleviating the dire economic condition of the group. He invites them to 
display a resolve to do something about it. He has framed the narrative of subjugation as 
a modal reality with which blacks must contend, while simultaneously dismissing this 
reality as a legitimate reason for African Americans to linger in feelings of 
powerlessness and vulnerability: 
I expect all of you to march with me and press on. Take off your bedroom 
slippers, put on your marching shoes. Shake it off. Stop complaining, stop 
grumbling, stop crying. We are going to press on. We’ve got work to do, 
CBC (transcript from thegrio.com). 
 
The narrative of resilience is also communicated in everyday discourse among 
blacks. This narrative is apparent in the conversations between black church parishioners 
recounted by Harris-Lacewell (2004) over the best means to deal with a white supervisor 
in the workplace perceived to be racially biased. When fellow church members counsel 
the parishioner to treat her boss with kindness and fulfill her work responsibilities with 
excellence, they are drawing upon their interpretation of bible verses that indicate it is her 
Christian duty to do so. But additionally, they draw upon the longstanding narrative of 
blacks as having both the capacity and responsibility to endure racial hardship with 
grace—to serve as a model of strength to other black people and help feed the positive 
collective self-image of the group. 
The general adherence of blacks to the belief that they possess both the ability and 
obligation to exhibit resilience in the face of racial discrimination is likely the driving 
force behind empirical studies revealing surprising trends in the impact of race-related 
stress on whites and blacks. According to a study by Williams, Yu, Jackson and 
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Anderson (1997), blacks report encountering stressors at a higher rate than whites. But 
race-related stress exerts a greater adverse impact on whites than on blacks. Further, 
examinations by Mabry and Kiecolt (2005) reveal no differences in frequency, means of 
expression or intensity of anger between whites and blacks.  Further, the authors find the 
most mistrustful blacks in the sample to be considerably less angry than the most 
mistrustful whites.  
Informed by the narrative of resilience, African Americans have expended 
considerable effort cultivating support systems that provide them with outlets for 
expressing their anguish over racial discrimination. In these spaces, blacks receive 
commiseration and affirmation that their personal experiences tie into the collective racial 
struggle. Additionally, they receive encouragement and strategic paradigms for 
encountering racism in a manner that preserves their positive sense of self-worth and 
lessens their feelings of vulnerability.  
The mechanisms blacks develop to alleviate feelings of vulnerability and distress 
in the face of duress prevent them from feeling emotions conveying powerless when 
encountering policy threats. Thus, the affective response of blacks will generally neither 
be anxiety, as predicted by the CAT model, nor feelings such as sadness. 
If the narrative of resilience insulates African Americans from feelings of 
powerlessness in response to policy threat, why does it not embolden African Americans 
to feel a sense of action-inducing anger in response? After all, in the aforementioned 
address by Obama, the narrative of resilience was invoked as a call to action.  
Although it is true Obama asked the black audience to take action, he undoubtedly 
drew a very tenuous historical connection between black action to demand concession 
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from government and satisfactory governmental responses. His invoking of the imagery 
of one step forward, two steps back is less a triumphant affirmation of a steady Hegelian 
march toward equality and more an acknowledgement of the entrenched (and often 
effective) historical resistance of the state to demands made by African Americans for 
justice.  
This is the intersection point of the narratives of resilience and subjugation. 
Blacks are confident in their capacity to effectively meet the challenges to their personal 
and collective senses of self-worth that come from a racially stratified sociopolitical 
system. Yet when threatened, they remain skeptical about their capacity to mount 
effective challenges to that political system itself. Given the prevalence of policy threats 
to African Americans in the political environment, they constantly weigh the choice 
between maintaining a level of detachment from the political system, so as to preserve a 
positive self-concept, or taking on political action that they are conditioned to believe 
carries a high risk of failure to meet its achieved objectives. The risk for blacks extends 
beyond failure to achieve the desired action; they risk diminishing their self-concept. 
Crocker and Knight (2005, p. 200) assert “people want to believe that they are 
worthy and valuable human beings, and this desire drives their behavior.” If blacks’ 
interactions with the political environment consistently serve as a reminder of their 
marginalized status within the state, then for the sake of their sense of personal worth, 
they will ultimately choose a course of refraining from further interaction. The narratives 
of black ideological thought even provide them with both the language and justification 
to employ for their inaction. Black man can’t make it in a white man’s world. No use 
playing the game; it’s rigged.  
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African Americans face a wholly different calculation than whites when assessing 
their options in a political environment shaped by an emergent policy threat. For blacks, 
failure to translate political participation to the desired outcome carries both personal 
disappointment and a sense that the lens of inferiority through which the individuals’ 
racial group is viewed was confirmed, albeit only temporarily, by the failure. The burden 
of double consciousness weighs heavy in a threat-abundant environment, as blacks must 
balance their sense of desire and obligation to be positive agents within the group with 
their desire to shield themselves from duress at the hands of an unresponsive 
sociopolitical system.  
The means of resolving these conflicting pulls on the psyche and behavior of 
African Americans is to exercise extreme selectivity in deciding which cues in the policy 
environment necessitate action; they pick their battles, so to speak, very carefully. By and 
large, many of the relevant policy threats that emerge in blacks’ political environment—
including those detailed in the introduction—are simply added to their long-running 
script on the subjugation of black interests. These threats are consistent with African 
Americans’ internalized beliefs about what they must contend with as members of a 
marginalized group in the U.S. They represent not what blacks must face in the 
environment, but more fundamentally what it means to be black in said environment.  
Black Americans’ cognitive contextualization of the policy threat as part of the 
cost of being black causes whatever initial unconscious affective response arises in 
response to the policy threat cue—be it fear, anger or sadness—to ultimately be tempered 
and diluted in its impact on behavior at the point it becomes consciously felt. The 
constraint exerted by blacks’ unique ideological worldview on both the emergence of 
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emotions in response to policy threats and their influence on behavior is the means by 
which anger is mismanaged as a mobilizing force for African Americans. Either the anger 
will fail to materialize among blacks, who feel a muted response to the emergent policy 
threat. Or, anger will materialize but does not boost their likelihood of taking up political 
action, because the anger cannot overcome the longstanding belief about the 
ineffectiveness of black action. 
I conceptualize this longstanding belief as racial resignation. Resignation is 
defined as acceptance of something perceived to be both undesirable and inevitable. I 
view the group-centric form of resignation unique to blacks not as an affective state itself, 
but rather as a longstanding cognitive predisposition that encompasses both the sense of 
fatalism provoked by the narrative of subjugation and the sense of forbearance stipulated 
by the narrative of resilience.  
When employing the interpretive lens of the black ideological worldview, blacks’ 
appraisals of emergent policy threats primes this resignation, which in turn dampens the 
emotion state generated in response to the threat. If African Americans’ response is 
indeed anger, racial resignation should prevent this emotion from mobilizing increased 
action to counteract the threat, as resignation signals to the individual the ineffectiveness 
of action to achieve responsiveness from a racially stratified political system. 
I have laid out three possible ways through race influences the emotional and 
behavioral responses of African Americans to policy threats. The first and simplest 
pathway follows an AI framework. It indicates African Americans will not exhibit any 
discernible affective or participatory change in response to policy threats, because such 
threats are simply not sufficient to activate the surveillance system that triggers a change 
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in feeling and behavior. Rather than represent a potential deviation from black 
Americans’ navigation of the routine political environment, policy threats are par for the 
course, representing the familiar rocky terrain that blacks must navigate as a politically 
marginalized group. Figure 2.5 below illustrates this first pathway. 
 
Figure 2.5: AI Pathway—African Americans’ Distinctive Affective and Behavioral 
Response to Threat Cues 
 
 
As Figure 2.5 illustrates, the policy threat cue fails to activate the surveillance 
system. Rather, the disposition system maintains an uninterrupted governance over 
African Americans’ affective response. As a result, there is no discernible change in 
affect, leading to no change in African Americans’ behavior is in response to the threat. 
The second and third pathways illustrate the influence of African Americans’ 
racial ideological worldviews on their formation of emotional and behavioral responses 
to cues of policy threat. These pathways broaden the framework of CAT by exploring the 
interaction of immediate cognitive assessments of the resources available in the present 
environment and the longstanding perceptions of capacity and effectiveness in the 
environment—perceptions I argue are governed by group identity cues. 
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 Figure 2.6 below illustrates the pathway whereby the heuristic of the black 
ideological narratives conditions individual blacks’ appraisal of the policy threat cue, 
mitigating their emotional response to the cue. 
 
Figure 2.6: CAT Pathway—Black Ideological Narratives Constraining Emotional 
Response of Blacks to Threat Cue 
 
Employing the set of lenses offered by the narratives of subjugation and resilience 
causes blacks to perceive the threat as further evidence of a racially stratified political 
system that is not responsive to black demands. The individual’s sense of efficacy is tied 
not to her possession of resources critical for participation, but rather, to her perception of 
the collective capacity of the racial group to mount an effective challenge to the threat. 
The narrative of subjugation signals this capacity is limited, thus leaving the individual 
feeling inefficacious.  
 Consideration of the group’s incapacity to effectively counter political threats 
primes African Americans’ sense of racial resignation. This resignation breeds a sense of 
detachment from the political system as a means of protecting the black individual from 
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suffering a blow to her self-concept. This protective mechanism helps to alleviate the 
incumbent feelings of vulnerability brought upon by the threat.  
This process ultimately produces a demonstrably muted emotional response to the 
threat. Rather than an action-inducing anger or a fear that prompts information seeking, 
the emotional response most closely resembles an indifference. Such indifference should 
not be taken as indication of African Americans’ apathy in the face of policy threat. On 
the contrary, it should be viewed as the rational response of individuals’ who seek to 
preserve a vulnerable psyche under constant barrage.  
This second proposed pathway ultimately arrives at the same outcome as the 
first—a muted emotional response to the policy threat cue. But they arrive at this 
outcome through very different means. The pathway rooted in the AI model is essentially 
a non-conscious process. This pathway, however, relies on cognitive processing that 
likely takes place at both conscious and unconscious levels and draws upon group cues 
and longstanding predispositions held by the individual. 
 As I noted earlier, the pathway rooted in the CAT framework could lead to 
another outcome—a strong emotional response, namely anger, which does not translate 
to action in the manner expected by conventional literature. Figure 2.7 displays this final 
pathway below. 
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Figure 2.7: CAT Pathway—Black Ideological Narratives Inhibiting Effect of Anger 
on Action 
 
The second pathway envisions the black ideological narratives influencing 
African Americans before their emotional response to the threat cue is engendered, thus 
conditioning the response that is ultimately registered. In contrast, this pathway envisions 
the narratives exerting influence after the emotion has already been engendered, 
subsequently conditioning the impact of that emotion on black participation.  
I focus specifically here on anger, as this is the most action ready emotion state. 
Adherence to a black ideological worldview may inhibit this action-readiness for African 
Americans by priming racial resignation right alongside the emotion state. Even if anger 
arises as an automatic affective response to the policy threat, the primed sense of 
resignation causes African Americans to consciously wrestle with—and ultimately be 
skeptical of—what utility any political action they feel immediately motivated to take 
will ultimately have. This act of second thinking disrupts the automatic translation of 
anger to action, thus preventing anger from exerting a mobilizing effect on black action 
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as posited by current work. In this pathway then, the heuristic of racial ideology subdues 
the initial thrust toward action by making black individuals conscious of their limited 
collective political efficacy, even after they have expressed anger over the policy threat. 
These figures model the possible pathways through which African Americans will 
respond to cues of policy threat in manners that are distinct from whites, and depart from 
conventional scholarly expectation. The empirical studies presented in this dissertation 
yield findings that can be interpreted to support all three of the pathways. These studies 
do not provide definitive word on which pathway is the most accurate. But they do reveal 
intriguing racial differences that corroborate the broad strokes of the theory presented 
here. Further, they affirm the need for and inform future work exploring the precise 
mechanisms through which blacks develop distinct emotional and behavioral response to 
policy threat cues than whites.  
What affects how whites and blacks respond to cues of policy opportunity? 
Unlike the diametrically opposed racial differences in responses to threat, the racial 
difference in responses to opportunity is a matter of degree. I expect whites to follow the 
model laid out by affective intelligence theory (recall Figure 2.1). I expect African 
Americans, however, to respond to cues of policy opportunity with a greater motivation 
to take up action. Thus, for blacks but not whites, there should be a discernible increase 
in likelihood of taking up action in response to prospective opportunity. The black 
ideological narrative of salvation is the driving force for blacks’ motivated response to 
opportunity cues. 
The religious connotation signified by the narrative of salvation is apropos given 
the historical intertwining of black political identity and the black church. The narrative 
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itself, which articulates a vision of black Americans as an oppressed people who will 
ultimately be delivered into a promised land of racial justice, is inextricably linked to the 
black Protestant tradition. But it has been transmitted both inside and outside of black 
religious spaces.  
The narrative is evident among African slaves in America who embraced the Old 
Testament story of Moses. They viewed the tale of his leading the Israelite exodus out of 
Egypt as an analogy for their own current plight and future deliverance from bondage 
(Feiler 2010). The narrative is also evident in Reverend Dr. King’s “I Have a Dream” 
speech, particularly as he shares “a dream that one day this nation will rise up and live 
out the true meaning of its creed: ‘We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are 
created equal’”. Finally, the salvation narrative is evident in remarks by a newly elected 
President Obama in 2008, as he describes the election of a black American man as the 
partial culmination of a centuries-long struggle for the nation to reach its ideals:  
If there is anyone out there who still doubts that America is a place where 
all things are possible, who still wonders if the dream of our founders is 
alive in our time, who still questions the power of our democracy, tonight 
is your answer…It's been a long time coming, but tonight, because of what 
we did on this date in this election at this defining moment change has 
come to America. 
 
Whereas the narratives of subjugation and resilience place emphasis on the past 
and present, the salvation narrative shifts African Americans’ gaze toward the future. 
This shift can exert significant influences on the attitudes and political calculations of 
blacks. By engendering African Americans with hope that there may be improvement to 
their normally suboptimal material circumstances, this narrative can create substantial 
motivation for blacks to take up political action to act on prospective opportunity in the 
policy sphere. 
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Hope is defined as a desire and expectation for a particular outcome to materialize. 
Similar to anger, hope is perceived to be a concrete emotional state attached to a specific 
object. Yet hope constitutes a future oriented affect (Just, Crigler and Belt 2007). Frijda, 
Kuipers and ter Schure (1989) find that in a context of uncertainty, the existence of hope 
that a favorable outcome will materialize alters perception of one’s environment—
specifically, by diminishing the role of self-agency in her assessment. This finding is 
complemented by the work of Uslaner (1998), who notes that feelings of optimism are 
rooted not in assessments of how one presently fares, but rather one’s long-run 
expectations. 
 This is critical for African Americans, whose group-informed sense of agency in 
the political environment is typically low.  If the presence of hope-inducing cues is 
sufficient to temporarily override blacks’ characteristic sense of collective inefficacy, 
these cues should provide an impetus for black political action. By shifting blacks’ focus 
away from their present suboptimal state, and toward a future in which they have faith 
they can shape for their benefit, salvation narratives provide blacks will effective 
motivation to act on potential opportunity in their environment.  
Research by Just, Crigler and Belt (2007) reveals when people feel hopeful, they 
engage in biased information seeking, searching for confirmatory evidence that the object 
of their hope will be realized. Transmission of the salvation narrative helps pay the cost 
of this information seeking by: (1) affirming black recipients’ capacity to take advantage 
of singular opportunities to advance black interests (evidenced by both the Jackson and 
Obama presidential campaigns’ usage of yes we can) and (2) assuring blacks that their 
  
 60 
prospects for the future remain bright despite the presence of obstacles from the past or 
present.  
The subjugation and resilience narratives influence blacks to contextualize 
emergent policy threats as additions to the long-running script chronicling blacks’ 
marginalized sociopolitical status. In contrast, the salvation narrative influences blacks to 
view emergent policy opportunities as constituting the next chapter in the story of 
exceptional moments of black breakthrough. Particularly for racially conscious blacks, 
this potential taps into both the desire for racial equity and the sense of obligation to 
utilize the resources at one’s disposal to advance the interests of the race. Consequently, 
it compels blacks to take up political action to make good on the opportunity presented. 
Figure 2.8 below presents the expected response of blacks to emergent policy 
opportunity in the political environment. 
 
Figure 2.8: Proposed Pathway Translating Opportunity Cues to Behavior among 
African Americans  
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Faced with what they likely perceive to be a rarely occurring policy opportunity, 
blacks draw upon the cues offered by the salvation narrative to determine their response. 
These cues prime a collective belief in the concept of racial deliverance. They also 
emphasize the responsibility of individual blacks to work toward bringing that future to 
pass. Together, these cues imbue individual blacks with a sense of optimism and 
assurance that the effort they put into acting on the opportunity can both yield individual 
gain and reap broader benefit to the community.  Feeling that their steps are ordered by 
God—to borrow the language of the church—blacks feel hopeful in response to the 
opportunity. This hope mobilizes them to take up political action to bring the opportunity 
to fruition. 
Summary 
This chapter laid out why African Americans should not be expected to respond 
to cues of either policy threat or opportunity with the same emotional and behavioral 
responses as whites. The ideological worldview of American liberalism to which whites 
generally adhere provides a perception of the political system as equitable and responsive 
to the demands of capable individuals. From this worldview spring the senses of efficacy 
and control that lead to white responses of anger to threats. This generally positive 
orientation to the political system also prevents policy opportunities from animating 
strong emotional responses among whites, leaving their level of political activity at the 
status quo.  
The black ideological narratives of subjugation and resilience communicate to 
African Americans a vision of the political system as being racially biased and 
unresponsive to their demands. This perspective breeds a sense of vulnerability and 
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detachment from the political system. As a result, blacks respond with resignation and 
inaction to policy threats. But the black ideological narrative of salvation encourages 
blacks to make good on potential opportunities for the betterment of the race, thus 
engendering among blacks a sense of hopefulness that mobilizes them to take action in 
response to opportunity cues.  
Integrating an account of how individuals’ broader racial ideological views affect 
their immediate processing of changes to the political environment provides a more 
comprehensive and accurate framework for understanding citizen motivation to 
participate in politics. In the chapters that follow, empirical tests of the broad strokes of 
theoretical account are made. The empirical tests provide more groundwork for 
establishing a cogent theory of the relationship between racial group identification, affect, 
and motivation to take action in response to changes in the political environment.  
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Chapter 3  
Study 1: ANES Data 
In this chapter, I explore whether findings from a national data set conform to 
one or more of the models presented earlier predicting the influence of race on 
individuals’ emotional and participatory responses to cues of both policy threat and 
opportunity. Extensive scholarship has made effective use of survey data to examine 
linkages between emotion and participation (e.g. Valentino et al 2009; Valentino et al 
2011; Banks and Valentino 2012). I build upon the foundation laid by this work to test 
hypotheses related to my claims. From analyses of nationally representative survey data, 
I uncover distinct racialized patterns in how people respond emotionally to different 
policy environments. These patterns are generalizable, consistent across multiple time 
intervals, and have varying impacts on political participation. The findings from this 
round of analyses provide some support for the first and second pathway models (see 
Figures 2.5 and 2.6). Whites and blacks in the data set differ in the extent to which they 
report anger under conditions of policy threat and hope under conditions of opportunity. 
The main takeaway from this set of analyses is the discovery of a black anger 
deficit. Under conditions of policy threat common to a sample of blacks and whites, 
blacks generally express greater dissatisfaction than whites; yet reports of anger dome 
from significantly fewer blacks relative to whites. The combination of blacks’ increased 
levels of dissatisfaction and their relative lack of anger in these threat climates 
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constitutes the anger deficit. And this deficit proves robust to various specifications of 
the model and alternate possible explanations.  
The analyses also provide suggestive evidence that blacks are more likely than 
whites to express hope when faced with the prospect of policy opportunity. Hope, 
however, is revealed to be a considerably weaker motivator of political action relative to 
anger—which significantly animates political action among both race groups. Thus, the 
racial anger deficit seems to portend more regarding the participation of blacks relative 
to whites does the racial hope differential. 
I begin the chapter with a discussion of the data before moving to a set of 
empirical analyses testing hypotheses related to race, anger and policy threat. I then lay 
out and test hypotheses related to race, hope and policy opportunity.  I close with 
discussion of the findings from both sets of analyses, and the initial implications and 
lingering questions that emerge from them. 
Data 
The cumulative American National Election Studies (ANES) data set offers a 
number of distinct advantages that make it well suited for tests of my hypotheses, such 
as adequately large samples of black respondents across years, a multitude of political 
attitude measures, and since 1980, a battery of questions gauging whether presidential 
incumbents and candidates have made respondents feel a variety of emotions (anger, fear, 
pride and hope).4  
The first challenge is to determine how to operationalize policy threats in the 
data set. In their ANES analyses, Valentino et al. (2009, p. 312) operationalize policy 
                                                 
4 Full text of ANES emotion question: Has [name of incumbent]—because of the kind of person he is, or 
because of something he has done—made you feel [ANGRY; AFRAID; HOPEFUL; PROUD]? 
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threat simply as “the likelihood of unwanted policy change if the opposing candidate 
were elected.” I adapt and refine this approach to provide a stronger operationalization 
of policy threat. If the prospect of the opposed candidate winning the Presidency is 
threatening, then people currently under the regime of the opposed party should 
perceive being in a constant state of policy threat. Thus, I limit my sample to partisan 
identifiers under an incumbent President of the opposing party.  
Admittedly, this is a blunt instrument of operationalization, which cannot 
account for the myriad factors other than the partisanship of the incumbent President 
that affect individuals’ assessments of their policy environment, such as fluctuations 
in the economy. Nevertheless, as will be demonstrated shortly, there is empirical 
evidence that the presence of Republican incumbents influences more negative 
assessments of the policy environment among Democratic identifiers. So while 
imprecise, this operationalization does reflect a genuine difference in how the 
partisans in the sample are processing cues within the policy environment based on 
the partisanship of the incumbent.  
The ANES pre-election interviews are conducted from September through 
November of presidential election years—the height of the campaign season. It is 
during this time that people are bombarded with cues about what the policy landscape 
will look like over the course of the next four years. For people opposed to the party 
of the incumbent president, the prospect of the continuation of the incumbent’s 
policies in the next presidential regime (either by the incumbent himself in a second 
term, or by another opposing party member who promises to largely maintain his 
predecessor’s course of action) is particularly threatening. These partisans’ concerns 
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about the next presidential regime are not simply based on their future forecasts, but 
also rooted in their actual dissatisfaction with their present policy environment. 
Thusly, the policy threat heralded by the out-partisan candidate’s presidential bid 
should constitute a relevant and salient threat. 
Because the emotions measures were added to the ANES in 1980, this year 
marks the beginning point of my analyses. Given the lack of partisan variation among 
the black sample in the ANES, the vast majority of the sample would be classified as 
threatened under Republican presidential regimes under my operationalization. Thus, 
to make the racial comparisons most accurate, I limit my analyses to black and white 
Democratic identifiers, and I conceptualize these Democrats as being in environments 
of policy threat during the years 1984, 1988, 1992, 2004 and 2008.5,6  
In the analyses, the variable representing anger is a dichotomous measure, with 
“1” indicating the respondent reported being made to feel angry by the incumbent 
president. I focus here solely on the incumbent rather than the major party candidates 
because I expect the incumbent to be the recipient of credit or blame for people’s 
satisfaction level with their current context, thus making him the most likely object of 
their emotional responses. Additionally, in three of the five election years in the analyses, 
the Republican incumbent is also the Republican candidate, running for a second term. 
Additionally, in one of the remaining years (1988), the incumbent’s purported party 
                                                 
5 Analyses for the year 2008 are conducted separately from the pooled analyses, due to the change in the 
way certain questions were asked of respondents (such as party ID). Results from 2008 will be presented 
along with results of the pooled analyses for the remaining years. 
6 In separate analyses, the entire sample of ANES respondents was included across all years 1980 through 
2004 in the pooled ANES. The results for these analyses are consistent with those presented here, 
indicating that (1) the anger deficit is not unique to Democratic identifiers, and (2) generally, the anger 
deficit has consequences for the participation of African Americans relative to whites beyond party lines. 
See Appendix Figure 6.1 for respective predicted probabilities of reporting anger for whites and blacks. See 
Figure 6.2 for impact of reporting anger on participation across all years and party IDs. 
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successor in office is his Vice President. I assume the motivation to prevent Vice 
Presidential successors to the office is equivalent to the motivation to oust incumbents 
seeking a second term. All results discussed are from analyses run on the ANES for the 
years 1984, 1988, 1992, 2004 and 2008. All independent and control variables are 
coded 0 to 1. 
Race, Policy Threat and Anger—Hypotheses 
Consistent with my proposition that adherence to the black ideological narratives 
of subjugation and resilience causes African Americans to possess more pessimistic 
long-term assessments of the political environment than do whites, I expect that across 
the election years included in my analyses, blacks in the ANES sample will consistently 
report more negative evaluations of the economy than their white Democratic 
counterparts (H1). These narratives have the potential to constrain the emotional 
response of African Americans in one of two ways. One, adherence to the narratives can 
inhibit the arousal of anger among blacks (consistent with the first and second pathways). 
If this is the case, I should expect a greater proportion of whites in the sample to express 
anger toward specific relevant actors in the environment than blacks (H2).  
Alternately, the narratives can inhibit not the arousal of anger among blacks, but 
rather, the mobilizing impact of anger on black respondents’ political activity (the third 
pathway; see Figure 2.7). If this is the case, then anger should be positively associated 
with increased political activity for whites, but not for blacks (H3). I expect H2 and H3 to 
run in opposition to one another, such that if evidence is found in support of one, 
evidence should also support the other’s null. 
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Race, Policy Threat, and Anger—Findings 
To test hypothesis 1, I examined the difference between black and white 
Democrats on two measures of respondents’ appraisals of their environment. The 
variable labeled economic evaluations is a 5-category measure gauging how 
respondents feel the condition of the national economy has fared over the past year. It 
is coded so that 1 indicates respondents feel the national economy has gotten 
significantly worse. Incumbent approval is a 5-category measure combining responses 
to the questions of whether the respondent approves or disapproves how the incumbent 
has handled his job, and how strongly they approve or disapprove. The variable is 
coded so that higher scores indicate stronger disapproval of the job performance of the 
Republican incumbent. 
Figure 3.1 below displays black and white respondents’ mean responses on 
the economic evaluation measure, while Figure 3.2 displays their respective mean 
responses on the incumbent approval measure.7 For comparative purposes, the years 
under Democratic incumbents (1980, 1996, and 2000) are also included to illustrate 
that Democrats are indeed more negative under out-party incumbents than under 
same-party incumbents. 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 Could racial differences in economic evaluations simply be a product of uncontrolled for economic 
disparities between blacks and whites in the sample? See Appendix Table 6.1 for results of OLS regression 
analyses with economic evaluations as the dependent variable, and race and personal economic indicators 
as independent and control variables. In most threat years, the positive effect of race on reporting negative 
evaluations is robust to inclusion of economic status variables. This supports the notion that African 
Americans indeed possess more negative orientations toward their political environment than whites. Also 
included is Table 6.2, presenting the results of OLS regressions with Republican incumbent disapproval as 
the dependent variables. Racial differences are even more robust to economic condition measures here.  
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Figure 3.1: Democrats’ Evaluations of National Economy, by Race and Year 
 
*Red outline indicates policy threat condition, represented by presence of Republican incumbent 
**Variable reverse coded, so higher scores indicate belief economy has gotten worse in past year. 
 
With the exception of the year 1980, when the economy sank into a recession, 
the economic evaluations of Democratic ANES respondents are noticeably more 
negative under Republican incumbents than Democratic presidents. This indicates that 
Republican regimes indeed signal threatening political environments for this sample.  
Given their common threatening environment, there is no reason to expect 
black and white Democrats to feel unequally dismal about the state of the economy. 
Yet, as the figures indicate, in every year except 2008 African American Democrats 
report more negative evaluations of the economy than white Democrats.8 ANOVA tests 
reveal these differences to be significant at alpha level 0.05 across all years in the study.  
                                                 
8 It is worth noting that the 2008 evaluations are reported in the midst of a national recession beginning in 
2007, which may explain the higher numbers of white Democrats reporting dissatisfaction with the 
economy. 
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Figure 3.2: Democrats’ Disapproval of Republican Incumbents, by Race and Year 
 
*Red outline indicates policy threat condition, represented by presence of Republican incumbent 
**Variable reverse coded, so higher scores indicate greater disapproval for incumbent 
 
Turning to incumbent approval ratings, differences in black and white 
Democrats’ approval of Republican incumbents are larger and consistent across all 
threat years. Blacks are consistently and significantly more disapproving of Republican 
incumbents than their white Democrats. These racial differences are essentially washed 
away when Democrats evaluate Democratic incumbents. This indicates that under the 
contexts operationalized as threatening, black Democrats are indeed more pessimistic 
toward the relevant actors within the political environment than their white Democratic 
counterparts. Whether this pessimism is due to perceptions of racially biased policy 
agendas tied to the Reagan and Bush administrations or a reflection of substantive 
socioeconomic disparities between blacks and whites in the sample, conventional 
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thinking asserts this pessimism will lead to more anger from black Democrats relative 
to white Democrats. However, analyses presented below reveal this is not the case. 
Hypothesis 2 is tested via logistic regression analyses conducted on the sample 
of Democrats. The dependent variable is the dichotomous measure of whether the 
respondent expressed anger at the Republican incumbent. A host of variables are 
included in the model that can be characterized as either resource variables (such as 
household income, employment status and educational attainment), or measures of 
engagement with politics (such as interest in the campaign and knowledge about 
politics). Additionally included are measures of internal and external efficacy.9 The 
key variable in the model is the dichotomous variable identifying black Democrats. 
Results of the logistic regression analyses for the years 1980 through 2004 are 
presented in Table 3.1, and analyses from 2008 are presented in Table 3.2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 The measure of external efficacy is coded so that 1 indicates feeling least efficacious. This coding 
decision reflects the expectation that feeling government is not responsive to one’s input should be 
positively associated with expressing anger toward a relevant political actor.  
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Table 3.1: Logistic Regression among Democrats—Reporting Anger toward 
Republican Incumbent as Dependent Variable, 1980-200410 
VARIABLES              MODEL 1          MODEL 2 
Black Democrat   -0.28* (0.14)     0.33 (0.33) 
Incumbent Disapproval  2.39*** (0.00)  2.52*** (0.19) 
Black Democrat X Incumbent 
Disapproval 
            --  --  -0.83* (0.41) 
Negative Economic Evaluation  0.34 (0.24)  0.36 (0.24) 
Education  0.76*** (0.21)  0.78*** (0.21) 
Household Income     -0.08 (0.17)  -0.08 (0.23) 
Home Ownership  -0.25* (0.12)  -0.25* (0.12) 
Unemployed  0.08 (0.17)  0.08 (0.17) 
Age  -0.80*** (0.21)  -0.80*** (0.21) 
Female  0.12 (0.12)  0.12 (0.11) 
South  -0.21^ (0.11)  -0.20^ (0.11) 
Interest in Campaign  0.57*** (0.16)  0.56*** (0.16) 
Political Knowledge  0.31** (0.11)  0.31** (0.11) 
Strength of Partisanship  0.51* (0.21)  0.54* (0.21) 
Internal Efficacy  0.16 (0.13)  0.15 (0.13) 
Mistrust  1.08*** (0.25)  1.08*** (0.25) 
External Efficacy (coded negatively)  0.13 (0.14)  0.13 (0.14) 
Year=1988  -0.67*** (0.13)  -0.67*** (0.13) 
Year=1992  -0.64*** (0.14)  -0.65*** (0.14) 
Constant  -2.21*** (0.31)  -2.31*** (0.31) 
Observations      2214      2214  
                                                 
10 Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<0.10. The control variable for 
year=2004 was dropped due to collinearity. 
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Pseudo R2  0.18   0.18  
 
As the first column of Table 3.1 reveals, even when controlling for the battery of 
demographic and engagement variables, black Democrats are significantly less likely 
than white Democrats to report feeling anger toward Republican incumbents. Further, 
this result is robust to inclusion of the economic evaluation and incumbent approval 
measures. The black Democrat variable has a coefficient of -0.28, significant at the 0.05 
alpha level. 
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Table 3.2: Logistic Regression among Democrats—Reporting Anger toward 
Republican Incumbent as Dependent Variable, 200811 
VARIABLES              MODEL 1          MODEL 2 
Black Democrat   -1.07** (0.35)     13.06 (675.44) 
Incumbent Disapproval  2.24*** (0.64)  2.67*** (0.72) 
Black Democrat X Incumbent 
Disapproval 
            --  --  -14.19 (675.44) 
Negative Economic Evaluation  -0.47 (1.41)  -0.07 (1.41) 
Education  1.70* (0.69)  1.66* (0.69) 
Household Income     -0.96 (0.80)  -0.90 (0.80) 
Home Ownership  0.18 (0.34)  0.19 (0.35) 
Unemployed  -1.21 (0.52)  -1.18* (0.52) 
Age  -2.13* (0.85)  -1.97* (0.86) 
Female  0.15 (0.34)  0.13 (0.34) 
South  -0.72* (0.33)  -0.72* (0.33) 
Interest in Campaign  1.34* (0.56)  1.27* (0.57) 
Political Knowledge  0.01 (0.32)  0.05 (0.32) 
Strength of Partisanship  0.91* (0.41)  0.88* (0.41) 
Internal Efficacy  0.37 (0.54)  0.33 (0.54) 
Mistrust  1.66* (0.83)  1.69* (0.83) 
External Efficacy (coded 
negatively) 
 -0.71 (0.49)  -0.69 (0.49) 
Constant  -0.50 (1.62)  -1.30 (1.69) 
Observations       453      453  
Pseudo R2       0.17   0.18  
 
                                                 
11 Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<0.10. The control variable for 
year=2004 was dropped due to collinearity. 
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As shown in Table 3.2, the coefficient on black Democrats in 2008 is also 
negative and significant in a two-tailed test. Figure 3.3 reveals black and white 
Democrats’ respective likelihoods of expressing anger toward Republican incumbents 
when all control variables are set at their mean values. 
 
Figure 3.3: Democrats’ Predicted Probabilities of Expressing Anger toward 
Republican Incumbents, with Control Variables at Means 
 
 
For the threat years 1984, 1998, 1992 and 2004 white Democrats are about 
seven percentage points more likely than black Democrats to express anger toward 
Republican incumbents. In 2008, the difference jumps to about ten percentage points. 
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The anger deficit displayed by black Democrats in 2008 is particularly striking given 
this time period offers black Democrats the chance to express their anger toward the 
incumbent for the government’s response to Hurricane Katrina, which blacks 
overwhelmingly decried as an instance of racial discrimination on the part of the 
federal government (Dawson 2011; White et al 2007). 
These findings provide support for hypothesis 2, revealing the presence of an 
anger deficit among black Democrats—despite their more pessimistic evaluations of 
the political environment relative to white Democrats. This anger deficit suggests the 
impact of black respondents’ ideological worldview is to suppress the emergence of 
anger in response to the threat cue represented by the Republican incumbent. If the 
racial difference is indeed manifest at the level of emotion arousal, rather than at the 
influence of emotion on behavior, then additional findings should support rejecting 
H3. I present these findings shortly. 
For the years 1980-2004, the positive association between disapproval of the 
incumbent and likelihood of expressing anger toward him is particularly strong and large 
in magnitude. Accordingly, I re-ran the model with the inclusion of an interaction 
between race of the Democratic identifier and negative evaluation of the incumbent. 
Results for this model are shown in the second column of Table 3.1. The coefficient of 
-0.83 (SE=0.41) for the interaction term reaches significance in a two-tailed test. 
Because accurate interpretation of interaction terms requires examination of the 
marginal effects of the interaction components, I present in Figure 3.4 the marginal 
effects plots for white and black Democrats. 
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Figure 3.4: Conditional Marginal Effect of Race on White and Black Democrats’ 
Likelihood of Expressing of Anger toward Incumbent at Various Levels of Approval, 
with 95% CI 
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The marginal plots reveal a stark difference in the emotional responses of the 
black and white Democrats who evaluate the Republican incumbents most harshly. 
The upward sloping arc of the plot for white Democrats reveals that as their 
evaluations of the Republican incumbents become more negative, they become more 
likely to express anger toward them. In contrast, the downward slope of the plot for 
black Democrats reveals that as they become more disapproving of Republican 
incumbents, they become less likely to express anger toward them.  
The confidence intervals of white and black Democrats stop overlapping as 
they move from weak disapproval to strong disapproval of the Republican incumbent, 
revealing that the racial anger deficit is most apparent among the most dissatisfied 
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Figure 3.3.5: Conditional Marginal Effect of Race on White and Black 
Democrats’ Likelihood of Expressing of Anger toward Incumbent at Various 
Levels of Approval, with 95% CI 
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Democrats. This disparity is inconsistent with extant scholarship. Yet it conforms to 
the expectations of the first and second pathways, as it indicates that blacks with the 
most negative perceptions of a relevant actor their political environment—the 
presidential incumbent—are reacting with anger to a considerably weaker degree 
than their white counterparts.  
Finally, to test hypothesis 3, a series of logistic regression analyses were 
conducted with a range of political activities as the dependent variable, including 
voting in the Presidential election, attempting to influence the vote choice of someone 
else, attending a political meeting or rally, and wearing a campaign button or sticker. 
These are the types of activities that distinguish the most politically engaged citizens 
from the rest of the electorate.  
If the racial difference in responses to policy threats manifests in the arousal of 
emotion, then there should be no difference in how anger translates to action for white 
and black Democrats, rejecting H3. Finding a positive correlation between anger and 
taking part in political activities for both whites and blacks reveals the potential of the 
racial anger deficit to make African Americans disengaged from mainstream political 
behavior. Conversely, a finding that anger mobilizes political action among whites but 
not blacks suggests African Americans may be processing anger in a manner 
unanticipated by me.  
Once again, resource and engagement variables are included in the model. The 
key independent variable of interest is the dichotomous variable measuring whether the 
respondent has expressed anger toward the incumbent. Also of interest is an interaction 
between race of Democrat and reporting anger toward the incumbent. This interaction 
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term is included to determine whether anger differentially impacts the political behavior 
of African Americans. Results of the logistic regressions are shown in Table 3.3 below. 
 
Table 3.3: Logistic Regression Predicting Likelihood of Voting among Democrats, 
1980-200412 
VARIABLES MODEL 1 MODEL 2 
Report of Anger toward Incumbent  0.29*  (0.15)  0.20 (0.16) 
Anger*Race of Democrat                --     --              0.37 (0.31) 
Incumbent Disapproval  0.15 (0.22)  0.16 (0.22) 
Negative Economic Evaluation             -0.20 (0.30)            -0.20 (0.30) 
Black Democrat  0.41* (0.17)  0.18 (0.25) 
Education  1.32***  (0.28)  1.32***  (0.28) 
Household Income  1.08*** (0.28)  1.07*** (0.28) 
Home Ownership  0.57***  (0.15)  0.57***  (0.15) 
Unemployed             -0.25 (0.19)             -0.26 (0.19) 
Age  0.72**  (0.26)  0.73**  (0.26) 
Female  0.40**  (0.14)  0.40**  (0.14) 
South             -0.54*** (0.14)             -0.53*** (0.14) 
Interest in Campaign  1.66*** (0.19)  1.67*** (0.19) 
Political Knowledge  0.71***  (0.14)  0.71***  (0.14) 
Strength of Partisanship  1.37***  (0.26)  1.36***  (0.26) 
Internal Efficacy  0.28 (0.17)  0.29 (0.17) 
Mistrust             -0.17 (0.33)             -0.17 (0.33) 
External Efficacy (coded negatively)             -0.64*** (0.17)             -0.65** (0.17) 
                                                 
12 Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<0.10. The control variable for 
year=2004 was dropped due to collinearity. 
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Year=1988             -0.23 (0.16)             -0.23 (0.16) 
Year=1992  0.18 (0.17)  0.19 (0.17) 
Constant            -2.48*** (0.38)            -2.48*** (0.35) 
Observations  1951   1951  
Pseudo R2  0.25   0.25  
 
The first column presents the results for voting in the Presidential election. As 
expected, the coefficient on the anger variable is positive and passes a two-tailed 
significance test. Anger exhibits an empirically discernible positive correlation with 
this form of participation, even in the presence of a multitude of measures 
conventionally associated with political action. Further, the second row of Model 2 
reveals a null interactive effect between race and reporting anger, indicating anger is 
working no differently for black Democrats than for white Democrats. The difference 
in likelihood of voting among individuals who express anger and those who do not 
with all control variables set to mean levels is about four percentage points. Given the 
little variation in self-reports of voting in presidential elections, the nontrivial boost 
offered by anger is notable.  
Further, as presented in Table 3.4 below, the motivating impact of anger on 
political action is not limited to the domain of voting.  
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Table 3.4: Logistic Regression Predicting Political Activities among Democrats, 
1980-2004 
VARIABLES 
Influencing another’s 
vote choice 
    Attending a 
    political mtg         
      Wearing a button/ 
                Sticker 
Report of Anger toward 
Incumbent 
  0.66*** (0.13) 0.92*** (0.25)   0.50* (0.20) 
Incumbent Disapproval   0.56** (0.20)  0.38 (0.34)  0.90** (0.30) 
Negative Economic 
Evaluation 
  0.35 (0.25)  0.36 (0.39)  0.24 (0.34) 
Black Democrat  -0.48** (0.14)  0.43* (0.21) -0.07 (0.19) 
Education   0.15 (0.21)  0.89** (0.32)  0.26 (0.29) 
Household Income   0.48* (0.24) -0.07 (0.37) -0.21 (0.33) 
Home Ownership   0.04 (0.13) -0.02 (0.20)  0.24 (0.18) 
Unemployed   0.08 (0.18)  0.16 (0.27)  0.17 (0.23) 
Age -1.06*** (0.23) -0.82* (0.36) -1.23*** (0.32) 
Female  0.35** (0.11) -0.42* (0.17) -0.37* (0.15) 
South  0.09 (0.12) -0.09 (0.19)  0.07 (0.17) 
Interest in Campaign  1.61*** (0.18)  0.69* (0.29)  1.28*** (0.26) 
Political Knowledge  0.40** (0.12)  0.64*** (0.13)   0.21 (0.18) 
Strength of Partisanship  0.82*** (0.21)  0.55^ (0.33)  1.00** (0.30) 
Internal Efficacy  -0.37^ (0.12)  0.51** (0.19) -0.03 (0.17) 
Mistrust   0.95** (0.28)  0.41 (0.44)  0.28 (0.39) 
External Efficacy 
(coded negatively) 
-0.37* (0.14) -0.84*** (0.24) -0.33^ (0.20) 
Year=1988 -0.19 (0.14) -0.13 (0.23) -0.14 (0.20) 
Year=1992 -0.33 (0.14) -0.08 (0.22) -0.03 (0.19) 
Constant -3.54*** (0.33) -5.06*** (0.54) -4.29*** (0.47) 
Observations 1950  1951  1952  
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Pseudo R2 0.16  0.15   0.10  
 
Expressing anger toward the Republican incumbent is positively and 
significantly associated influencing the vote choice of others, attending a political 
meeting or rally and wearing a campaign button or sticker. Figure 3.5 presents the 
effect of anger on the probability of engaging in these activities, broken out by race of 
Democrat.  
 
Figure 3.6: Effect of Anger on Democrats’ Likelihood of Political Action, by Race—
across all years 1980-2004 
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As the figure illustrates, possession of anger toward the Republican incumbent 
makes both white and black Democrats significantly more likely to engage in these 
political activities. In two of the cases, possession of anger not only closes the racial 
participation deficit for blacks, it boosts black participation to the point that it exceeds 
white participation. The motivating impact of anger on these actions makes more 
critical the fact that a greater proportion of blacks than whites are found in the “no 
anger” condition rather than the “anger” condition. 
The results from the 1980-2004 analyses indicate the anger deficit exhibited by 
black respondents has real consequences for their participation relative to whites. Just 
as their general lack of socioeconomic resources relative to whites hinders the 
participation of African Americans, these analyses suggest that blacks’ general lack of 
anger relative to whites also inhibits their participation. It must be noted, however, 
that the anger does not exhibit the same positive influences on participation in the 
2008 analyses. As shown in Tables 3.5 and 3.6 below, anger is only significantly and 
positively related to one form of action—wearing a campaign sticker or button. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 85 
Table 3.5: Logistic Regression Predicting Likelihood of Voting among Democrats, 
200813 
VARIABLES MODEL 1 MODEL 2 
Report of Anger toward 
Incumbent 
-1.31 (1.19)          -14.80 (1540.23) 
Anger*Race of Democrat --     --           14.09 (1540.23) 
Black Democrat -0.42 (0.77)          -14.32 (1540.23) 
Education  1.39 (1.41)             1.37        (1.40) 
Household Income  1.77 (1.57)             1.70*       (1.57) 
Home Ownership  1.64* (0.71)             1.67***        (0.15) 
Unemployed -0.69 (1.21)           -0.81       (1.23) 
Age -5.14* (1.99)           -5.17*        (2.00) 
Female  0.82 (0.67)            0.75        (0.67) 
South -0.56 (0.64)           -0.60       (0.64) 
Interest in Campaign  3.91** (1.22)            3.87***       (1.23) 
Political Knowledge  0.48 (0.65)            0.44       (0.66) 
Strength of Partisanship  2.56* (1.00)            2.57*        (1.00) 
Internal Efficacy  0.31 (1.19)            0.22       (1.18) 
Mistrust -2.25 (1.87)          -2.22       (1.87) 
External Efficacy (coded 
negatively) 
-3.38** (1.27)         -3.34**       (1.28) 
Constant 3.84^ (2.19)        -17.42 (1540.23) 
Observations 422           422  
Pseudo R2  0.32           0.33  
 
                                                 
13 Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<0.10. The variables economic 
evaluation and incumbent disapproval were dropped due to collinearity. 
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In the 2008 analyses, anger is negatively associated with attending a political 
meeting or rally (b=-1.38, SE=0.49). Otherwise, anger produces only null effects, 
including in the domain of voting. In sum, anger is demonstrated to be positively 
associated with various campaign activities for both black and whites between 1980 
and 2004. But anger fails to produce a consistently positive influence on participation 
in the 2008 analyses.  
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Table 3.6: Logistic Regression Predicting Political Activities among Democrats, 
2008 
VARIABLES 
Influencing 
another’s vote choice 
Attending a political  
meeting or rally 
   Wearing a 
campaign 
button/sticker 
Report of Anger 
toward Incumbent 
   0.19 (0.32) -1.38** (0.49)   0.84* (0.41) 
Incumbent 
Disapproval 
  1.77* (0.82) -3.41*** (0.90)  1.44 (1.09) 
Negative Economic 
Evaluation 
-0.65 (0.95) -1.44 (1.35)  0.02 (0.98) 
Black Democrat  0.11 (0.65) -0.95^ (0.56)  0.65** (0.24) 
Education  0.86* (0.41) -0.78 (0.86)  0.33 (0.43) 
Household Income  0.16 (0.51) -0.36 (1.01)  0.17 (0.54) 
Home Ownership -0.21 (0.23) -0.34 (0.47) -0.32 (0.24) 
Unemployed -0.44 (0.42)  0.31 (0.71)  0.30 (0.44) 
Age -0.57 (0.55)  0.49 (1.07)  0.46 (0.58) 
Female  0.46* (0.22) -0.29 (0.45)  0.46 (0.24) 
South -0.48* (0.22) -0.43 (0.46) -0.34 (0.23) 
Interest in Campaign  1.76*** (0.42)  0.69* (0.29)  1.55** (0.48) 
Political Knowledge  0.02 (0.21)  0.54 (0.42)   0.10 (0.23) 
Strength of 
Partisanship 
 0.30 (0.26) -1.05^ (0.55)  0.41 (0.28) 
Internal Efficacy -0.11 (0.35) -1.44 (1.35)  0.44 (0.37) 
Mistrust  0.13 (0.58) -2.49* (1.01) -0.60 (0.62) 
External Efficacy 
(coded negatively) 
-0.17 (0.33) -3.41*** (0.90) -0.58^ (0.35) 
Constant -2.97* (1.33)  6.61*** (1.87) -4.68** (1.58) 
Observations  453  447  453  
Pseudo R2  0.09  0.28   0.10 
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Nevertheless, these analyses yield no racial difference in how anger translates to 
political activity, indicating rejection of H3. Findings from the ANES data suggest that 
black ideological cues inhibit the arousal of anger among black Democrats, without 
inhibiting its mobilizing effect on black participation. These findings conform to the 
first and second pathways. As I have no means of testing the mechanism inhibiting 
anger for black respondents, I cannot say whether this black anger deficit is arising 
subconsciously (consistent with the AI pathway) or consciously (consistent with the 
CAT pathway). But the evidence that the arousal of anger is being impeded among 
black respondents relative to their white counterparts under a common threat is a 
notable one. 
I ran an additional set of analyses to ensure the racial anger deficit uncovered 
here is not simply a proxy for blacks’ general lack of socioeconomic resources, 
efficacy or political engagement relative to whites. First, I ran separate models for 
black and white respondents predicting expression of anger toward the incumbent. 
The results of these models are presented in Table 3.7.  
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Table 3.7: Logistic Regression Predicting Anger toward Republican Incumbents 
1980-2004, for Black and White Democrats Separately14 
VARIABLES         Black Democrats     White Democrats 
Incumbent Disapproval  1.71*** (0.43)  2.53*** (0.21) 
Negative Economic 
Evaluation 
 0.12 (0.56)  0.46 (0.30) 
Education  1.06* (0.53)  0.75** (0.25) 
Household Income     0.80 (0.57)  -0.18 (0.27) 
Home Ownership  -0.19 (0.28)  -0.28^ (0.15) 
Unemployed  0.52 (0.33)    - 0.02 (0.23) 
Age  -1.22* (0.51)  -0.84** (0.26) 
Female  0.20 (0.27)  0.13 (0.13) 
South  -0.35 (0.25)  -0.07 (0.15) 
Interest in Campaign  0.32 (0.35)  0.55** (0.19) 
Political Knowledge  0.33 (0.27)  0.27^ (0.14) 
Strength of Partisanship  0.94^ (0.50)  0.55* (0.26) 
Internal Efficacy     - 0.28 (0.29)  0.22 (0.16) 
Mistrust  1.13^ (0.58)  1.01** (0.32) 
External Efficacy (coded 
negatively) 
 0.35 (0.31)  0.14 (0.17) 
Year=1988  -0.98** (0.32)  -0.80*** (0.16) 
Year=1992  -0.45 (0.32)  -0.81*** (0.17) 
Constant  -2.35** (0.76)  -2.37*** (0.37) 
Observations       417      1535  
Pseudo R2  0.15   0.20  
 
                                                 
14 Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<0.10. The control variable for 
year=2004 was dropped due to collinearity. 
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In addition to the previously examined markers of displeasure with the 
incumbent (incumbent disapproval, and dissatisfaction with the state of the national 
economy over the past year), the same factors that are significant (or marginally 
significant) and positively correlated with expressing anger for black respondents—
political mistrust, education and strength of partisanship—are positively correlated with 
expressing anger for white respondents. Could the racial anger deficit simply be a 
product of blacks not possessing any of these anger-boosting attributes to the same 
degree as whites?  
Independent sample t-tests reveal whites and black respondents to have no 
differences in their levels of mistrust, whereas blacks report stronger partisanship than 
whites. On the other hand, blacks lag significantly behind whites in mean education 
level. Is the racial anger deficit simply a product of disparities in blacks’ possession of 
this anger stimulating resource? The fact that the anger deficit persists when we control 
for the education variable in a multivariate analysis suggests that it is not. To further 
refute this claim, I ran a logistic regression predicting expressions of anger toward the 
incumbent including an interaction term between race of respondent and education 
level. Results are presented in Table 3.8. 
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Table 3.8: Logistic Regressions Predicting Anger toward Republican Incumbents 
1980-2004, including Interactions between Race and Education & Political 
Knowledge15 
VARIABLES             
Race      -0.56* (0.25) 
Race*Educ Interaction       0.61 (0.48) 
Education  0.69** (0.22) 
Political Knowledge  0.29* (0.11) 
Incumbent Disapproval  2.38*** (0.17) 
Negative Economic 
Evaluation 
 0.34 (0.24) 
Household Income     -0.07 (0.23) 
Home Ownership  -0.23* (0.12) 
Unemployed  0.10 (0.17) 
Age  -0.79*** (0.21) 
Female  0.11 (0.11) 
South  -0.23* (0.11) 
Interest in Campaign  0.61*** (0.15) 
Strength of Partisanship  0.60** (0.20) 
Internal Efficacy     - 0.16 (0.13) 
Mistrust  1.08*** (0.25) 
External Efficacy (coded 
negatively) 
 0.15 (0.14) 
Year=1988  -0.68*** (0.13) 
Year=1992  -0.68 (0.14) 
Constant  -2.19*** (0.30) 
                                                 
15 Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<0.10. The control variable for 
year=2004 was dropped due to collinearity. 
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Observations       2214  
Pseudo R2  0.18  
 
The coefficient on respondent race is negative and significant at the 0.05 alpha 
level. But the interaction term between race and education is only slightly larger than 
its standard error. This null result provides assurance that the racial disparity in 
education attained is not the driving force behind the black anger deficit. 
 The final set of analyses addresses a possible alternate explanation for the 
anger deficit findings that deviates from my theoretical contention. Are blacks less 
likely to express anger toward incumbents simply because they are expressing anxiety 
toward them? To answer this question, I ran a logistic regression model identical to that 
used to test hypothesis 2, but with expression of anxiety toward the incumbent as the 
dependent variable. Table 3.9 presents the results of this analysis.  
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Table 3.9: Logistic Regression among Democrats—Reporting Feeling Afraid of 
Republican Incumbent as Dependent Variable16 
VARIABLES           1980-2004              2008 
Black Democrat   -0.15 (0.13)    -0.13 (0.26) 
Incumbent Disapproval  1.98*** (0.18)  2.47*** (0.62) 
Negative Economic 
Evaluation 
 -0.11 (0.22)  0.08 (1.04) 
Education  0.94*** (0.20)  0.99* (0.47) 
Household Income     -0.16 (0.21)  -0.37 (0.58) 
Home Ownership  0.01 (0.11)  -0.37 (0.27) 
Unemployed  0.15 (0.16)  0.55 (0.47) 
Age  -0.85*** (0.20)  -1.95** (0.64) 
Female  0.27** (0.10)  0.71** (0.25) 
South  -0.12 (0.11)  -0.52* (0.24) 
Interest in Campaign  0.32* (0.15)  0.52 (0.44) 
Political Knowledge  0.21^ (0.11)  0.07 (0.24) 
Strength of Partisanship  0.36^ (0.19)  0.47 (0.29) 
Internal Efficacy  0.13 (0.12)  0.24 (0.40) 
Mistrust  0.90*** (0.24)  0.92 (0.64) 
External Efficacy (coded 
negatively) 
 -0.07 (0.13)  -0.92* (0.38) 
Year=1988  -0.66*** (0.13)  -- -- 
Year=1992  0.32** (0.12)  -- -- 
Constant  -2.98*** (0.29)  -1.38 (1.29) 
Observations      2242      467  
Pseudo R2  0.15   0.12  
                                                 
16 Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<0.10. The control variable for 
year=2004 was dropped due to collinearity. 
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The first column of Table 3.9 presents the results from the pooled years 1980 
through 2004, while results from 2008 are displayed in the second column. For both 
time periods, the coefficient on race of respondent is statistically indistinguishable 
from zero, indicating that blacks in the sample are no or more less likely than whites 
to report being made to feel anxious by the incumbent. These models refute the notion 
that African Americans are generally not expressing anger in these contexts of policy 
threat because they are expressing fear. Thus, the possibility remains that the anger 
deficit uncovered here reflects the generally muted emotional response of African 
Americans to policy threats. This paves the way for subsequent studies to examine 
why this muted response is generated. Is it because the threats represent only business 
as usual for blacks? Or is it due to blacks consciously employing ideological 
narratives to nullify the emotion-arousing effects of the threat? 
The preceding sets of analyses uncover strong and robust evidence indicating 
policy threats elicit an emotional response of anger from a significantly smaller 
proportion of blacks than whites. These findings also provide a compelling counter to 
the claims that less blacks express anger because they possess less socioeconomic or 
engagement resources, or that blacks are more likely to feel afraid than angry in 
response to policy threats. Yet there exists another alternate explanation that must be 
addressed. Is it indeed the case that fewer blacks than whites are reporting anger under 
common policy threat climates? Or are fewer blacks reporting being angry despite 
actually feeling anger, due to social desirability concerns? 
The stereotypical images of the menacing, violence-prone “angry black man” 
and the garish, domineering “angry black woman” are prevalent and easily accessible 
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in mainstream American discourse. Such stereotype frames have even been employed 
as prisms through which to view the actions of both Barack (see Cassidy 2012) and 
Michelle Obama (see Nelson 2013), illustrating their relevance to U.S. politics. Could 
black ANES respondents, not wanting to conform to this salient stereotype, 
inaccurately report that incumbents did not make ever make them feel angry when 
indeed they were made to feel angry?  
This may appear to be an intriguing explanation for the racial anger deficit 
uncovered in the analyses. Yet, this explanation does not hold up under careful 
scrutiny. Anger was empirically shown to be positively correlated with political 
activity. Therefore, if a significant portion of blacks who reported feeling no anger 
actually did feel anger, the differences in participation levels between blacks in the 
“anger” column and those in the “no anger” column in Figure 3.5 should not be nearly 
as large in magnitude as they are. Further, the predictors of anger for blacks are 
largely consistent with those for whites, indicating there is no other factor along which 
blacks are uniquely and systematically responding to the anger question.  
Studies across multiple disciplines employing various methodologies to 
explore feelings of anger among blacks tend to find no significant differences between 
blacks and whites in reports of feeling and expressing anger (Mabry and Kiecolt 2005; 
Walley-Jean 2009). Walley-Jean (2009) finds a tendency among black women to 
suppress feelings of anger in immediate contexts triggering their frustration. Whereas 
it seems this finding may corroborate the claim that black ANES respondents are 
suppressing their true feelings of anger toward incumbents when asked, it is more 
likely the case that this anger suppression conforms to the second pathway (see Figure 
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2.6). Once the immediately aroused affect of anger interacts with the predisposition of 
racial resignation invoked by the threat, such anger subsides by the time it is 
consciously manifested. Thus, responding to the survey question by saying one was 
not made angry is indeed an accurate assessment of the emotions the black respondent 
allowed himself to feel whenever provoked by the incumbent, as opposed to a 
fabricated response drudged up so as not to conform to a negative stereotype. 
The notion that fear of conforming to the “angry black” stereotype may 
constrain African Americans’ immediate affective response to cues in their political 
environment should not be dismissed outright. It should be explored in greater depth, 
because it reveals a critical means through which a salient narrative of the black 
American experience moderates the cognitive, affective and behavioral experiences of 
blacks in politically relevant contexts. Nonetheless, the racial anger deficit found here 
appears to not be driven by black respondents’ surface-level social desirability 
concerns when responding to the ANES questions.  
In sum, the findings presented thus far are most consistent with the image of 
African Americans employing a distinct interpretative lens of their political 
environment, which stems their tide of anger over a policy threat, relative to white 
counterparts. Blacks were no more likely than whites to express anxiety under the 
same policy threat contexts, refuting the notion that feelings of anger and anxiety are 
an either-or proposition in response to threat. It is not the case that fewer blacks than 
whites report anger because they are afraid. In the absence of anger or fear, what are 
they feeling? 
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The anger deficit has implications for participation, as expressions of anger are 
positively associated with voting and a host other electoral activities for both whites 
and blacks, but not across all analyses. these findings suggest anger can be viewed 
analogously to socioeconomic and engagement resources from the civic voluntarism 
model; the fact that blacks generally possess anger in smaller measure than whites 
hurts blacks’ political participation relative to whites. 
I now turn to hypotheses and analyses related to race, hope, and policy 
opportunity. To this point African Americans have shown less inclination to express 
anger than whites under contexts of policy threat. Will they show a greater inclination 
to express hope under climates of prospective policy opportunity? I adapt the logistic 
regression analyses employed above to answer this question.  
Again, the primary comparison is between black and white Democratic 
identifiers. Consistent with the designation of hope as a future-oriented emotion state in 
the previous chapter, I shift focus in these analyses from incumbent Presidents in 
election years to Democratic presidential candidates. Among the Democratic identifiers 
in the sample, such candidates should represent the prospect of an agreeable policy 
landscape. Further, that prospect should be salient for Democrats regardless of their 
present policy environment. Hence, I make no theoretical or empirical distinction here 
for the party affiliation of the incumbent and examine all years 1980-2008.17  
Race, Policy Opportunity and Hope—Hypotheses 
In the previous chapter, I introduced the black ideological narrative of salvation, 
which is primed among African Americans when receiving cues of opportunity and 
                                                 
17 Once again, results for 2008 will be presented separately from those from the pooled data set 
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provides motivation for them to act on the opportunity (see Figure 2.8 for a visual 
model of the pathway connecting racial ideology, emotion and action). This concept 
informs my hypotheses regarding the respective influence of policy opportunity cues on 
black and white Democrats. Among Democrats, I expect a greater proportion of blacks 
to report feeling hopeful about the Democratic candidate than whites (H1). Feelings of 
hope expressed by blacks will be mediated by their feelings of optimism regarding the 
future (H2). Finally, expressions of hope will have a stronger positive association with 
political participation for black Democrats relative to white Democrats (H3). 
Race, Policy Opportunity and Hope—Findings 
Hypothesis 1 is tested via multivariate logistic regression analyses conducted on 
the sample of white and black Democrats across all eligible years. The dependent 
variable is the dichotomous measure indicating whether or not the Democratic 
respondent at any point expressed hope for the Democratic candidate. The key 
independent variable is the race of respondent. The control variables included in the 
model are identical to those from the anger analyses, with the addition of one variable—
how the respondent feels the national economy will change in the next year. This 5-
category variable is employed as a measure of respondents’ optimism. It is coded so that 
0 indicates the respondent feels the economy will get significantly worse in the next year, 
and 1 indicates the economy will get significantly better. The results from analyses for 
the period from 1980 through 2004 are presented in Table 3.10. 
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Table 3.10: Logistic Regression among Democrats—Expressing Hope for 
Democratic Presidential Candidates as Dependent Variable, 1980-200418 
VARIABLES              MODEL 1          MODEL 2                         MODEL 3 
Black Democrat      0.27* (0.11)   0.27* (0.11)     0.49* (0.20) 
National Economy 
Forecast 
       --   --   0.39** (0.12)     0.48** (0.14) 
Black Dem*Nat’l 
Economy Forecast 
       -- --   -- --    -0.42 (0.30) 
Incumbent Disapproval  0.45** (0.13)  0.50*** (0.14)     0.51*** (0.14) 
Negative Economic 
Evaluation 
 0.24 (0.18)  0.26 (0.19)     0.26 (0.19) 
Education  0.77*** (0.17)  0.76*** (0.17)     0.76*** (0.17) 
Household Income     -0.26 (0.18) -0.24 (0.18)    -0.25 (0.18) 
Home Ownership  -0.26* (0.10) -0.26** (0.10)    -0.25* (0.10) 
Unemployed  -0.01 (0.14) -0.05 (0.14)    -0.04 (0.14) 
Age  -0.05 (0.16) -0.00 (0.17)    -0.01 (0.17) 
Female  0.23** (0.08)  0.26** (0.09)     0.26** (0.09) 
South  -0.28** (0.09) -0.28** (0.10)    -0.28** (0.10) 
Interest in Campaign  1.03*** (0.12)  1.01*** (0.13)     1.02*** (0.13) 
Political Knowledge  0.31** (0.10)  0.30** (0.10)     0.30** (0.10) 
Strength of Partisanship  1.14*** (0.16)  1.04*** (0.17)     1.04*** (0.17) 
Internal Efficacy  -0.30** (0.10) -0.30** (0.10)    -0.30*** (0.10) 
Mistrust  0.03 (0.20)  0.06 (0.20)      0.06 (0.20) 
External Efficacy   -0.12 (0.11) -0.12 (0.11)     -0.12 (0.11) 
Constant  -0.82** (0.27)  -1.38 (1.29)    -1.07 (0.30) 
Observations      3546      3398    3398  
                                                 
18 Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<0.10. The control variable for 
year=2004 was dropped due to collinearity. Year controls included in analyses but not shown for ease of 
reading. 
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Pseudo R2      0.08    0.09     0.09  
 
The first column of the table shows the model without the optimism variable. 
The coefficient on the key measure—the dichotomous variable for black Democrats—
is positive and statistically significant. As shown in column two, inclusion of the 
optimism variable has virtually no impact on the magnitude and standard error of the 
coefficient for race of respondent. Yet, the effect of the optimism measure is positive 
and significant at the 0.01 alpha level.  
That neither the magnitude nor the significance of the coefficient on black 
Democrats are altered upon inclusion of the forecast variable suggests that optimistic 
economic forecasts do not mediate expressions of hope for either blacks not whites. 
Rather, this measure independently correlates with expression of hope for same-party 
candidates. As shown in Figure 3.7 (presented shortly), when setting all control 
variables at their mean levels, the predicted probability that black Democrats express 
hope toward the same-party candidate is about five percentage points higher than white 
Democrats. 
Also of note in Table 3.10 is the strongly significant positive correlation 
between disapproval of the incumbent and expressed hope for the Democratic 
presidential candidate. Given the greater propensity of black Democrats to express 
disapproval of incumbents relative to their white counterparts, it is possible that this 
measure moderates blacks’ expression of hope for presumptive Democratic presidents. 
Could the black Democrats’ greater likelihood of expressing hope be driven by the 
subset of blacks particularly dissatisfied by the incumbent? In analyses not shown, an 
interaction between incumbent disapproval and respondent race yielded null findings. 
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Apparently, the impact of incumbent disapproval on expression of hope toward the 
Democratic candidate is not differentiated by race.  
  Finally, column three includes an interaction term between race of the 
Democratic respondent and the optimistic economic forecast measure. The value of this 
interaction coefficient is not much larger than its standard error value, indicating there 
is no discernible racial difference in how optimism translates to white and black 
Democrats’ likelihoods of expressing hope toward the same-party candidate. Optimistic 
economic forecasts seem to operate neither as mediators nor moderators of expressions 
of hope.  
This first set of analyses has revealed the same set of black respondents who 
exhibited an anger deficit to exhibit a positive hope differential. This finding provides 
confirmation of hypothesis 1, which stated a greater proportion of black Democrats 
would report hope toward Democratic candidates than their white Democratic 
candidates. Contrary to hypothesis 2, however, expressions of optimism about the 
national economy do not contribute to racial differences in expressions of hope. This is 
apparent despite the fact that black Democrats in the sample generally express greater 
optimism than their white counterparts19. Conceivably, the hope differential exhibited 
by black Democrats in the years 1980 through 2004 should be even stronger in 2008, as 
the object of their affect—Barack Obama—is both a same-party and same-race 
candidate. As table 3.11 reveals, however, this is not the case. 
 
 
                                                 
19 See Figure 6.3 in Appendix for mean economic forecast values for black and white Democrats across 
all years 
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Table 3.11: Logistic Regression among Democrats—Reporting Hope toward 
Democratic Presidential Candidates as Dependent Variable, 200820 
VARIABLES              MODEL 1      MODEL 2 
Black Democrat      0.74 (0.45)  0.71 (0.45) 
Unemployment forecast        --   --  0.11 (0.52) 
Incumbent Disapproval  2.03*** (0.57)  1.91** (0.59) 
Negative Economic 
Evaluation 
 0.65 (1.35)  0.42 (1.77) 
Education  0.33 (0.73)  0.20 (0.74) 
Household Income     -0.21 (0.84)  0.02 (0.85) 
Home Ownership  -0.26* (0.10)  0.16 (0.38) 
Unemployed   -0.41 (0.68 -0.02 (0.79) 
Age    -0.36 (0.89) -0.31 (0.90) 
Female  0.23** (0.08)  0.33 (0.37) 
South  -0.46** (0.37) -0.45 (0.37) 
Interest in Campaign  1.20* (0.59)  1.05^ (0.61) 
Political Knowledge      -0.40 (0.36) -0.32 (0.36) 
Strength of Partisanship  0.45 (0.46)  1.04*** (0.17) 
Internal Efficacy  0.49 (0.60) -0.30*** (0.10) 
Mistrust  -0.14 (0.97) -0.08 (0.99) 
External Efficacy (coded 
negatively) 
 1.11 (0.56)  1.19* (0.57) 
Constant  -1.86 (1.62) -1.66 (2.01) 
Observations       467   456  
Pseudo R2       0.14   0.13  
 
                                                 
20 Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<0.10. The control variable for 
year=2004 was dropped due to collinearity.  
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The first column of Table 3.11 contains the model excluding any measure of 
optimistic forecast for the nation. The magnitude of the coefficient on race of 
Democratic respondent is large, but accompanied by a large standard error. It fails to 
reach significance in even a one-tailed test. The results from this column indicate that 
black Democrats were no more or less likely than their white counterparts to express 
hope for the African American Democratic candidate. 
In the 2008 ANES, the question of how the national economy will fare in the 
next year is only asked to half the sample. As a proxy, this model includes the 
respondents’ opinion of whether nationwide unemployment will rise, fall or stay the 
same in the next year. The variable is coded 0 to 1, with a value of 1 indicating the 
respondent believes unemployment will fall. This variable is included in the second 
column of Table 3.10. Once again, the magnitude and standard error on coefficient for 
respondent race remain virtually unchanged. Also, the coefficient for the 
unemployment forecast variable is much smaller than its standard error.21 Finally, an 
interaction between respondent race and the optimism measure (not shown) produces 
null findings.  
 Why does the positive hope differential among black Democrats seemingly 
erode in 2008? A difference of means test reveals that the mean response of black 
Democrats to the hope question is significantly higher than the mean response of white 
Democrats, suggesting that indeed considerably more black Democrats than white 
Democrats expressed hope toward Obama. The null effect of race in the multivariate 
                                                 
21 In analyses not shown, the model was run with the original national economy forecast variable included. 
This measure also failed to reach conventional significance.  
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analysis must be attributable to inclusion of a variable in the model that co-varies with 
race and subsumes its impact on the dependent variable. 
 I have identified that variable to be the dichotomous measure of respondents’ 
political knowledge, indicated by correctly identifying the party in control of the U.S. 
House of Representatives. Table 3.12 presents the results from the respective analyses 
with the political knowledge variable included and excluded.  
Table 3.12: Logistic Regression among Democrats—Likelihood of Expressing Hope 
toward Democratic Candidate in 2008, Knowledge Excluded22 
VARIABLES 
MODEL 1: 
KNOWLEDGE 
INCLUDED 
                   MODEL 2: 
                KNOWLEDGE 
                  EXCLUDED 
Black Democrat      0.74 (0.45)                 1.09** (0.41) 
Political knowledge      -0.40 (0.36)                   --     -- 
Unemployment forecast       0.11 (0.52)                 0.24 (0.43) 
Incumbent Disapproval  2.03*** (0.57)   
1.68*** 
(0.44) 
Negative Economic 
Evaluation 
 0.65 (1.35)    -0.46 (1.07) 
Education  0.33 (0.73)   0.33 (0.57) 
Household Income     -0.21 (0.84)                0.79 (0.67) 
Home Ownership  -0.26* (0.10)                0.13 (0.30) 
Unemployed  -0.41 (0.68   0.02 (0.60) 
Age  -0.36 (0.89)               -0.49 (0.75) 
Female  0.23** (0.08)                0.22 (0.30) 
South  -0.46** (0.37)              -0.23 (0.29) 
Interest in Campaign  1.20* (0.59)               1.51** (0.46) 
                                                 
22 Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<0.10. The control variable for 
year=2004 was dropped due to collinearity.  
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Strength of Partisanship  0.45 (0.46)               0.73* (0.37) 
Internal Efficacy  0.49 (0.60)               0.41 (0.49) 
Mistrust  -0.14 (0.97)              -0.25 (0.74) 
External Efficacy (coded 
negatively) 
 1.11 (0.56)               0.50 (0.45) 
Constant  -1.86 (1.62)             -1.41 (1.27) 
Observations       467                583  
Pseudo R2      0.14         0.16  
 
The two columns of Table 3.12 present the model with the inclusion and 
exclusion of the political knowledge variable. As shown in the second column, in the 
absence of this measure, the coefficient on race of Democratic respondent increases in 
magnitude and achieves significance at the 0.01 alpha level. Setting all control variables 
to their mean values, the predicted probability of expressing hope toward Obama among 
black Democrats is about seven percentage points higher than the probability among 
white Democrats (see Figure 3.7 below). 
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Figure 3.7: Democrats’ Predicted Probabilities of Expressing Hope for Democratic 
Candidates, with Control Variables at Means 
 
Comparing the remaining variables from the first and second columns reveals 
very few changes to the model result from exclusion of the political knowledge variable. 
Further, the standard error for the political knowledge measure is almost as large as the 
coefficient. Finally, the pseudo R2 is larger is larger in the model excluding the 
knowledge measure. This indicates that excluding the measure leads to a model that 
provides a stronger predictor of the dependent variable over a null model. 
The fact that inclusion of the political knowledge variable completely erases the 
impact of race on the dependent variable suggests African American Democrats’ 
expression of hope toward Obama in 2008 is mediated by their political knowledge. 
Sobel-Goodman mediation tests, however, reveal that the indirect effect of black 
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Democrats’ knowledge on their likelihood of expressing hope is indistinguishable from 
zero. So this particular empirical test does not confirm what the naked eye observes 
from the analyses. What could explain this apparent entanglement between race, 
knowledge and expression of hope in 2008?  
One possible explanation is that the Obama presidential campaign generally 
motivated African Americans to pay heightened attention to politics. Black enthusiasm 
over the prospect of an Obama presidency therefore translated to increased knowledge 
of politics. And in the 2008 analyses, the effect of the enthusiasm translating to 
increased knowledge is the seemingly mediating effect of knowledge on blacks’ 
likelihood of hope expressions.  
While plausible, this account is not born out empirically. Comparing the 
proportions of black Democrats who correctly identified the majority party in the 
House in the 2008 ANES to the proportion that answered correctly in the 1980-2004 
ANES reveals virtually no change.  About 40% of black respondents answered 
correctly between 1980 and 2004, compared to around 41% in 2008. The difference is 
actually found among white Democrats. Between 1980 and 2004, about 56% of white 
Democrats correctly identified the House majority party. In 2008, only about 50% of 
white Democrats gave a correct answer. Could the apparent decline in political 
knowledge among white Democrats plausibly reflect a decline in their enthusiasm over 
the prospect of an Obama presidency relative to blacks? And could this differential 
account for the observed relationship between race, knowledge and hope? In the 
absence of clear means of testing these claims, I cannot move beyond speculation.  
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Thus far, the pooled analyses from 1980 through 2004 provide evidence in 
support of the claim that when faced with a common cue of policy opportunity, African 
Americans are more likely to express hope than whites. The 2008 analyses provide 
weaker support for this hypothesis, with a racial effect only detectable in the absence of 
the political knowledge measure. Both sets of analyses illustrate black and white 
respondents’ hope expressions to be independent from their optimistic economic 
forecasts, contradicting hypothesis 2.  
The remaining analyses test Hypothesis 3, examining whether expressing hope 
is positively associated with increased political action—particularly among African 
Americans. As with the anger tests, I ran a series of logistic regression analyses with 
various forms of political activity as the respective dependent variables, and expression 
of hope toward the Democratic candidate as the key independent variable. Table 3.13 
below presents only the findings for the hope variable, for both the 1980-2004 and 
2008 data.23 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
23 These analyses included all control variables listed in Table 3.12 
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Table 3.13: Logistic Regressions Predicting Political Activities among Democrats, 
1980-2004 
 
Action 
Hope  
Effect 
  
Hope*Race 
 
1980-
2004 2008 
   1980 
  -2004   2008 
Voting in 
presidential election 
 0.04 
(0.44) 
-1.35 
(0.95) 
    0.70* 
  (0.33) 
      -10.64 
  (1055.00) 
Influencing others’ 
vote choice 
 0.33* 
(0.13) 
 0.17 
(0.29) 
  -0.10 
  (0.34) 
         1.06 
        (1.21)                
Attending political 
meeting/rally 
 0.38  
(0.23) 
-1.52*** 
(0.39) 
  -0.20 
  (0.52) 
         0.54 
        (1.52) 
Wearing 
button/sticker 
 0.17 
(0.20) 
 0.23 
(0.39) 
  -0.51 
  (0.44) 
        -0.48 
        (1.05) 
 
Expressing anger toward incumbents was found to be positively associated with 
various forms of political activity among Democrats. As Table 3.13 illustrates, hope 
exhibits far less consistent effects. In the data from 1980-2004, expressing hope toward 
the Democratic candidate is positively and significantly associated with only one of the 
four political activities examined—attempting to influence someone’s vote choice. As 
shown in the second column, expressing hope actually decreases Democrats’ likelihood 
of attending a political meeting or rally in 2008.   
The third and fourth columns of Table 3.12 present the interaction terms for 
hope and race of Democrat. This interaction reaches two-tailed significance for voting 
in the 1980-2004 data. Could this positive effect be indicative of the distinctly 
motivating hope effect for the participation of African Americans, as hypothesized? 
The difference in the predicted probabilities of voting between white and black 
Democrats who report hope for a Democratic candidate with all other variables at their 
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means amounts to about 4.5 percentage points. This difference serves as the only 
indication that hope exerts a stronger mobilizing effect for the black Democrats in the 
sample relative to the white Democrats.  
So overall, hope fails to produce a mobilizing effect on participation that is on 
par with the demonstrated effects of anger. This finding is consistent with prior 
literature, which finds threat cues are stronger motivators of political action than cues 
of opportunity (see Miller and Krosnick 2004). Additionally, the data provide very little 
evidence that hope produces unique mobilizing effects for blacks. African American 
Democrats appear to possess a positive hope differential relative to their white 
Democratic counterparts, but that differential does not translate to substantially more 
political activity. 
 Overall, this set of analyses invokes an image of the relationship between 
race, hope and political action that seems less certain, less definitive, and less 
potentially impactful than the relationship emerging from examinations of race, anger 
and action. Under common conditions of prospective policy opportunity, do 
significantly more African Americans express hope than whites? Under certain 
conditions, yes. Does hope translate to increased likelihood of engaging in political 
action? With the exception of voting, no. Does the apparent hope differential exhibited 
by African Americans carry the potential to be as critical a concept within future 
studies of black political behavior as their anger deficit? The evidence from ANEs data 
casts doubt on that possibility.    
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Summary: Implications and Arising Questions 
Analyses of the ANES paint a picture of African Americans as generally being 
both less prone to anger and more prone to hope relative to whites. Being less prone to 
anger places blacks at somewhat of a participatory disadvantage relative to whites, and 
blacks’ disposition towards hope fails to overcome that disadvantage.  
These analyses are certainly not without limitations, including the inability to 
explore emotional responses outside of the four designated emotions, and an inability to 
pinpoint more precise conditions of policy threat and condition for respondents. 
Nevertheless, the findings yielded from the examinations are largely consistent across 
varied time periods, and generalizable to the national population, thus effectively 
heralding a call for modification to extant understanding of the impact of policy threat 
on individuals’ affect and behavior.  
In essence, these findings reveal that race matters. Race plays an influential role 
in the cognitive and affective processing of changes to one’s political environment. In 
particular, race constrains the emotional response of African Americans to cues of 
policy threat, consistent with the first and second pathways discussed in the previous 
chapter. Importantly, no evidence suggests that the race differences uncovered here are 
simply capturing differences in efficacy between whites and blacks.24 This lends 
credence to my contention that the black ideological narratives informing their 
worldview condition the affective responses of African Americans to cues of change in 
the policy environment.  
                                                 
24 In analyses not shown, I ran Sobel-Goodman mediation tests to determine whether efficacy and trust 
measures mediate the effect of race on respondents’ emotional responses the incumbents. All results were 
null.  
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The findings presented here raise a number of important questions that drive 
future examinations deriving from this work. Among them is the question of what 
emotional response African Americans feel in lieu of either anger or anxiety when 
confronted with the prospect of policy threat. Aforementioned research has connected 
political anxiety to coping behaviors. Could the coping posture of blacks reflect their 
genuine feelings of anxiety in threatening environments, despite their self-reports? Or is 
it the case that blacks are indeed getting angry, yet their anger is transferred more 
diffusely than whites, and thus not captured in these kinds of empirical examinations? 
Whereas whites may direct anger over their political environment toward specific 
institutions and actors in that environment, blacks direct their anger toward more 
broadly at the system itself.  
The implications for participation should remain largely unchanged if this is the 
case. Targeting specific actors should provide whites with a greater sense of control, 
thus fueling their participation. In contrast, blacks should feel less sense of control over 
the entire sociopolitical system itself, thus inhibiting their action. Regardless of the 
implications for behavior, the actual emotions felt by African Americans in the face of 
threats needs to be determined. The following two chapters present the design and 
results from a survey experiment I created to gain more leverage on these key issues. 
But the experiments reveal racial differences manifesting in an entirely different 
manner than they manifest from the ANES analyses, thus raising even more questions 
that inform future work the development and refinement of a theory of racialized 
responses to policy change cues. 
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Chapter 4  
Study 2: Overview of Experiment Data 
In this chapter, I present details regarding the design and administration of an 
experiment conducted on a sample of adults living in the Detroit metro area from May 
2013 through May 2014. In total, 139 whites and 148 blacks are included in the sample. 
Evidence from analyses of survey data in Chapter 3 provide evidence that racial cues 
constrain blacks emotional responses to policy change cues. Policy threat conditions 
provoked a significantly greater proportion of whites than blacks to express anger, 
whereas policy opportunity conditions made a greater proportion of blacks express hope 
relative to whites. The experiment was designed to press further into this racial dynamic 
by exposing white and black subjects to treatments designed to be cues of either policy 
threat or opportunity, then inviting them to take a variety of actions in response to the cue. 
Additionally, the experiment measures subjects’ emotional responses to the cue, and their 
attitudes on the responsiveness of the local political elites to their opinion on the issue.  
This experimental study is designed to allow for more in-depth exploration of the 
theoretical model by providing subjects with more concrete and definitive cues of 
potential threat and opportunity in a relevant policy domain. Additionally, the experiment 
allows for examination of a greater range of emotional responses to policy change cues 
than that allowed by the survey data.  
 The administration of the experiment was not without its challenges. The 
Detroit metro area is host to a bevy of unique demographic, socioeconomic and political 
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characteristics that interact to pose significant barriers to the data collection. Factors 
ranging from high segregation to a prevailing area-wide sense of fatigue with political 
incompetence and corruption at the local level to a weakened political infrastructure 
resulting in outdated archives of registered voter addresses all contributed to my 
encountering many difficulties recruiting subjects for participation in what was only an 
approximately 15 minute survey. Survey recruitment included sending invitations to 
mailing lists of registered voters, advertising in local newspapers, and entering local area 
churches, universities and workplaces with invitations to take the survey. 
Working through these challenges ultimately yielded a sample of African 
American subjects that was significantly older, more religious, more attentive to local 
news and more politically trusting and efficacious than the white sample. Nevertheless, 
empirical tests reveal that black and white subjects’ reported emotions and actions across 
the treatment conditions remain virtually unchanged upon inclusion of the demographic 
variables as controls. The robustness of the treatment effects to the inclusion of the 
demographic and social characteristics indicates that the experimental treatments are 
indeed influencing subjects’ attitudes, feelings, and behavioral stances independent of the 
social characteristics that vary from whites to blacks in the sample. 
In the next section, I describe the treatments and experiment questionnaire. I then 
review my expectations for the experiment, describe the data in greater detail and 
highlight the analyses I employ to test those expectations. Finally, I present the key 
preliminary findings from the analyses, and discuss their implications for my theory of a 
racialized model of affective response to policy change. 
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Experiment Design 
I first describe the treatments, before discussing the pre- and post- treatment 
questionnaires.25 In total, there are three treatment conditions: 
1. Control 
2. Policy Threat 
3. Policy Opportunity26 
 
The treatment takes the form of variations of a political flyer believed to be 
authentic by the subjects. All of the treatments address the same issue—a proposed plan 
to privatize the Detroit Water and Sewerage Department (DWSD). As of the time of this 
writing, the privatization plan is actually in discussion to become a reality. Proponents of 
the plan assert that privatization will reduce longstanding inefficiencies, which will better 
streamline water service, and lower rates. Opponents, on the other hand, decry 
privatization as a job-killer for local workers and argue such a move will lead to lax 
standards that make water less safe.  
I followed the example of Miller and Krosnick (2004) in making the treatments 
address an issue of potential relevance to the subjects that is actually being deliberated in 
their policy environment. With actual political goods at stake, ranging from the safety of 
subjects’ water and its cost to their concerns over government efficiency and local 
employment, subjects were expected to elicit authentic emotional responses to the flyers, 
                                                 
25 See Appendix for all of the treatments, and the questionnaire. 
26 Originally, there were three threat conditions and three opportunity conditions. The treatment 
for the “threat (or opportunity) + racial prime” condition contained alterations of the wording and imagery 
intended to prime subjects’ racial group identification (e.g. inclusion of a picture either a black or white 
family). The treatment for the “threat (or opportunity) + narrative” condition contained altered text intended 
to invoke either the narrative of subjugation (e.g. inclusion of the text “here we go again…”) or the 
narrative of salvation (e.g. “we’ve finally got somebody on our side”). Due to these manipulations not 
changing how subjects responded to neither the threat nor opportunity condition, and the smaller numbers 
of people grouped across these conditions, I collapsed these conditions into the broader “threat” and 
“opportunity” conditions. See Appendix for the treatments for all of the original conditions. 
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and make decisions regarding what political action they would realistically take on the 
issue. This method strikes me as yielding more credible responses form subjects than a 
design that asks them to produce reactions to a hypothetical situation.27  
The issue of water in the Detroit area is contentious. For years, residents have 
complained about paying exorbitant rates and receiving inefficient service. Whereas one 
may expect that a proposal to overhaul the organization providing the service would be 
universally heralded, the proposal to shift authority over water service to a private firm 
operating outside the state of Michigan has drawn the ire of many. The notion that local 
residents would be dependent on forces outside of the city for a valued service reinforces 
in the minds of many the notion that local residents are steadily losing their control over 
the collective destiny of their community (Duran 2014; Gullien 2014). This tension 
between the desire for better water service and the demand for continued control over 
local resources has made the DWSD privatization issue particularly divisive. Accordingly, 
I expected to tap into authentic emotions among subjects due to the use of this issue in 
the treatments. 
All of the flyers comprising the treatments purport to be from citizen advocacy 
groups, and all highlight the potential privatization of the DWSD. The control flyer 
provides a pair of arguments made by proponents of the privatization alongside two 
arguments made by its opponents. The control flyer encourages people to gather more 
information about the privatization from a nonpartisan policy group specified on the flyer.  
The threat flyers emphasize three negative possible consequences of the privatization: 
loss of local jobs, increased risk to subjects’ water, and even higher water bills. This 
                                                 
27 To ensure the issue represented a relevant threat or opportunity to subjects, I limited the population to 
people living within the geographic bounds of the DWSD. This includes residents of Wayne, Macomb and 
Oakland Counties in southeast Michigan. 
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content is accompanied by imagery of people with dour expressions. In contrast, the 
opportunity flyers emphasize three positive potential consequences of the change: 
elimination of wasteful government spending, improved water quality standards and the 
smallest increases to water bills in decades. This content is accompanied by imagery of 
people with cheery demeanors. I strove to echo as accurately as possible in the flyers the 
pro and con arguments actually used by advocates on either side of the issue, while also 
maintaining a conceptual parity in the relative strength of the threat and opportunity 
arguments in the treatments.  
The pre- and post-test questionnaire consists almost entirely of close ended 
questions with five-response categories adapted from the text of the ANES and the 2001-
2003 National Survey of American Life. To stem the risk for acquiescence bias, I avoided 
using the strongly disagree to strongly agree response items, opting instead for not at all 
likely to extremely likely where relevant. The pre-test questions ask about subjects’ 
general senses of external efficacy and political trust, as well as their senses of system 
blame and how fairly they believe American society has treated people from their 
background. 
Two questions from the post-test questionnaire invite subjects to take immediate 
action on the DWSD privatization. They are invited to add their name to a letter either 
favoring or opposing the privatization, which they are told will be sent to the state 
legislature. This represents the type of direct immediate action expected by conventional 
literature to be associated with anger over the issue). Additionally, subjects are invited to 
provide an email or mailing address to receive more information on the privatization 
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form a non-partisan group. This is an example of the information seeking action typically 
associated with anxiety.28  
Subjects are also asked to report the degree to which they felt the following 
emotions, ranging from not at all to extremely: angry, anxious, concerned, delighted, 
distressed, enthusiastic, frustrated, hopeful, motivated, optimistic, outraged, relieved, and 
worried. In addition, questions are posed gauging subjects’ senses of efficacy related to 
the particular issue of the DWSD privatization (e.g. how likely it is that politicians care 
about what people like you think about this issue?). Finally, subjects are asked a standard 
battery of demographic and social characteristic questions, ranging from frequency of 
church attendance to education level. In total there are 33 questions, taking most subjects 
around 10 to 15 minutes to complete. 
Expectations 
Due primarily to the small size and non-representativeness of the sample, I 
hesitate to view this experiment as more than a pilot study. While precluding definitive 
tests of hypotheses, this study allows me to explore emergent trends and consider their 
implications for the burgeoning theory, as well as inform future iterations of the study 
that will contain larger and more representative samples.  
I am foremost interested in exploring the following factors. Are there significant 
racial differences in the emotions subjects report feeling over the issue of DWSD 
privatization? The ANES data yielded such differences, as black respondents were found 
                                                 
28 In addition to these immediate actions, subjects are asked to report the likelihood that they engage in the 
following actions in the future: discussing the DWSD plan with others, attending a meeting or forum on 
DWSD, and contacting a public official about DWSD. Analyses in which subject responses to these 
questions are the dependent variable yielded similar results to those in which the immediate action 
questions are the dependent variables. Due to the overlap between these questions and the immediate action 
questions, and the fact these questions measure only intended action as opposed to actual actions taken, the 
empirical examinations focus only on the immediate actions subjects can take within the survey. 
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to be less likely to report anger and more likely to report hope than their white 
counterparts under common policy conditions. Will the experiment yield the same trends, 
which would constitute further evidence supporting the first two threat racial pathways 
(see Figures 2.5 and 2.6), as well as the racial opportunity pathway (Figure 2.8)? 
Alternately, I will examine whether there are racial differences in how the various 
reported emotion states—particularly anger—associate with the types of action subjects 
are invited to take on the issue. The ANES data uncovered no racial differences in how 
anger associated with political activity, and one instance in which race influenced the 
association between hope and activity (in the domain of voting). Will the experiment 
corroborate this finding? Or will it yield evidence in support of the third racial pathway 
(see Figure 2.7), which models how racial resignation dampens the mobilizing influence 
of anger on blacks’ political participation? 
Finally, I will explore detectable racial differences in whether subjects are more 
mobilized by exposure to the policy threat treatment or the policy opportunity treatments. 
Uncovering evidence that black and white subjects differ in their participatory 
responsiveness to the respective treatments illuminates the implications of the racial 
differences in emotional responses to policy change cues. If anger—through whatever 
mechanism—is not the mobilizing force for blacks that it is for whites, then the policy 
threat cues so prevalent in American political discourse (see Chapter 1 for examples) may 
be ineffective at propelling African Americans to action. 
Description of the Data 
In order to maximize both the parsimony and theoretical richness of the analyses, 
I used confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to categorize the multiple emotion variables 
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into five proposed constructs. I originally proposed constructs relating to the core 
emotion states designated in conventional literature: angry, composed of the items angry, 
frustrated and outraged; anxious, composed of the items anxious, distressed, concerned, 
and worried; satisfied, composed of the items delighted, enthusiastic and relieved; and 
finally hopeful, comprising optimistic and hopeful. 
Table 4.1 below presents the factor loadings from CFA with varimax rotation. 
Component loadings for three of the four originally proposed constructs far exceed the 
conservative cut-off point of 0.40. The items for angry and satisfied in particular load 
very strongly, indicated high validity for each of proposed constructs. In contrast, the 
components of hopeful load considerably weaker.  
Table 4.1: Emotion Variables—Obliquely rotated component loadings and 
communalities based on principal components analysis with varimax rotation 
COMPONENT ANGRY ANXIOUS CONCERNED SATISFIED HOPEFUL 
Outraged 0.82     
Frustrated 0.80     
Angry 0.79     
Anxious  0.58 0.39   
Distressed  0.57 0.37   
Concerned  0.39 0.57   
Worried  0.38 0.57   
Delighted    0.78 0.23 
Enthusiastic    0.74 0.23 
Relieved    0.68 0.21 
Optimistic    0.54 0.43 
Hopeful    0.34 0.40 
      
n 352 344 344 337 337 
Eigenvalues 1.92 1.82 0.07 2.41 0.11 
% of total 
variance 
1.15 1.19 0.05 0.95 0.23 
# of measures 3 2 2 3 2 
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Of significant interest is the emergence of another negative emotion construct—
one composed of items that were expected to load onto anxious, yet appear to be 
empirically distinct from that emotion state. This construct is labeled concerned, 
composed of the items concerned and worried. As subsequent analyses show, this 
emotion influences the activity of black subjects in unanticipated and intriguing ways.  
Because the variable for signing the letter is both immediate and an assertive 
action, it serves as the key dependent variable to determine the effect of the treatment on 
activism through making respondents angry (or hopeful, in the case of my expectation 
regarding African Americans). Accordingly, the variable for signing up for more 
information (or information seeking) allows me to test for the presence of the 
conventional relationship between an emotion state of anxiety (or perhaps concern) and 
seeking information to clarify one’s political position.  
I shift focus now to providing illustrative descriptions of the sample. Figure 4.1 
on the following page presents comparisons of the mean levels of the black and white 
samples on several key demographic and social characteristics. 
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Figure 4.1: Subjects’ Mean Levels of Demographic Factors, by Race of Subject 
(variables coded 0 to 1)2930 
 
As the wide margins denote, black sample subjects are significantly more 
educated and civically engaged than their white counterparts. These differences are most 
likely due to the fact that a majority of black subjects were drawn from churches in the 
Detroit metro area. In contrast, the majority of white subjects were drawn from a local 
area college. More racial differences emerge when comparing black and white subjects’ 
respective mean reported levels of political efficacy and trust, presented in Figure 4.5 
below. 
 
 
 
                                                 
29 *denotes difference significant at 0.05 alpha level. ^ denotes difference significant at 0.10 alpha level. 
30 Notes: Average age of black subjects: 40/white subjects: 23. Both black and white subjects report mean 
income in range of 45,000-55,000. As of 2011, median household income in was $45,981.  
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Figure 4.2: Political Engagement & Worldview Variables, by Race of Subject31 
 
Relative to white subjects, black subjects report higher levels of political 
efficacy—operationalized as the belief politicians care about their opinion, and people 
like them have say in government affairs. Additionally, blacks’ mean level of reported 
trust in government is marginally higher than that of whites, but the difference of three 
points is almost negligible. All of these results run counter to expectations based on 
scholarly understanding of racial attitudes (e.g. Aberbach and Walker 1970), thus 
underscoring how unique both samples are relative to the actual population. These unique 
results suggest the churches from which black subjects were drawn play a central role in 
socializing them to believe they have a vital voice in local political operations. 
Turning to comparisons of generalized life outlooks, the only significant racial 
difference is found in subject reports of how fairly American society has treated people 
from their background. As expected, the mean report by black subjects is considerably 
                                                 
31 Treated fairly= “How fairly would you say American society has dealt with people from your 
background?” Life chance= “How big of a problem is it if some people have more of a chance in life than 
others?” Blame ppl=” If people don’t do well in life, how much are they to blame themselves?” 
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lower than that for whites—a difference of nearly 30 points. While this finding may 
provide corroboration of the aforementioned narrative of black subjugation, the preceding 
comparisons seem to indicate the blacks in this sample exhibit more than resilience in the 
face of this acknowledged subjugation, but also a sense of confidence in their ability to 
transcend it and participate effectively in politics. I expect this confidence to manifest in 
higher reports of positive emotions among black subjects in relevant contexts, as well as 
strong associations between such positive emotion and willingness to engage in political 
action among black subjects. I also acknowledge the possibility that this apparent 
political confidence may manifest in blacks exhibiting emotions and participation 
patterns no different from their white counterparts.  
The remaining sets of figures provide greater insight into the characteristics of the 
sample, presenting the racial homogeneity and general economic condition of the 
neighborhoods in which respondents live, the personal age and household income 
distributions of respondents, and finally, the distributions of respondents taking the 
survey online versus on paper, and recruited from the local area college. 
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Figure 4.3: Racial Composition of Black Subjects’ Zip Codes 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Racial Composition of White Subjects’ Zip Codes 
 
Reflecting the high degree of racial segregation in the Detroit metro area, both 
sets of subjects live in neighborhoods that are overwhelmingly occupied by people of the 
same race, according to the 2010 census (Figures 4.3 and 4.4 above). 
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Figure 4.5: Median Income of Black Subjects’ Zip Codes 
 
 
Figure 4.6: Median Income of White Subjects’ Zip Codes 
 
The median incomes of subjects’ zip codes also reflect the economic stratification 
of the area (Figures 4.5 and 4.6). Just over half (51%) of white subjects live in in areas 
with median household incomes considerably higher than the state average. In contrast, 
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nearly half (47%) of black subjects live in areas with median household incomes 
considerably lower than the state median.  
 
Figure 4.7: Distribution of Household Income among Black Sample 
 
Figure 4.8:  Distribution of Household Income among Black Sample 
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Despite this neighborhood-level distinction, the distribution of subjects’ personal 
incomes are quite similar (Figures 4.7 and 4.8), offering further indication of the 
uniqueness of the black sample.  
 
Figure 4.9: Age Distribution of Black Sample 
 
 
Figure 4.10: Age Distribution of White Sample 
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Also of note is the difference in age distribution of the subjects. Virtually all of 
the white subjects are 30 years old or younger, consistent with the fact that many are 
recruited from a college community. Among black subjects, there is far greater parity 
across age levels. It is plausible the varying age distributions among the samples can have 
impact on the results, because the prospect of DWSD privatization should be of greater 
concern to older people who hold the bulk of bill paying or maintaining a household. 
 
Figure 4.11: Proportion of Home Owners among Black Sample 
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Figure 4.12: Proportion of Home Owners among White Sample 
 
 
Figure 4.13: Percentage of Black Sample Recruited from Local College 
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Figure 4.14: Percentage of White Sample Recruited from Local College 
 
 
 
Figure 4.15: Proportion of Black Sample taking Survey Online or on Paper 
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Figure 4.16: Proportion of White Sample taking Survey Online or on Paper 
 
The substantive variations in factors such as age, education level, and home 
ownership across race lines makes possible an outcome in which differences in subjects’ 
responses to the treatment are varying not along the main variable of interest (their race), 
but rather, along one or more of these variables.32 To ensure that these social and 
demographic variables do not pose potential barriers to my identification of genuine race 
effects in subjects’ responses to the treatment, I ran OLS analyses for each race 
separately. In the first set of analyses, the full slate of social and demographic 
characteristics, as well as the efficacy and trust measures, are regressed on subjects’ 
reported emotion (see Table 4.2). In the second set, these variables are regressed on 
subjects’ responses to the participation questions (Table 4.3). 
 
                                                 
32 Of course, controlling for these variables in multivariate analyses—which I do in the next chapter—
isolates the effect of race on subjects’ responses to treatments. But the recent wave of experimental work 
emphasizes the importance of analyzing and evaluating treatment effects in the absence of controls (see 
Imai, Keele, Tingley and Yamamoto 2011) 
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Table 4.2: OLS Regression—Effect of Demographic and Social Characteristics on 
Reported Emotions, by Race of Subject 
 ANGRY ANXIOUS CONCERNED SATISFIED HOPEFUL 
         
 BLACK WHITE BLACK WHITE BLACK WHITE BLACK WHITE BLACK WHITE 
           
EDUCATION 
  -0.20^ 
 (0.12) 
-0.00 
 (0.13) 
-0.02 
 (0.10) 
 0.07 
 (0.12) 
-0.07 
 (0.12) 
-0.10 
 (0.13) 
  -0.15^ 
  (0.08) 
-0.12 
 (0.12) 
  -0.46** 
  (0.13) 
-0.20 
 (0.17) 
           
INCOME 
   0.12^ 
 (0.07) 
 0.07 
 (0.05) 
 0.10 
 (0.06) 
 0.04 
 (0.05) 
 0.05 
 (0.07) 
 0.11 
 (0.06) 
 0.02 
 (0.05) 
-0.01 
 (0.05) 
 -0.00 
  (0.08) 
   0.16* 
 (0.07) 
           
AGE 
 0.26 
 (0.17) 
-0.31 
 (0.26) 
 0.19 
 (0.15) 
-0.17 
 (0.26) 
 0.13 
 (0.18) 
  -0.47^ 
 (0.28) 
-0.03 
 (0.11) 
 0.25 
 (0.25) 
 0.08 
 (0.18) 
 0.22 
 (0.36) 
           
OWNHOME 
-0.06 
 (0.06) 
 -0.02 
  (0.07) 
-0.09 
 (0.05) 
-0.01 
 (0.07) 
 0.02 
 (0.07) 
 0.03 
 (0.07) 
 -0.02 
  (0.04) 
-0.01 
 (0.06) 
 -0.01 
 (0.07) 
-0.09 
 (0.09) 
           
PARTYID 
 0.09 
 (0.09) 
-0.08 
 (0.07) 
 0.12 
 (0.07) 
-0.03 
 (0.07) 
 0.08 
 (0.10) 
0.01 
(0.07) 
   0.11^ 
 (0.06) 
 0.04 
 (0.07)  
 0.04 
 (0.09) 
-0.03 
 (0.10) 
           
CHURCH 
ATTEND. 
-0.02 
(0.09) 
0.11^ 
(0.06) 
-0.01 
(0.08) 
  0.16* 
(0.06) 
0.03 
(0.09) 
0.03 
(0.07) 
  0.15* 
(0.06) 
  0.13* 
(0.06) 
0.17^ 
(0.09) 
0.08 
(0.09) 
           
LOCAL NEWS 
 0.01 
 (0.09) 
  0.05 
 (0.07) 
 0.07 
 (0.07) 
-0.08 
 (0.07) 
 -0.07 
  (0.09) 
 0.02 
 (0.08) 
-0.06 
 (0.06) 
-0.10 
 (0.07) 
0.08 
 (0.09) 
-0.07 
 (0.10) 
           
OFF’LS CARE 
 0.02 
 (0.13) 
 0.05 
 (0.11) 
 0.01 
 (0.11) 
 0.02 
 (0.11) 
 0.06 
 (0.13) 
 0.14 
 (0.12) 
-0.07 
 (0.08) 
 0.10 
 (0.11) 
 0.09 
 (0.14) 
 0.15 
 (0.15) 
           
SAY IN GOVT. 
 0.14 
 (0.13) 
 0.10 
 (0.09) 
-0.03 
 (0.11) 
 0.09 
 (0.09) 
-0.01 
 (0.13) 
-0.05 
 (0.10) 
-0.09 
 (0.09) 
 0.14 
 (0.09) 
 0.05 
 (0.13) 
 0.25 
 (0.13) 
           
TRUST IN 
GOVT. 
  -0.29^ 
 (0.15) 
 0.04 
 (0.10) 
-0.11 
 (0.13) 
 0.08 
 (0.10) 
-0.08 
 (0.16) 
 0.11 
 (0.11) 
 0.16 
 (0.10) 
 0.01 
 (0.10) 
-0.03 
 (0.16) 
 0.03 
 (0.14) 
           
FAIR 
BACKGROUND 
 0.04 
 (0.13) 
-0.08 
 (0.08) 
   0.20^ 
 (0.11) 
-0.08 
 (0.08) 
 0.03 
 (0.13) 
-0.16* 
(0.08) 
-0.04 
 (0.09) 
-0.05 
 (0.07) 
 0.01 
 (0.14) 
-0.15 
 (0.10) 
           
LIFE CHANCE 
 0.12 
 (0.11) 
-0.11 
 (0.08) 
 0.04 
 (0.09) 
-0.07 
 (0.08) 
  0.21^ 
(0.12) 
 -0.03 
 (0.08) 
  -0.14^ 
 (0.07) 
 0.05 
 (0.08) 
 0.00 
 (0.11) 
 0.07 
 (0.11) 
           
BLAME PPL 
-0.07 
 (0.13) 
-0.00 
 (0.11) 
-0.11 
 (0.11) 
-0.00 
 (0.11) 
 -0.12 
  (0.13) 
 -0.00 
 (0.12) 
-0.07 
 (0.09) 
 0.12 
 (0.11) 
 0.12 
 (0.13) 
 0.24 
 (0.15) 
           
CONSTANT 
 0.11 
 (0.13) 
 0.31 
 (0.14) 
-0.02 
 (0.14) 
0.19 
(0.14) 
 0.23 
 (0.17) 
 0.46* 
 (0.15) 
   0.20^ 
 (0.11) 
-0.07 
 (0.14) 
 0.20 
 (0.16) 
-0.01 
 (0.20) 
           
N 111 122 111 118  113   122 110 122 113 122 
           
ADJ. R2 0.03 -0.00 0.05 -0.01 -0.05   0.06 0.15 0.05 0.11 0.07 
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As Tables 4.2 and 4.3 reveal, none of the observed variables exert consistent, 
significant effects across the dependent variables of interest. The only conventionally 
significant effect for education level is to make black subjects less likely to report 
hopefulness. Church attendance produces two positive and significant associations with 
white subjects’ emotions on DWSD, boosting both their anxiety and their satisfaction.  
Table 4.3: OLS Regression—Effect of Demographic and Social Characteristics on 
Reported Actions, by Race of Subject 
 LETTER SIGNING INFO. SEEKING 
   
 BLACK WHITE BLACK WHITE 
     
EDUCATION 
-1.01 
 (1.03) 
-1.35 
 (1.43) 
  1.95^ 
 (1.05) 
 0.42 
 (1.93) 
     
INCOME 
 -0.62^ 
 (0.64) 
 0.07 
 (0.58) 
 0.22 
 (0.65) 
 0.37 
 (0.98) 
     
AGE 
   3.06^ 
 (1.58) 
 2.83 
 (2.84) 
 1.17 
 (1.51) 
0.97 
(3.65) 
     
OWNHOME 
  -1.23* 
 (0.60) 
 -0.03 
  (0.70) 
 0.19 
 (0.57) 
1.67 
(1.10) 
     
PARTYID 
 0.69 
 (0.76) 
-0.36 
 (0.74) 
-0.18 
 (0.77) 
 1.01 
 (1.26) 
     
CHURCH ATTEND. 
 0.65 
 (0.81) 
  0.21 
 (0.68) 
 0.03 
 (0.81) 
-0.66 
 (1.13) 
     
LOCAL NEWS 
-1.19 
 (0.74) 
-0.69 
 (0.78) 
 0.16 
 (0.80) 
-1.53 
 (1.17) 
     
OFF’LS CARE 
  -2.72* 
 (1.20) 
-1.26 
 (1.21) 
-0.32 
 (1.17) 
 0.82 
 (1.65) 
     
SAY IN GOVT. 
-0.95 
 (1.17) 
 0.58 
 (1.02) 
 0.52 
 (1.16) 
  2.84^ 
 (1.47) 
     
TRUST IN GOVT. 
   3.46* 
 (1.37) 
 1.03 
 (1.13) 
 0.64 
 (1.36) 
 -4.21* 
 (2.07) 
     
FAIR BACKGROUND 
-0.91 
 (1.17) 
-0.36 
 (0.80) 
 0.64 
 (1.22) 
-0.91 
 (1.28) 
     
LIFE CHANCE 
 0.14 
 (0.96) 
-0.21 
 (0.83) 
   2.35* 
 (1.06) 
 1.82 
 (1.38) 
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BLAME PPL 
-1.60 
 (1.15) 
 0.97 
 (1.17) 
 0.78 
 (1.13) 
 2.05 
 (1.79) 
     
CONSTANT 
 0.69 
 (1.38) 
-0.54 
 (1.53) 
-5.05 
 (1.54) 
  -4.87  
 (2.52) 
     
N 119 123 118 123 
     
ADJ. R2 0.15  0.06 0.11  0.19 
 
Table 4.3 reveals only one instance in which the variable for home ownership 
exerts an effect that is significant at the 0.05 alpha level—with black home owners less 
likely than non-home owners to add their name to the letter to the state legislature.  Aside 
from a marginally significant negative association with reporting feelings of concern 
among white subjects, age exerts no discernible impact on emotions or actions. Exposure 
to local news fails to associate with any of the emotions or participation variables.  
Turning to the efficacy, trust and general attitude variables that make up the 
bottom half of Table 4.2, there are virtually no associations between these measures and 
subjects’ reported emotions. The lone exception to this is the conventionally significant 
and negative relationship between believing American society has treated people from 
the subject’s background fairly and reporting concern, among whites. More significant 
effects are present in Table 4.3, especially among the government trust variable. Yet, no 
clear patterns of influence emerge for any of these variables.   
In sum, these OLS regressions reveal an absence of strong, clear patterns of 
influence from any of these social, demographic and attitude measures on subjects’ 
responses to the emotion and participation prompts This gives me confidence that despite 
the significant (and in some cases, non-representative) differences between the black and 
white samples in the study, analyses can indeed yield measurable treatment effects that 
vary by race rather than the characteristics held in unequal measure by each racial group.  
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Summary: Setting the Stage for Empirical Tests 
Due to the limitations of data collecting, the samples of white and black adults 
yielded by the process are in many ways unique from the general populations from which 
they were drawn. Nevertheless, the preliminary investigations presented in this chapter 
indicate that these differences will not preclude race from being a determinant factor in 
how subjects respond to the treatment conditions. The higher than average education, 
political trust and efficacy levels of the African American sample should make it more 
difficult to ascertain measurable race differences in the empirical analyses. Hence, the 
race differences that do materialize in the next chapter provide particularly strong 
verification of the existence of a racial divide in how people process and respond to cues 
of policy threat and opportunity. 
 Confirmatory factor analysis of the data uncovered the presence of a negative 
emotional state that falls outside of the conventional negative affect spectrum of anger 
and fear. Analyses in the next chapter reveal this emotion, labeled concerned, to 
primarily exhibit influence on the participation of black subjects.  
 The experimental treatments to which subjects are exposed directly and 
explicitly communicate policy change cues to them. The survey instrument invites 
subjects to take immediate political action on the policy in question. Additionally, 
subjects report a wide range of affective responses to the treatment. These three factors 
allow for precise and direct examinations of the relationship between exposure to cues of 
policy threat and opportunity, emotional responses to those cues, and the participation 
decisions associated with those emotions.  
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In the next chapter I present the results from a set of empirical examinations 
employed to make those precise tests. The methods range from simple t-tests to structural 
equation modeling (SEM), and together they begin to paint a complex and intriguing 
picture illustrating the role of race in shaping individuals’ emotional and behavioral 
responses to cues of policy change. 
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Chapter 5  
Study 2: Analyses of Experiment Data 
This chapter presents and discusses the findings from the survey experiment. 
Analyses range from comparisons of means across treatment conditions to structural 
equation modeling (SEM) and robustness checks. Recall from the previous chapter that 
analyses of the data will examine three key areas: whether racial differences emerge in 
subjects’ reported emotions across threat and opportunity conditions (relating to the first 
and second pathways), whether racial differences emerge in which emotions—
particularly anger and hope—stimulate action among subjects (relating to the third and 
fourth pathways), and whether racial differences emerge in subjects’ participatory 
responsiveness to the threat and opportunity treatments. 
 The SEM methodology allows me to simultaneously measure the effect of the 
treatments on subjects’ reported emotions, and the effect of those reported emotions on 
subjects’ participation. This means of analysis is rooted in my expectation that the 
primary pathway through which the treatments influence subject participation on DWSD 
privatization is through engendering one or more emotional responses to the issue. SEM 
allows me to examine if the emotions engendered in response to the treatments are indeed 
associated with greater likelihood of action, as well as if the treatments stimulate action 
among subjects independent of their effects on subjects’ emotions. Figure 5.1 below 
illustrates the logic behind the structural equation models. 
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Figure 5.1: Proposed Path Diagrams Illustrating Influence of Treatments on Subject 
Participation 
 
As indicated by the arrows, there are two ways through which the respective 
policy change treatments are expected to influence subjects’ participation on DWSD 
privatization. Primarily, I expect the cues to influence action by engendering certain 
emotions. These engendered emotions in turn influence the subjects to take action. 
Hence, the primary impact of the treatments on subject participation is indirect, through 
arousing particular emotions. But as the curved arrows indicate, in addition to this 
indirect effect, the treatments may also exert direct effects on subjects’ participation, net 
of their effects on emotions.  
Structural equation modeling allows me to examine both the indirect effects of the 
treatments on subject participation—through the emotions they arouse—as well as the 
effects of the treatments on subject participation independent of those emotions. Further, 
this methodology allows me to pinpoint where racial differences emerge in the translation 
of policy cues to political participation. Evidence that white subjects in the threat 
treatment—but not black subjects—are more likely to report anger would indicate the 
racial difference emerges in the arrow connecting the threat cue to anger. This racial 
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difference would have implications for participation only if anger is shown to be 
positively associated with action taking among both black and white subjects. This is 
precisely the account indicated by the ANES analyses in Chapter 3 (and conforming to 
the first and second pathways discussed in Chapter 2). Black respondents were less likely 
than white respondents to report anger, and this anger deficit had implications for a racial 
participation gap because reported anger boosted political activity among both blacks and 
whites. 
Alternately, the evidence could indicate that both white and black subjects are 
more likely to report anger in the threat condition, yet such reported anger is positively 
associated with action for white subjects, but not for black subjects. The racial difference, 
therefore, would be evident in the arrow connecting anger to action. That anger indeed 
arises in response to policy threat cues but does not translate to action among blacks 
would conform to the third racial pathway. 
The same logic holds true for the effects of opportunity on subject participation. 
The racial difference may emerge in black subjects being more likely than white subjects 
to report hope from the opportunity condition. But this difference only has implications 
for racial participation differences if hope bolsters action among both sets of subjects. 
Alternately, both whites and blacks may be more likely to report hope in the opportunity 
condition, yet hope is positively associated with action only for blacks. The ANES data 
produced evidence that black respondents were more likely than whites to express hope 
under conditions of policy opportunity. The evidence on whether hope was a mobilizing 
force—particularly for African Americans—was more mixed. 
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Overall, the experimental findings indicate no evidence of racial differences in 
subjects’ reports of anger in the threat condition or hope in the opportunity condition, 
contradicting the results of the ANES analyses. The arrows connecting the treatments to 
the emotions are similar for each group. Yet, significant racial differences are present in 
which emotions stimulate action among subjects. These differences in turn suggest 
possible racial variation in whether subjects are more responsive to the threat or 
opportunity treatments.  
 Across most SEM specifications, the anger aroused among white subjects in 
the threat condition was strongly and positively correlated with action. In contrast, the 
anger reported among black subjects in the threat condition produced null effects on 
participation. This finding provide support of the third pathway (see Figure 2.7), which 
posits racial cues inhibit the mobilizing effect of anger on action for African Americans. 
In contrast, reported hope among subjects in the opportunity condition produces 
null effects on participation for both black and white subjects, with one exception. In the 
presence of attitude and efficacy measures, hope stimulates participation for white 
subjects. Thus, whereas the ANES data provided mixed results on racial differences and 
hope, the experiment produced no evidence in support of my claims. Interestingly, among 
black subjects, there is a significant, positive association between reporting satisfaction 
over the DWSD privatization and taking immediate action on the issue. Among white 
subjects, on the other hand, no such association between satisfaction and participation is 
present.  
This chapter proceeds first with presentation and discussion of the trends 
emergent from observation of mean comparisons across treatment conditions. This paves 
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the way for the various specifications of SEM models. The chapter concludes with 
discussion of how the findings—both that conform to my claims and that surprised me—
further the development of a model of racialized responses to policy change cues. In 
particular, I grapple with arising and lingering questions and concerns, and begin to chart 
out the future steps that will build on the insight gained through this process.  
Mean Comparisons: Observing Treatment Effects on Attitudes, Emotions and 
Behavior 
The initial set of figures present the mean effects of the treatments on subjects’ 
opinions on the DWSD privatization, as well as their feelings of external efficacy specific 
to the issue. As illustrated by Figures 5.2 and 5.3 below, the treatments generally have the 
intended effect on whether subjects support or oppose the proposed DWSD 
privatization.33 Figure 5.3 displays the results for black subjects, and Figure 5.3 presents 
the results for white subjects. 
                                                 
33 The opinion variable is coded 0 to 1, with 0 indicating the subject strongly opposes the privatization 
(consistent with the threat flyer, which opposes the privatization), and 1 indicating strongly favoring 
privatization (consistent with the opportunity flyer). 
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Figure 5.2: Black Subjects’ Views on DWSD, by Condition34 
 
 
 
                                                 
34 These figures present the mean responses of subjects on each of the indicators.  
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Figure 5.3: White Subjects’ Views on DWSD, by Condition 
 
For black subjects, approval in the control condition hovers right around the 
midpoint, which indicates they neither approve nor favor the DWSD privatization. 
Approval drops 20 points for blacks in the threat condition, and rises 13 points for black 
in the opportunity condition. White subjects in the control condition sit just beyond the 
midpoint at 0.54. White approval of DWSD privatization drops 12 points from the 
control to the threat condition, and rises just seven points from the control to the 
opportunity condition. 
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The treatments’ apparent influences on subjects’ attitudes and efficacy on the 
issue reveal a mixed bag.35 For both subject groups, reporting that the DWSD issue will 
turn out as they want it to is actually highest in the threat condition. Black subjects 
generally believe the DWSD privatization is more important than white subjects, and 
exposure to the threat condition only increases this sentiment among African Americans, 
as indicated by the nine point differential between threat and control. Among blacks, 
there appear to be no distinguishable differences across treatments in reports that officials 
care what people like them think about the DWSD issue, nor for reports of how much 
influence they have on the issue. Whites in the threat condition are more pessimistic 
about the likelihood public officials care about their opinion on DWSD, indicated by the 
nine-point differential between control and threat. Meanwhile, exposure to either 
treatment condition is associated with a slightly increased likelihood that whites believe 
they have influence on the issue, indicated by the 5-6 point differentials. 
 The patterns evident from observations of the mean effects are confirmed by 
the results of simple ordinary least squares (OLS) analyses regressing the treatment 
effects on each of the DWSD opinion and efficacy variables. As shown in Table 5.1, the 
threat condition is strongly and positively associated with both black and white subjects 
reporting opposition to the privatization (as indicated by the negative sign on the 
respective coefficients). The effect is slightly larger for blacks, indicated by their 
respective coefficient sizes. The opportunity treatment, however, exhibits only a 
marginally positive association with supporting the privatization, and this effect is only 
present for black subjects (p=0.07). White subjects in the opportunity condition are no 
                                                 
35 Outcome: how likely is it this issue turns out the way you want it to? Importance: how important is this 
issue to you? Officials care: how likely is it that officials care about the opinion of people like you on this 
issue? Influence: How likely is it that you are able to influence politicians on this issue? 
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more likely to support the privatization than white subjects in the control condition. This 
absence of a treatment effect on white opinion can be attributed to the fact that the mean 
opinion of whites in the control condition is tilted toward support of the privatization, 
whereas the mean opinion of black subjects in the control is essentially neutral. 
 
Table 5.1: Effect of Treatments on DWSD Atittudes by Race, No Controls36,37 
 OPINION OUTCOME IMPORTANCE OFF’LS CARE MY INFLUENCE 
  
         
 BLACK WHITE BLACK WHITE BLACK WHITE BLACK WHITE BLACK WHITE 
THREAT 
  -0.19** 
(0.06)  
-0.12* 
(0.06) 
 0.10^  
(0.05) 
0.08 
(0.05) 
0.08 
(0.06) 
 0.00 
(0.05) 
 0.00 
 (0.05) 
-0.09 
 (0.05) 
 0.02 
 (0.06) 
-0.04 
 (0.05) 
OPP. 
  0.14^ 
 (0.07) 
 0.07 
 (0.07) 
 0.07 
 (0.06) 
 0.05 
 (0.06) 
-0.01 
 (0.07) 
-0.08 
 (0.06) 
-0.01 
(0.06) 
-0.01 
 (0.06) 
0.00 
(0.06) 
 0.02 
 (0.06) 
 
Surprisingly, in all but one case the threat and opportunity treatments produce null 
results for belief the DWSD issue will turn out as subjects want, importance of the 
DWSD privatization, belief public officials care what subjects think about the issue, and 
how much influence they have on the issue of DWSD privatization. The lone exception is 
the positive effect of the threat condition on black subjects’ belief that the privatization 
will turn out as they want, which falls short of two-tailed significance (p=0.07). That such 
factors prove robust to exposure to the treatment conditions suggests the cues of policy 
change do not influence subjects’ feelings of efficacy related to the change. Rather, those 
feelings of efficacy likely mediate the emotional response to the cue. Analyses presented 
later provide evidence suggestive of this mediating effect. 
                                                 
36 In this and all subsequent regression tables, the respective dependent variables from each simple model 
are listed along the top row, with the independent variables listed in the far left column. 
37 *=p<0.05, **=0<0.01, ***=p<0.001. Standard errors below each coefficient in parentheses. 
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Figures 5.4 and 5.5 below present the mean emotion levels across condition for 
black and white subjects, respectively 
Figure 5.4: Black Subjects’ Mean Emotion Levels across Conditions 
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Figure 5.5: White Subjects’ Mean Emotion Levels across Conditions 
 
Relative to African American subjects in the control condition, blacks in the 
threat condition report what seem to be substantively higher levels of each of the negative 
emotion states—anger, anxiety and concern. The differential between threat and control 
is 17 points for anger, 12 points for anxiety, and 11 points for concern. White subjects in 
the threat condition also report more anger relative to those in the control, but the 
differential is a much smaller seven points. The differential for anxiety is an even smaller 
three points. And whites in the threat condition report slightly less concern than those in 
the control. On the whole, black subjects, despite the preponderance of evidence 
(presented in the previous chapter) indicating they come from a sample with 
uncharacteristically positive orientations toward the political system, express all 
measured negative emotions at an apparently higher rate than white subjects when 
exposed to cues of policy threat.  
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 Exposure to the opportunity treatment appears to engender positive emotions 
more effectively for black subjects than white subjects. Among blacks, the differential 
between the opportunity and control conditions is nine points for satisfaction, and seven 
points for hope. For whites in contrast, the opportunity treatment fails to engender greater 
reports of positive emotions relative to the control. The mean satisfaction report for white 
subjects in the opportunity condition is four points less than the mean report in the 
control. Meanwhile, just one point separates whites’ mean hope levels in the control and 
opportunity conditions. But the opportunity condition appears to notably reduce white 
subject’s reports of negative affect. The differential between the control and opportunity 
conditions is 9 points for anger, 5 points for anxiety, and 23 points for concern. 
 Regressing the treatment conditions on subjects’ reported emotions across race 
provides confirmation of the patterns on display in the mean comparisons. See Table 5.2 
for the results below. 
 
Table 5.2: Effect of Treatments on Emotion by Race, No Controls 
 ANGER FEAR CONCERN SATISFIED HOPEFUL 
      
 BLACK WHITE BLACK WHITE BLACK WHITE BLACK WHITE BLACK WHITE 
THREAT 
  0.16** 
(0.06)  
0.07 
(0.05) 
 0.11* 
(0.05) 
0.03 
(0.05) 
0.08 
(0.06) 
-0.01 
 (0.05) 
-0.06 
(0.04) 
 -0.12* 
 (0.05) 
-0.02 
 (0.06) 
 -0.12* 
 (0.06) 
OPP. 
-0.04 
 (0.06) 
-0.09^ 
(0.05) 
  -0.02 
(0.06) 
-0.06 
 (0.05) 
-0.01 
 (0.07) 
  -0.19** 
(0.06) 
0.03 
(0.05) 
-0.04 
(0.05) 
0.07 
(0.06) 
-0.01 
 (0.07) 
 
As the table indicates, if there is a racial deficit in subjects’ likelihood of 
responding with anger to the threat condition, the deficit is possessed by white subjects. 
The association between exposure to the threat and reporting anger is strong and positive 
among black subjects, and only null among white subjects. This finding is in stark 
  
 150 
contrast to the main finding from the ANES data. This finding contradicts the first and 
second race pathways (see Figures 2.6 and 2.7), which posit race cues will inhibit the 
arousal of anger among black subjects in the threat condition. The possibility remains that 
the experiment conforms to the third pathway, wherein the anger reported among black 
subjects does not increase their likelihood of adding their name to the DWSD letter. 
Also running counter to my expectations is the apparent failure of the opportunity 
treatment to increase reports of hope among either set of subjects, let alone African 
Americans. In Chapter 2, I laid out the expectation that the influence of the black 
ideological narrative of salvation would cause policy opportunity cues to have 
disproportionately stimulating effects on the participation of African Americans. The 
failure of the opportunity treatment to arouse hope among black subjects casts serious 
doubt on that proposition. 
  I turn now to comparing black and white subjects’ respective mean rates of 
participation on the DWSD issue across the treatments, shown in Figures 5.5 and 5.6. 
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Figure 5.6: Black Subjects’ Participation, by Condition 
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Figure 5.7: White Subjects’ Participation, by Condition 
 
Across all conditions and both forms of participation, black subjects generally 
exhibit a higher likelihood of taking action than whites. Mean black participation rates 
generally hover between 0.3 and 0.5, with white rates generally between 0.1 and 0.4. 
Again, this is likely due to the distinct characteristics of the sample. The black sample 
possesses more of the engagement resources associated with political participation, thus 
alleviating the costs of action for them relative to the white sample (Rosenstone and 
Hansen 1993; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995). 
Notably, black subjects appear to be most likely to engage in action in the threat 
condition. This enhanced participation should cast a major blow to my expectations 
should subsequent analyses reveal the threat treatment to be indirectly mobilizing black 
subjects through making them angry. Consistent with the expectations of extant literature, 
the opportunity condition does not appear to stimulate participation for either group as 
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effectively as the threat condition. This constitutes another apparent departure from my 
expectations, as my models posit the opportunity condition will be a greater mobilizer for 
black subjects than the threat condition. 
Once again, the patterns indicated by the mean comparisons are confirmed by the 
results of logistics and OLS regression analyses. As revealed by Table 5.3 below, 
regressing the treatment condition on participation paints a more definitive picture of the 
absence of a direct effect of the treatments on subjects’ action taking on DWSD. For both 
subject groups, the treatment effects fail to meet the threshold for significance in even a 
one-tailed test. 
Table 5.3: Effect of Treatments on Participation Across Race, No Controls 
 
LETTER WRITING 
SEEKING 
INFORMATION 
     
 BLACK WHITE BLACK WHITE 
     
THREAT 
0.62 
(0.47) 
0.82 
(0.55) 
0.26 
(0.50) 
-0.40 
 (0.65) 
    
OPPORTUNITY 
0.36 
(0.52) 
0.06 
(0.65) 
0.00 
(0.55) 
-0.81 
 (0.82) 
 
The absence of direct effects of the treatments on subjects’ participation does not 
mean the treatments are completely without impact. It is likely the case that the primary 
influence of the treatments on subjects’ participation is through the respective emotions 
they arouse. So the SEM analyses will paint a more accurate picture of the influence of 
the treatments on subjects’ actions.  
Figures 5.8 and 5.9 below display the respective mean rates of adding one’s name 
to the letter for black and white subjects whose reported emotion falls below the 
midpoint, and those whose reported emotion falls above the midpoint on the respective 
emotion scales. This display allows me to ascertain whether an increase in each 
  
 154 
respective emotion appears to be positively or negatively associated with the direct 
immediate form of participation. 
Figure 5.8: Black Subjects’ Mean Rates of Letter Signing across Emotions 
 
 
Figure 5.9: White Subjects’ Mean Rates of Letter Signing across Emotions 
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The figures suggest that anger exerts a stronger mobilizing effect on direct action 
among black subjects relative to white subjects. But blacks appear to be just as mobilized 
by the negative emotions of anxiety and concern as they are by anger. Further, hope 
seems to exert no discernible mobilization effects for either subject group. But these 
apparent differences are statistically indistinguishable from zero, limiting their 
instructiveness. To effectively discern the influence of subjects’ reported emotions on 
their political activity requires regression analysis.  
Figures 5.10 and 5.11 display the mean rates of information seeking for those 
below and above the midpoint for each emotion.  
 
Figure 5.10: Black Subjects’ Mean Rates of Information Seeking across Emotions 
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Figure 5.11: White Subjects’ Mean Rates of Information Seeking across Emotions 
 
A near mirror image emerges between black and white subjects. Among black 
subjects, all emotions appear to be positively related to seeking information. Among 
whites, all but one emotion—concern—appear to be either negatively or negligibly 
related to seeking more information on DWSD privatization.  
Logistic and OLS analyses regressing the emotion states on the participation 
variables reveal effects not easily discernible from observing the mean comparisons. 
Results of the regressions are presented in Table 5.4 below. 
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Table 5.4: Effects of Emotions on Participation Across Race, No Controls 
 LETTER  
WRITING 
SEEKING  
INFO 
   
 BLACK WHITE BLACK WHITE 
     
ANGRY 
   3.00^ 
 (1.79)  
 3.91* 
(1.71) 
 -2.72^ 
 (1.62) 
 0.61 
 (2.40) 
    
ANXIOUS 
-1.44 
 (1.68) 
   -1.35 
(1.63) 
  1.30 
 (1.53) 
  -0.46 
 (2.38) 
     
CONCERNED 
 2.14^ 
(1.12) 
  -1.54 
(1.312) 
  3.92** 
 (1.19) 
-1.26 
  (1.88) 
     
SATISFIED 
  3.59* 
(1.63) 
1.24 
(1.32) 
 -1.31 
 (1.33) 
1.19 
(1.67) 
     
HOPEFUL 
-0.20 
 (1.15) 
1.13 
(1.13) 
  1.35 
 (1.11) 
1.46 
(1.51) 
 
The regression analyses reveal anger, concern, satisfaction, and hope exhibiting 
influence on participation in distinct ways for black and white subjects. For white 
subjects, anger works precisely as predicted by conventional literature. As indicated by 
the coefficient of 3.91, which is more than twice as large as the standard error, anger is 
strongly and positively associated with taking immediate action on DWSD. 
Anger also exhibits an apparently large positive effect on black subjects’ 
immediate action. But this positive effect is only marginally significant (p=0.09), falling 
short of the conventional two-tailed test.  
The state of concern appears to positively influence both forms of immediate 
action, but only for African American subjects. For black subjects in the information 
seeking model, the coefficient on concern is more than three times larger than the 
standard error. Concern has by far the strongest positive association with black subjects’ 
information seeking. Concern also marginally increases black subjects’ likelihood of 
taking immediate action on DWSD (p=0.06), although its coefficient places it behind 
anger in magnitude of influence. Concern exhibits null results for whites in both 
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participation models. This finding necessitates further the effort to better understand the 
meaning and role of concern for African Americans.  
The regressions indicate only a few instances in which either positive emotion—
satisfaction and hopefulness—have empirically discernible effects on subjects’ 
participation. Among black subjects, reported feelings of satisfaction over the DWSD 
privatization have a strong, positive association with taking up immediate action. The 
coefficient on satisfaction indicates the mobilizing effect of satisfaction for blacks is only 
slightly smaller in magnitude than the mobilizing effect of anger for whites. In this case, 
satisfaction plays the role I expected to find for hope, which exhibits no relationship with 
action. Hope has null associations with both forms of participation for both sets of 
subjects. 
The striking observation from these simple regression analyses is the distinction 
in the respective influences on black and white subjects’ immediate action taking on the 
DWSD issue. Anger is apparently the sole mobilizer of immediate action for whites in 
the sample. For African Americans, anger (as well as concern) serves as a weaker 
mobilizer, while satisfaction appears to be the strongest motivator of immediate action 
among blacks.  
I did not anticipate the present-oriented emotion of satisfaction to elicit any 
racially distinct influence on participation. Yet as the SEM analyses reveal, satisfaction 
largely plays the mobilizing force for black subjects that my model posits hope should 
play. This raises many questions for my model and subsequent tests of it. Has my 
theoretical contention overstated the impact of future-oriented emotions such as hope and 
overlooked the importance of present-oriented emotions for African Americans? 
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Alternately, are the results for satisfaction and hope reflecting measurement issues? The 
hope construct, after all, did load considerably weaker than the other emotion constructs. 
In sum, the preliminary observations of the experimental data yield the following 
overarching patterns. Neither the threat nor opportunity treatments manage to elicit strong 
or consistent direct impacts on the participation of black and white subjects relative to the 
control. Yet they do manage to elicit distinct emotional responses from the subjects 
relative to the control. White subjects generally follow the patterns laid out by 
conventional literature; the emotion state with the strongest positive effect on their 
immediate action is anger. Black subjects do not appear to depart from conventional 
expectations in all the ways I anticipated. Exposure to the threat treatment strongly 
engenders anger among black subjects, contradicting the findings of Chapter 3. And 
blacks appear to be motivated to take action not by feelings of hope, but rather feelings of 
anger, concern, and most strongly, feelings of satisfaction.  
Proposing structural equation models that estimate the direct and indirect effects 
of the treatments and emotions on subjects’ immediate action taking on DWSD provides 
more clarity into how blacks and whites in the sample respond distinctly to the cues of 
policy threat and opportunity in their political environment. The models, presented and 
discussed in the following section, do provide some evidence corroborating the existence 
of racialized distinctions in subjects’ emotional and behavioral responses to policy cues. 
Results from SEM Analyses 
The SEM analyses reveal suggestive evidence that exposure to the threat 
condition mobilizes—albeit indirectly through the emotions it engenders—white subjects 
more effectively than black subjects. There is considerably weaker support for the claim 
  
 160 
that exposure to the opportunity condition more effectively mobilizes black subjects than 
white subjects—again, indirectly through the emotional responses generated by the 
treatment. Across various model specifications, anger—which is effectively aroused 
among both black and white subjects in the threat condition—emerges as the emotional 
state most consistently animating immediate action among whites. In contrast, 
satisfaction—which is only weakly aroused by the opportunity condition—consistently 
motivates action among blacks across specifications. Results for both sets of subjects are 
altered only slightly upon inclusion of demographic and life stage controls such as age, 
gender, education level, and home owner status. On the other hand, inclusion of attitude 
and efficacy variables such as governmental trust and belief that public officials care 
about subjects’ opinion on DWSD leads to results that depart from those yielded by other 
specifications. This model specification reveals suggestive evidence of mediating effects 
for the attitude and efficacy measures. 
 For each model specification, I first present the direct effects of each treatment 
on subjects’ reported emotions. These treatment effects provide further leverage on the 
question of whether there is a racial difference in anger reported by subjects exposed to 
the threat treatment and hope reported by subjects exposed to the opportunity condition. 
Recalling Figure 5.1, this inquiry explores if racial differences manifest in the arrow from 
the treatment to the subjects’ reported emotions.  
I proceed to show the direct effects of the threat cue and each emotion on 
subjects’ actions. This set of results provides insight in my second area of exploration—
whether racial differences emerge in whether emotions engendered by the threat cue 
(particularly anger) are subsequently associated with greater likelihood of participation 
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among subjects. These results examine racial differences both in the arrow leading from 
the emotion to action, and the arrow flowing directly from the treatment to action. 
Following this set of findings is presentation of the indirect and total effects of 
threat on subjects’ actions for each emotion state. These findings shed light on the final 
question of whether racial differences exist in subjects’ participatory responsiveness to 
the policy threat treatment. Those differences will largely reflect the indirect effects of 
the treatments, through the emotions they arouse among black and white subjects.  
Presentation of the direct and indirect effects of the opportunity treatment follow. 
Again, I am first examining whether racial differences emerge in the impact of the 
opportunity cue on subjects’ reported emotions. I then will examine whether there are 
racial differences in which emotions aroused by the opportunity treatment associate with 
greater participation. Based on comparisons of the direct and indirect effects of the 
opportunity treatment on subjects’ emotions, I draw inferences about the responsiveness 
of both black and white subjects to this type of policy cue. 
Finally, I present path diagrams displaying the impact of the treatments on 
subjects’ reported emotions, and those emotions’ subsequent influence on participants’ 
actions. The path diagrams illustrate the direct and indirect influence of the treatments on 
subject participation, illuminating the potential differences in subjects’ responsiveness to 
each.  
The first model specification includes no control variables, isolating the direct and 
indirect treatment effects on subjects’ reported emotions and actions. Table 5.5 below 
displays the direct effects of the threat and opportunity treatments on subjects’ reported 
emotions.  
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Table 5.5: Structural Model Parameters—Direct Effects of Threat and Opportunity 
Conditions on Reported Emotions by Race, No Controls 
 ANGRY ANXIOUS CONCERNED SATISFIED HOPEFUL 
         
 BLACK WHITE BLACK WHITE BLACK WHITE BLACK WHITE BLACK WHITE 
           
THREAT 
 0.18*** 
(0.05) 
 0.14*** 
(0.04) 
 0.11** 
(0.04) 
 0.08* 
(0.04) 
 0.10* 
(0.05) 
 0.11** 
(0.04) 
 -0.07* 
 (0.03) 
 -0.11** 
 (0.04) 
 -0.05 
 (0.05) 
 -0.11** 
 (0.04) 
           
OPPORTUNITY 
 -0.16* 
 (0.05) 
-0.15** 
(0.04) 
 -0.09* 
 (0.05) 
 -0.08* 
 (0.04) 
 -0.12* 
 (0.05) 
 -0.18** 
 (0.04) 
  0.07^ 
 (0.04) 
  0.07 
 (0.04) 
  0.08 
 (0.05) 
  0.09^ 
 (0.05) 
 
The threat treatment in this model influences all emotions in the expected 
direction. And with the exception of hopefulness for black subjects, the influence of the 
treatment on reported emotions is significant at the 0.05 alpha level. Based on this direct 
effects table, exposure to the threat condition engenders more anger among black subjects 
than white subjects, producing evidence rejecting the first two racial pathways. Subjects’ 
race does not appear to inhibit the arousal of anger in response to the threat. 
 The opportunity treatment alleviates both black and white subjects’ feelings of 
anger, anxiety or concern, and all effects are empirically distinguishable from zero. Yet, 
the treatment manages to exhibit only marginally positive effects on subjects’ positive 
emotions, as black subjects report slightly more satisfaction (p=0.052) and whites report 
slightly more hope (p=0.07). Overall, both treatments are shown to be effective 
influencers of subjects reported emotions—particularly their negative emotions. 
 I turn now to examining the direct impact of the threat treatment on subjects’ 
participation, as well as the impacts of the emotions aroused by the threat cue. Table 5.6 
below displays the direct effects both of the threat condition and each reported emotion 
on subjects’ likelihood of adding their name to the advocacy letter on DWSD (the direct 
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immediate action) and signing up to receive more information on DWSD (immediate 
information seeking). 
 
 
Table 5.6: Structural Model Parameters—Direct Effects of Threat and Reported 
Emotions on Subject Participation by Race, No Controls 
 LETTER  
SIGNING 
SEEKING  
INFORMATION 
     
 BLACK WHITE BLACK WHITE 
     
THREAT 
 0.01 
(0.10) 
  0.15^ 
(0.09) 
  0.07 
  (0.10) 
0.04 
(0.06) 
     
ANGRY 
 0.46 
 (0.34) 
 0.69* 
  (0.33) 
  -0.57^ 
 (0.33) 
 0.02 
 (0.24) 
     
ANXIOUS 
-0.24 
 (0.32) 
  -0.31 
(0.32) 
 0.32 
 (0.32) 
-0.06 
 (0.23) 
     
CONCERNED 
  0.42^ 
 (0.24) 
  -0.29 
(0.23) 
     0.72** 
 (0.23) 
-0.11 
 (0.16) 
     
SATISFIED 
  0.72* 
 (0.31) 
0.37 
(0.27) 
-0.15 
 (0.31) 
 0.21 
 (0.19) 
     
HOPEFUL 
-0.06 
 (0.23) 
0.27 
(0.22) 
 0.28 
 (0.23) 
 0.17 
 (0.16) 
     
N 109 125 109 125 
     
χ2 
  217.73 
 p=0.00 
  239.15 
  p=0.00 
   217.73 
   p=0.00 
  239.15 
 p=0.00 
     
RMSEA    0.44 0.43    0.44 0.43 
 
The direct effect of the threat treatment on letter signing for white subjects has a 
marginally positive coefficient (p=0.09). This is the only instance in which the treatment 
condition exhibits a direct effect on subject participation that approaches empirical 
verifiability. In contrast, the coefficient on the direct of threat for black subjects is a 
fraction of its standard error. Comparing the respective direct effects of the threat cue on 
white and black subjects’ willingness to take up direct immediate action on DWSD is 
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noteworthy, because it provides suggestive evidence of whites conforming to the 
expectations of conventional literature, while giving no indication that African 
Americans also comport in the same manner.  
The direct effects of reported emotions on subjects’ actions further illuminate 
racial differences. For whites, anger is the only emotion that exhibits a significant 
association with signing the letter, and the magnitude of the coefficient on anger is 
substantively large. Meanwhile for African Americans, the effect of anger on signing the 
letter is null. For this group, concern exhibits a marginally positive effect on letter signing 
(p=0.07). But it is satisfaction that has the strongest positive association with anger for 
blacks. The coefficient of 0.72 on satisfaction is on par with the effect of anger for whites 
in the sample, suggesting this positive emotion state is as mobilizing for African 
Americans as is anger—the emotion conventionally associated with political activism—
for whites. Because the threat condition both increases anger and decreases satisfaction 
among both groups (as indicated by Table 5.5), the indirect effect of exposure to the 
threat condition appears to be stimulating direct action among white subjects, while 
producing a null or negative impact on direct action on black subjects. 
Turning to the domain of information seeking, there is among black subjects a 
marginally negative association between reporting anger and signing up for more 
information (p=0.09). This result constitutes one instance suggestive of African 
Americans conforming with expectations, as anger makes people more confident and less 
reliant on others for information. Among blacks, reporting concern is strongly associated 
with seeking information. Thus, among African Americans, concern exhibits influences 
on participation that make it akin to both anger (stimulating direct immediate action) and 
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anxiety (stimulating information seeking). Finally, no emotions exhibit empirically 
discernible influences on information seeking among whites. 
 Table 5.7 (next page) presents the total and indirect effects of exposure to the 
threat treatment on subjects’ participation, across each respective emotion. All effects are 
null (or marginal in the case of the indirect effect of threat on stimulating blacks’ 
information seeking through making them more concerned) with one notable exception. 
Between its marginal direct effect on white participation and its indirect effect through 
increasing whites’ anger, the threat treatment boasts a strong total effect on white 
subjects’ likelihood of adding their name to the letter. This effect confirms again the 
conformity of white subjects to the expectations laid out by conventional literature. 
Meanwhile, the null findings for black subjects illustrate the need to revise that existing 
literature38. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
38 The null total effect for African Americans is likely due to the conflicting pulls on their action due to the 
varying impacts the threat treatment exerts on their emotions. Because the threat condition dampens their 
satisfaction, it demobilizes action. But threat also increases concern, which is marginally associated with 
letter signing. Therefore, rather than an outright demobilizing effect, which would be indicated by a 
significant and negative coefficient effect, the null effect likely represents the slight mobilizing effect of 
increasing concern offset by the greater relative demobilizing effect of decreasing satisfaction. 
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Table 5.7: Structural Model Parameters—Total and Indirect Effects of Threat Condition on Participation across Emotions & 
Race, No Controls 
SIGN 
LETTER 
ANGRY ANXIOUS CONCERNED SATISFIED HOPEFUL 
           
 BLACK WHITE BLACK WHITE BLACK WHITE BLACK WHITE BLACK WHITE 
           
Total  
   0.10 
   (0.10) 
 0.24* 
(0.09) 
  -0.01 
   (0.10) 
 0.13 
 (0.09) 
 0.06 
 (0.10) 
 0.12 
 (0.09) 
-0.04 
 (0.10) 
 0.11 
 (0.09) 
 0.02 
 (0.10) 
 0.12 
 (0.00) 
           
Indirect 
  0.08 
  (0.06) 
 0.09^ 
(0.05) 
 -0.03 
  (0.04) 
-0.02 
 (0.03) 
  0.04 
  (0.03) 
-0.03 
 (0.03) 
-0.05 
 (0.03) 
-0.04 
 (0.03) 
 0.00 
 (0.01) 
-0.03 
 (0.03) 
 
SEEK 
INFO 
ANGRY ANXIOUS CONCERNED SATISFIED HOPEFUL 
           
 BLACK WHITE BLACK WHITE BLACK WHITE BLACK WHITE BLACK WHITE 
           
Total  
  -0.03 
  (0.10) 
   0.04 
(0.06) 
  0.10 
  (0.10) 
 0.04 
 (0.07) 
 0.14 
 (0.11) 
 0.03 
 (0.07) 
 0.07 
 (0.09) 
 0.02 
 (0.06) 
 0.05 
 (0.10) 
   0.02 
  (0.06) 
           
Indirect 
  -0.10 
  (0.07) 
0.00 
(0.03) 
  0.04 
  (0.04) 
-0.00 
 (0.02) 
  0.08^ 
 (0.04) 
-0.01 
 (0.02) 
 0.01 
 (0.02) 
-0.02 
 (0.02) 
-0.02 
 (0.02) 
  -0.02 
  (0.02) 
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I turn now to the direct and indirect effects of the opportunity condition on 
subjects’ participation in the absence of controls. The direct effects of the treatment and 
emotions are displayed in Table 5.8 below. 
Table 5.8: Structural Model Parameters—Direct Effects of Opportunity Condition 
and Emotions on Subjects’ Participation, No Controls 
 LETTER  
SIGNING 
SEEKING  
INFORMATION 
     
 BLACK WHITE BLACK WHITE 
     
OPPORTUNITY 
 0.04 
 (0.10) 
-0.13 
 (0.10) 
-0.03 
 (0.10) 
-0.08 
 (0.07) 
     
ANGRY 
 0.50 
 (0.33) 
   0.73* 
 (0.33) 
-0.52 
 (0.33) 
-0.01 
 (0.24) 
     
ANXIOUS 
-0.24 
 (0.32) 
-0.27 
 (0.32) 
 0.32 
 (0.32) 
-0.04 
 (0.23) 
     
CONCERNED 
  0.42^ 
(0.23) 
   -0.34 
 (0.23) 
    0.71** 
(0.23) 
-0.15 
 (0.16) 
     
SATISFIED 
  0.70* 
(0.31) 
 0.29 
 (0.27) 
   -0.19 
(0.31) 
 0.19 
 (0.19) 
     
HOPEFUL 
-0.07 
 (0.28) 
 0.28 
 (0.22) 
    0.28 
(0.23) 
 0.19 
 (0.16) 
     
N 109 125 109 125 
     
χ2 
  219.20 
 p=0.00 
   236.76 
  p=0.00 
   219.20 
   p=0.00 
  236.76 
 p=0.00 
     
RMSEA    0.44 0.43    0.44 0.43 
 
As evidenced by the null results across the first row, the opportunity treatment 
fails to exhibit any significant direct effects on subject participation. The direct effects of 
the emotions are generally equivalent here to their effects in the threat model displayed in 
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Table 5.6. One notable difference between the models is that here the anger on 
information seeking among blacks is null.  
Because exposure to the opportunity condition decreases anger among both 
groups, its indirect effect on letter singing among white subjects is apparently 
demobilizing. Conversely, because exposure to the opportunity condition slightly 
increases satisfaction and decreases concern among black subjects, the indirect effect of 
this treatment is to exhibit both mobilizing and demobilizing effects on blacks’ direct 
action taking. 
 The total and indirect effects of the opportunity condition, presented in Table 
5.9, are virtually identical to the effects of the threat condition, save the lone major 
exception. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 169 
Table 5.9: Structural Model Parameters—Total and Indirect Effects of Opportunity Condition on Participation across 
Emotions and Race, No Controls 
SIGN 
LETTER 
ANGRY ANXIOUS CONCERNED SATISFIED HOPEFUL 
           
 BLACK WHITE BLACK WHITE BLACK WHITE BLACK WHITE BLACK WHITE 
           
Total  
  -0.04 
   (0.11) 
 -0.25* 
 (0.11) 
0.06 
(0.11) 
-0.12 
 (0.11) 
-0.02 
 (0.11) 
-0.08 
 (0.10) 
 0.09 
 (0.11) 
-0.12 
 (0.10) 
 0.03 
 (0.10) 
  -0.11 
  (0.10) 
           
Indirect 
 -0.08 
  (0.06) 
  -0.11^ 
  (0.06) 
 0.02 
 (0.03) 
 0.02 
 (0.03) 
 -0.05 
  (0.04) 
 0.06 
 (0.04) 
 0.05 
 (0.03) 
 0.02 
 (0.02) 
-0.01 
 (0.02) 
   0.02 
  (0.02) 
 
SEEK 
INFO 
ANGRY ANXIOUS CONCERNED SATISFIED HOPEFUL 
           
 BLACK WHITE BLACK WHITE BLACK WHITE BLACK WHITE BLACK WHITE 
           
Total  
   0.05 
  (0.11) 
  -0.04 
(0.07) 
-0.06 
 (0.11) 
-0.08 
 (0.00) 
-0.11 
 (0.11) 
-0.06 
 (0.07) 
-0.04 
 (0.10) 
-0.07 
 (0.07) 
-0.01 
 (0.10) 
   0.02 
  (0.06) 
           
Indirect 
   0.08 
  (0.06) 
0.00 
(0.04) 
 -0.03 
  (0.03) 
 0.00 
 (0.02) 
  -0.09^ 
  (0.05) 
 0.03 
 (0.03) 
-0.01 
 (0.02) 
 0.01 
 (0.01) 
 0.02 
 (0.02) 
  -0.07 
  (0.07) 
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Because exposure to the opportunity condition reduces reported anger among 
white subjects, it exhibits a total effect on whites’ likelihood of signing the letter that is 
demobilizing. While the opportunity condition makes whites less likely to sign the letter 
relative to the control, it demonstrates a null effect on blacks’ likelihood of signing the 
letter. This null effect is likely due to the inability of the opportunity treatment to 
engender more than marginally greater feelings of satisfaction among blacks. Thus, 
similar to the takeaways from the ANES data, findings from the experiment data raise 
doubt that policy opportunity cues can close the gap in black participation in the wake of 
the disparity in black participatory responses to policy threat cues. 
 Figures 5.12 and 5.13 on the following pages illustrate the significant and 
marginally significant direct and indirect effects of the threat treatment and emotions on 
the participation of black and white subjects, respectively. Subsequently, Figures 5.14 
and 5.15 illustrate the significant and marginally significant direct and indirect effects of 
the opportunity treatment and emotions on the participation of black and white subjects, 
respectively. These figures display the stark contrast in the emotions serving as the major 
pathways translating receipt of the policy change cue to action—anger for whites, and 
satisfaction (and to a lesser extent, concern) for blacks. 
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Figure 5.12: Path Diagram–Direct & Indirect Effects of Threat on Action among Black Subjects, No Controls 
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Figure 5.13: Path Diagram–Direct & Indirect Effects of Threat on Action among White Subjects, No Controls 
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Figure 5.14: Path Diagram–Direct & Indirect Effects of Opportunity on Action among Black Subjects, No Controls 
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Figure 5.15: Path Diagram–Direct & Indirect Effects of Opportunity on Action among White Subjects, No Controls 
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In the absence of any control variables, clear racially distinct patterns emerged. 
But as indicated in the previous chapter, the black and white samples vary from one 
another in many key dimensions. To ensure the racial differences uncovered here are not 
artifacts of the uniqueness of the samples, I re-specified the structural model with a host 
of demographic control variables included.39 The racial differences prove largely robust 
to the inclusion of these controls, an encouraging sign that these analyses are uncovering 
a genuine phenomenon rather than a series of quirks limited to a wonky sample. 
Once again, first on display are the respective direct effects of the threat and 
opportunity treatments on each reported emotion. Table 5.10 presents these effects below. 
Table 5.10: Direct Effects of Threat and Opportunity Conditions on Reported 
Emotions by Race, Demographic Controls Included 
 ANGRY ANXIOUS CONCERNED SATISFIED OPTIMISTIC 
         
 BLACK WHITE BLACK WHITE BLACK WHITE BLACK WHITE BLACK WHITE 
           
THREAT 
 0.19*** 
(0.05) 
 0.13*** 
(0.04) 
 0.13** 
(0.04) 
 0.07* 
(0.04) 
 0.12* 
(0.05) 
 0.10** 
(0.04) 
 -0.07* 
 (0.03) 
-0.11** 
(0.04) 
 -0.05 
 (0.05) 
-0.11** 
(0.04) 
           
OPPORTUNITY 
-0.16*** 
(0.05) 
-0.16*** 
(0.04) 
-0.10* 
(0.05) 
-0.09* 
(0.04) 
-0.13* 
(0.05) 
-0.18*** 
(0.04) 
  0.07^ 
 (0.04) 
 0.06 
(0.04) 
  0.07 
 (0.05) 
 0.08^ 
(0.05) 
 
All effects that were significant or marginally significant in the first model retain 
their respective levels of influence upon inclusion of the demographic variables. Further, 
none of the coefficient sizes change by more than 0.02 points from the first model 
specification. Notably, the anger deficit possessed by white subjects has become slightly 
larger. 
                                                 
39 The demographic control variables included are: highest education attained, frequency of religious 
service attendance, number of voluntary, civic, social, or labor organizations involved with, home owner 
status, party identification (coded Republican to Democrat), frequency of viewing/reading local news, age 
and gender. Also included in this and the subsequent model specification with attitude and efficacy controls 
are the following: scale measure indicating whether the subject opposes or favors the DWSD privatization 
(coded “strongly oppose” to “strongly favor”), and a dichotomous variable indicating whether the subject 
took the survey online or via pen and paper (1 =via pen and paper). All variables are coded 0 to 1. 
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 Turning focus squarely to the impact of the threat condition and emotions in 
the presence of demographic controls, shown in Table 5.11 below.  
Table 5.11: Structural Model Parameters—Direct Effects of Threat Condition and 
Emotions on Subjects’ Participation, Demographic Controls Included 
 LETTER  
SIGNING 
SEEKING  
INFORMATION 
     
 BLACK WHITE BLACK WHITE 
     
THREAT 
 0.07 
 (0.10) 
 0.09 
 (0.10) 
 0.09 
 (0.10) 
 0.04 
 (0.07) 
     
ANGRY 
 0.54 
 (0.36) 
   0.62^ 
 (0.33) 
-0.20 
 (0.35) 
 0.16 
 (0.24) 
     
ANXIOUS 
-0.43 
 (0.33) 
-0.09 
 (0.33) 
 0.04 
 (0.33) 
-0.06 
 (0.23) 
     
CONCERNED 
   0.44^ 
 (0.23) 
-0.30 
 (0.24) 
   0.55* 
 (0.23) 
-0.11 
 (0.16) 
     
SATISFIED 
   0.72* 
 (0.33) 
 0.42 
 (0.28) 
 0.00 
 (0.34) 
 0.21 
 (0.19) 
     
HOPEFUL 
-0.12 
 (0.18) 
 0.33 
 (0.23) 
 0.38 
 (0.26) 
 0.19 
 (0.16) 
     
FAVOR DWSD CHANGE 
-0.02 
 (0.18) 
  -0.31^ 
 (0.23) 
 0.01 
 (0.18) 
 0.07 
 (0.13) 
     
EDUCATION 
-0.16 
 (0.23) 
-0.46 
 (0.26) 
  0.54* 
 (0.23) 
 0.17 
 (0.18) 
     
CHURCH ATTEND. 
  0.09 
 (0.17) 
-0.11 
 (0.13) 
-0.05 
 (0.17) 
 -0.16^ 
 (0.09) 
     
CIVIC ORGS. 
 0.09 
 (0.15) 
-0.07 
 (0.14) 
-0.07 
 (0.14) 
 0.11 
 (0.09) 
     
HOME OWNER 
 -0.26* 
 (0.12) 
 0.02 
 (0.13) 
 0.05 
 (0.12) 
 0.12 
 (0.09) 
     
PARTY ID 
-0.06 
 (0.17) 
-0.05 
 (0.15) 
-0.22 
 (0.17) 
 0.14 
 (0.10) 
     
LOCAL NEWS  
-0.23 
 (0.16) 
-0.03 
 (0.15) 
 0.10 
 (0.16) 
-0.04 
 (0.10) 
     
AGE 
   0.62^ 
 (0.35) 
 0.85 
 (0.47) 
 0.29 
 (0.35) 
 0.00 
 (0.34) 
     
FEMALE 
   0.22* 
 (0.10) 
   0.19* 
 (0.09) 
 0.14 
 (0.10) 
 0.02 
 (0.06) 
     
PAPER 
 0.09 
 (0.12) 
 0.12 
 (0.09) 
 0.08 
 (0.13) 
 0.04 
 (0.07) 
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N  99  119  99  119 
     
χ2 
  301.17 
 p=0.00 
   239.15 
  p=0.00 
   301.72 
   p=0.00 
 308.50 
 p=0.00 
     
RMSEA    0.20 0.43    0.20 0.19 
 
In the presence of the demographic controls, exposure to the threat condition now 
has a null effect on letter signing among white subjects. Similarly, the positive effect for 
anger on whites’ direct immediate action falls just short of two-tailed significance 
(p=0.06).  
 For black subjects on the other hand, the emotion effects remain unchanged in 
the face of this set of controls. Concern remains marginally related to letter signing while 
satisfaction remains strongly related to this domain of action. Further, the coefficient on 
satisfaction is unchanged with demographic controls added. In sum, controlling for the 
life stage variables weakens the associations between threat, anger and direct action for 
whites, but does not erase them entirely. Including these variables has no effect on the 
noted association between satisfaction and direct immediate action among African 
Americans. 
 In the domain of information seeking, direct effects remain largely unchanged 
by inclusion of the controls. Again, no emotion states are associated with signing up for 
more information on DWSD among whites. Among blacks, the positive effect on concern 
is identical to its effect in the model sans controls. Meanwhile the marginally negative 
effect of anger on African Americans’ information seeking has dissipated into a null 
result.  
Table 5.12 on the following page presents the total and indirect effects of the 
threat treatment on subject’s participation across emotion states in the demographic 
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variables model. As expected, based on the weaker direct effects observed for white 
subjects in Table 5.11, the total effect of the threat on white letter signing is only 
marginally positive in this model. All other effects remain virtually identical here to their 
effects in the model without controls.  
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Table 5.12: Structural Model Parameters—Total and Indirect Effects of Threat Condition on Participation across Emotions 
and Race, Demographic Controls Included 
SIGN 
LETTER 
ANGRY ANXIOUS CONCERNED SATISFIED HOPEFUL 
           
 BLACK WHITE BLACK WHITE BLACK WHITE BLACK WHITE BLACK WHITE 
           
Total  
0.16 
(0.12) 
  0.17^ 
(0.10) 
0.00 
(0.11) 
 0.08 
 (0.10) 
 0.11 
 (0.11) 
 0.06 
 (0.10) 
 0.00 
 (0.10) 
 0.04 
 (0.10) 
 0.06 
 (0.10) 
 0.05 
 (0.10) 
           
Indirect 
0.10 
(0.07) 
  0.09^ 
(0.05) 
-0.05 
 (0.05) 
-0.01 
 (0.03) 
  0.05 
  (0.04) 
-0.03 
 (0.03) 
-0.06 
 (0.04) 
-0.05 
 (0.03) 
 0.01 
 (0.01) 
-0.04 
 (0.03) 
 
SEEK 
INFO 
ANGRY ANXIOUS CONCERNED SATISFIED HOPEFUL 
           
 BLACK WHITE BLACK WHITE BLACK WHITE BLACK WHITE BLACK WHITE 
           
Total  
   0.05 
  (0.11) 
0.06 
 (0.07) 
0.10 
(0.11) 
 0.03 
 (0.07) 
 0.16 
 (0.11) 
 0.02 
 (0.07) 
 0.09 
 (0.10) 
 0.01 
 (0.07) 
 0.07 
 (0.10) 
   0.02 
  (0.07) 
           
Indirect 
  -0.04 
  (0.07) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
-0.01 
 (0.02) 
   0.07^ 
  (0.04) 
-0.01 
 (0.02) 
-0.00 
 (0.03) 
-0.02 
 (0.02) 
-0.02 
 (0.02) 
  -0.02 
  (0.02) 
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Table 5.13 below presents the direct effects of the opportunity cue and reported 
emotions on subjects’ participation. 
Table 5.13: Structural Model Parameters—Direct Effects of Opportunity Condition 
and Emotions on Subjects’ Participation, Demographic Controls Included 
 LETTER  
SIGNING 
SEEKING  
INFORMATION 
     
 BLACK WHITE BLACK WHITE 
     
OPPORTUNITY 
-0.02 
 (0.11) 
-0.07 
 (0.10) 
 0.03 
 (0.11) 
-0.06 
 (0.07) 
     
ANGRY 
 0.57 
 (0.35) 
   0.62^ 
 (0.34) 
-0.17 
 (0.35) 
 0.14 
 (0.24) 
     
ANXIOUS 
-0.42 
 (0.33) 
-0.05 
 (0.32) 
 0.05 
 (0.32) 
-0.09 
 (0.23) 
     
CONCERNED 
  0.44^ 
 (0.24) 
-0.32 
 (0.23) 
   0.54* 
 (0.24) 
-0.14 
 (0.17) 
     
SATISFIED 
   0.72* 
 (0.33) 
 0.39 
 (0.27) 
-0.05 
 (0.33) 
 0.20 
 (0.20) 
     
HOPEFUL 
-0.11 
 (0.27) 
 0.33 
 (0.23) 
 0.39 
 (0.26) 
 0.20 
 (0.16) 
     
FAVOR DWSD CHANGE 
-0.03 
 (0.18) 
  -0.31^ 
 (0.18) 
-0.02 
 (0.18) 
 0.08 
 (0.13) 
     
EDUCATION 
-0.17 
 (0.23) 
 -0.49^ 
 (0.26) 
   0.53* 
 (0.23) 
 0.16 
 (0.09) 
     
CHURCH ATTEND. 
 0.10 
 (0.17) 
-0.11 
 (0.13) 
-0.04 
 (0.17) 
-0.16 
 (0.09) 
     
CIVIC ORGS. 
 0.10 
 (0.15) 
-0.07 
 (0.14) 
-0.06 
 (0.15) 
 0.11 
 (0.10) 
     
HOME OWNER 
 -0.26* 
 (0.12) 
 0.01 
 (0.13) 
 0.04 
 (0.12) 
 0.11 
 (0.09) 
     
PARTY ID 
-0.06 
 (0.17) 
-0.06 
 (0.15) 
-0.22 
 (0.17) 
 0.13 
 (0.10) 
     
LOCAL NEWS  
-0.24 
 (0.16) 
-0.03 
 (0.15) 
 0.10 
 (0.16) 
-0.04 
 (0.10) 
     
AGE 
   0.62^ 
 (0.35) 
 0.87 
 (0.47) 
 0.29 
 (0.35) 
 0.01 
 (0.33) 
     
FEMALE 
   0.22* 
 (0.10) 
   0.19* 
 (0.09) 
 0.14 
 (0.10) 
 0.02 
 (0.06) 
     
PAPER 
 0.09 
 (0.13) 
 0.13 
 (0.09) 
 0.07 
 (0.13) 
 0.04 
 (0.06) 
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N  99  119  99  119 
     
χ2 
  307.81 
 p=0.00 
  309.40 
  p=0.00 
   307.81 
   p=0.00 
 309.43 
 p=0.00 
     
RMSEA    0.20 0.19    0.20 0.19 
 
Results here are virtually identical to those for the threat condition. The 
opportunity condition produces only null direct effects on subject participation. Anger 
has a marginally positive effect on letter signing among whites (p=0.06), while remaining 
null among blacks. The strong positive association between satisfaction and letter signing 
remains for blacks, as well as the marginally positive relationship between concern and 
direct action (p=0.07). Finally, concern remains strongly and positively related to black 
subjects’ information seeking. 
 The total and indirect effects of opportunity (in Table 5.14 on following page) 
achieve one notable result. By decreasing reports of anger among white subjects, the 
opportunity treatment produces a marginal negative indirect impact on whites’ propensity 
to add their name to the letter.  
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Table 5.14: Structural Model Parameters—Total and Indirect Effects of Opportunity Condition on Participation across 
Emotions and Race, Demographic Controls Included 
SIGN 
LETTER 
ANGRY ANXIOUS CONCERNED SATISFIED HOPEFUL 
           
 BLACK WHITE BLACK WHITE BLACK WHITE BLACK WHITE BLACK WHITE 
           
Total  
  -0.11 
  (0.12) 
  -0.17 
  (0.11) 
0.02 
(0.11) 
-0.07 
 (0.11) 
-0.08 
 (0.12) 
-0.02 
 (0.10) 
 0.03 
 (0.11) 
-0.05 
 (0.10) 
-0.03 
 (0.11) 
-0.05 
 (0.10) 
           
Indirect 
  -0.09 
  (0.06) 
  -0.10^ 
(0.06) 
 0.04 
 (0.04) 
 0.00 
 (0.03) 
 -0.06 
  (0.04) 
 0.06 
 (0.04) 
 0.05 
 (0.04) 
 0.02 
 (0.02) 
-0.01 
 (0.02) 
 0.03 
 (0.02) 
 
SEEK 
INFO 
ANGRY ANXIOUS CONCERNED SATISFIED HOPEFUL 
           
 BLACK WHITE BLACK WHITE BLACK WHITE BLACK WHITE BLACK WHITE 
           
Total  
   0.00 
  (0.12) 
  -0.09 
(0.08) 
  -0.03 
  (0.11) 
-0.05 
 (0.08) 
-0.10 
 (0.12) 
-0.04 
 (0.07) 
-0.03 
 (0.11) 
-0.05 
 (0.07) 
-0.00 
 (0.11) 
  -0.05 
  (0.07) 
           
Indirect 
   0.03 
  (0.06) 
  -0.02 
(0.04) 
  -0.00 
(0.03) 
 0.01 
 (0.02) 
 -0.07 
  (0.04) 
 0.02 
 (0.03) 
-0.00 
 (0.02) 
 0.01 
 (0.01) 
 0.03 
 (0.03) 
   0.02 
  (0.02) 
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Taken altogether, these findings show that inclusion of demographic factors 
weakens the impacts of the threat cue and the state of anger on whites’ direct immediate 
action, while having no impact on the relationships between satisfaction, concern and 
action among blacks. The stark racial differences remain just as apparent in the presence 
of this set of controls as it does in their absence. Figures 5.16 through 5.19 display the 
direct and indirect effects of the respective treatments and emotions in these models, as 
well as the significant and marginal effects of the control variables.  
These figures illustrate the same patterns found in the figures for the model sans 
controls. Among black subjects, exposure to the threat treatment produces a slight 
indirect mobilizing effect by increasing concern; but this effect is overtaken by a stronger 
indirect demobilizing effect brought about by decreasing blacks’ feelings of satisfaction 
(Figure 5.16). Among whites, there is a clear pathway from threat to anger, and a 
marginal pathway from that anger to direct action (Figure 5.17). Turning to opportunity, 
Figure 5.18 reveals scant evidence of an indirect mobilizing effect of the treatment 
among African Americans, by slightly increasing feelings of satisfaction. This effects 
runs in opposition to the slight indirect demobilizing effect of the opportunity treatment, 
via its decreasing of concern among black subjects. Finally, Figure 5.19 illustrates a scant 
indirect demobilizing effect of opportunity for white subjects, as it decreases their 
feelings of action-stimulating anger.  
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Figure 5.16: Path Diagram–Direct & Indirect Effect of Threat on Action among Black Subjects, with Demographic Controls 
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Figure 5.17: Path Diagram–Direct & Indirect Effect of Threat on Action among White Subjects, with Demographic Controls 
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Figure 5.18: Path Diagram–Direct & Indirect Effect of Opportunity on Action among Black Subjects, with Demographic 
Controls 
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Figure 5.19: Path Diagram–Direct & Indirect Effect of Opportunity on Action among White Subjects, with Demographic 
Controls 
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Inclusion of a standard battery of demographic and life stage control variables 
weakened associations among whites, but did not otherwise alter any of the observed 
racial distinctions in how emotions condition subjects to participate on DWSD 
privatization. Are these racial differences similarly robust to the inclusion of variables 
measuring subjects’ broader political attitudes and sense of efficacy on the DWSD issue?  
It is plausible that the racialized lenses through which blacks and whites view 
their political environment are reflected in part in their respective senses of efficacy. 
Accordingly, the proposed structural equation model with attitude and efficacy variables 
included strongly suggests the presence of mediating effects40.  
Examination of the direct effects of the treatments on subjects’ emotions, shown 
in Table 5.15 below, reveals the first manner in which the attitude and efficacy model 
departs from the previous specified models. 
Table 5.15: Direct Effects of Threat and Opportunity Conditions on Reported 
Emotions by Race, Attitude and Engagement Controls Included 
 ANGRY ANXIOUS CONCERNED SATISFIED OPTIMISTIC 
         
 BLACK WHITE BLACK WHITE BLACK WHITE BLACK WHITE BLACK WHITE 
           
THREAT 
  
0.18*** 
 (0.05) 
   0.13** 
  (0.04) 
  0.11* 
(0.04) 
  0.06^ 
(0.04) 
  0.09^ 
(0.05) 
  0.09* 
 (0.04) 
-0.08* 
(0.03) 
-0.11** 
(0.04) 
-0.06 
 (0.05) 
-0.11** 
(0.04) 
           
OPP. 
 -0.15** 
 (0.06) 
 -0.16*** 
 (0.04) 
-0.08^ 
(0.05) 
-0.08* 
(0.04) 
-0.11* 
(0.06) 
 -0.17*** 
 (0.04) 
 0.08* 
 (0.04) 
 0.07^ 
(0.04) 
 0.08 
 (0.05) 
 0.10* 
(0.05) 
 
                                                 
40 The attitude and efficacy variables are: trust in government to do the right thing; belief that people like 
the subject have a say in government, how important the subject thinks the DWSD privatization is; how 
much the subject believes public officials care what people like her think about the DWSD privatization; 
how much influence people from the subject’s community have on the DWSD issue; how much influence 
the subject herself has on the DWSD issue; and how likely the subject believes it is the issue will turn out 
how the subject wants it to. 
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The effects of exposure to the threat cue have only marginally positive effects on 
white subjects’ anxiety (p=0.07) and black subjects’ concern (p=0.08). Additionally, 
exposure to the opportunity condition only marginally reduces black subjects’ anxiety 
(p=0.07). Yet, opportunity generally exhibits stronger positive effects on subjects’ 
positive emotions than it produced in prior specifications. The positive effect of exposure 
to the opportunity cue on black subjects’ satisfaction becomes significant at the 0.05 
alpha level, while its effect on white subjects’ satisfaction goes from null to marginally 
significant (p=0.07). Additionally, the effect on whites’ reported hope goes from 
marginally to conventionally significant. Still, however, there is no arousal of hope 
among black subjects. 
 Examining the direct effects of the threat treatment and emotions on subject 
participation reveals more critical differences from prior specifications; the results are 
displayed in Table 5.16 below. 
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Table 5.16: Structural Model Parameters—Direct Effects of Threat Condition and 
Emotions on Subjects’ Participation, Attitude & Engagement Controls Included 
 LETTER  
SIGNING 
SEEKING  
INFORMATION 
     
 BLACK WHITE BLACK WHITE 
     
THREAT 
-0.05 
 (0.11) 
 0.06 
 (0.09) 
-0.02 
 (0.10) 
 0.04 
 (0.06) 
     
ANGRY 
  0.74^ 
(0.38) 
   0.61* 
 (0.31) 
-0.41 
 (0.35) 
-0.03 
 (0.22) 
     
ANXIOUS 
  -0.40 
 (0.34) 
-0.22 
 (0.30) 
 0.25 
 (0.32) 
-0.02 
 (0.21) 
     
CONCERNED 
 0.22 
 (0.27) 
 -0.75* 
 (0.22) 
  0.50* 
 (0.25) 
-0.17 
 (0.16) 
     
SATISFIED 
  0.60^ 
 (0.34) 
 0.10 
 (0.26) 
-0.26 
 (0.31) 
 0.11 
 (0.18) 
     
HOPEFUL 
-0.17 
 (0.25) 
   0.45* 
 (0.21) 
 0.18 
 (0.24) 
 0.03 
 (0.15) 
     
FAVOR DWSD CHANGE 
-0.01 
 (0.19) 
 -0.28^ 
 (0.17) 
-0.12 
 (0.18) 
 0.04 
 (0.12) 
     
TRUST IN GOVT 
 0.42 
 (0.27) 
   0.44* 
 (0.26) 
 0.20 
 (0.25) 
   -0.38** 
 (0.14) 
     
SAY IN GOVT 
-0.18 
 (0.24) 
 0.05 
 (0.17) 
 0.06 
 (0.22) 
    0.37** 
 (0.12) 
     
DWSD IMPORTANT 
 0.19 
 (0.19) 
     0.76*** 
    (0.18) 
  0.49* 
 (0.18) 
    0.35** 
 (0.09) 
     
DWSD—OFF’LS CARE  
-0.02 
 (0.27) 
    -0.72*** 
(0.21) 
 0.03 
 (0.25) 
 0.19 
 (0.15) 
     
DWSD—LOCAL INFL.  
 0.00 
 (0.24) 
     -0.09 
 (0.21) 
 0.08 
 (0.22) 
-0.09 
 (0.15) 
     
DWSD—MY INFL 
 0.13 
 (0.28) 
 0.28 
 (0.22) 
-0.11 
 (0.25) 
 0.00 
 (0.16) 
     
DWSD OUTCOME 
 0.04 
 (0.27) 
 0.27 
 (0.20) 
 0.33 
 (0.25) 
 0.11 
 (0.15) 
     
PAPER 
 0.02 
 (0.10) 
 0.06 
 (0.08) 
-0.09 
 (0.09) 
 0.03 
 (0.05) 
     
N  104  121  104  121 
     
χ2 
  325.42 
 p=0.00 
   329.96 
  p=0.00 
   325.42 
   p=0.00 
 329.96 
 p=0.00 
     
RMSEA    0.22 0.20    0.22 0.20 
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Anger retains its positive and significant effect on white subjects’ direct 
immediate action. But anger also exhibits a positive effect on black subjects’ 
participation that falls ever so short of two-tailed significance (p=0.053). Furthermore, 
the positive effect of satisfaction on black subjects’ direct action has been weakened to be 
only marginally positive (p=0.07). And the magnitude of this coefficient is lower than the 
coefficient on anger for black subjects. When controlling for subjects’ senses of efficacy 
on the DWSD issue, the clear racial differences in the association between anger and 
action become much less evident. 
Table 5.16 reveals two additional results that depart notably from those of prior 
specifications. Reported feelings of hope are strongly and positively associated with 
direct immediate action, but only for white subjects. In previous models, hope has 
produced null effects on participation, despite the initial expectation that it would 
mobilize action among African American subjects. Yet upon inclusion of the attitude and 
efficacy variables, this emotion state stimulates action among only whites.  
Also, concern produces a significant and negative effect on white subjects’ direct 
immediate action. The magnitude of this demobilizing effect is considerably larger than 
the positive effects of both anger and hope for white subjects. The threat treatment, 
therefore, yields both participation stimulating and depressing influences for whites, as it 
has been shown to yield for black subjects in prior models.  
It should come as no surprise that efficacy variables exert a partial mediating 
effect on the association between subjects’ reported emotions and their participation. 
After all, efficacy is capturing individuals’ assessments of their capacity to participate 
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effectively in politics and extract responsiveness from government elites. I have 
essentially argued that African Americans’ assessment of the diminished collective 
efficacy of the group is what dampens the association between anger over policy threats 
and action. Accordingly, inclusion of efficacy variables should account in part for a 
portion of the demobilizing effect of that collective assessment. 
Table 5.17 (on the following page) presents the total and indirect effects of the 
threat treatment on subjects’ participation, in the presence of the attitude and efficacy 
controls.  
The one notable result is that for both black and white subjects, the exposure to 
the threat condition yields a marginally positive indirect effect on direct immediate 
action. This finding further illustrates how racial differences are much less apparent in the 
presence of attitude and efficacy variables. 
 Examining the direct effects of the opportunity treatment on participation 
reveal the same associations between emotion and action as those found in Table 5.16. 
The results are displayed in Table 5.18 (on page 190). 
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Table 5.17: Structural Model Parameters—Total and Indirect Effects of Threat Condition on Participation across Emotions 
and Race, Attitude & Engagement Controls Included 
SIGN 
LETTER 
ANGRY ANXIOUS CONCERNED SATISFIED HOPEFUL 
           
 BLACK WHITE BLACK WHITE BLACK WHITE BLACK WHITE BLACK WHITE 
           
Total  
   0.08 
  (0.12) 
0.13 
(0.09) 
  -0.10 
  (0.12) 
0.04 
(0.09) 
-0.04 
 (0.11) 
-0.01 
 (0.10) 
  -0.10 
 (0.10) 
 0.05 
 (0.09) 
-0.04 
 (0.11) 
    0.01 
(0.09) 
           
Indirect 
   0.13^ 
  (0.08) 
 0.08^ 
(0.05) 
  -0.04 
(0.04) 
-0.01 
 (0.02) 
  0.02 
  (0.03) 
-0.07 
 (0.04) 
-0.05 
 (0.03) 
-0.01 
 (0.03) 
 0.01 
 (0.02) 
-0.05 
 (0.03) 
 
SEEK 
INFO 
ANGRY ANXIOUS CONCERNED SATISFIED HOPEFUL 
           
 BLACK WHITE BLACK WHITE BLACK WHITE BLACK WHITE BLACK WHITE 
           
Total  
  -0.10 
  (0.11) 
0.04 
 (0.06) 
0.01 
(0.11) 
 0.04 
 (0.06) 
 0.02 
 (0.11) 
 0.02 
 (0.06) 
 0.00 
 (0.10) 
 0.03 
 (0.06) 
-0.03 
 (0.10) 
   0.04 
  (0.06) 
           
Indirect 
  -0.07 
  (0.07) 
  -0.00 
(0.03) 
0.03 
(0.04) 
-0.00 
 (0.01) 
  0.04 
  (0.03) 
-0.02 
 (0.02) 
 0.02 
 (0.03) 
-0.01 
 (0.02) 
-0.01 
 (0.02) 
  -0.02 
  (0.02) 
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Table 5.18: Structural Model Parameters—Direct Effects of Opportunity Condition 
and Emotions on Subjects’ Participation, Attitude & Engagement Controls 
Included 
 LETTER  
SIGNING 
SEEKING  
INFORMATION 
     
 BLACK WHITE BLACK WHITE 
     
OPPORTUNITY 
 0.08 
 (0.11) 
 0.04 
 (0.10) 
-0.01 
 (0.10) 
-0.05 
 (0.06) 
     
ANGRY 
   0.71^ 
 (0.37) 
   0.62* 
 (0.31) 
-0.44 
 (0.34) 
-0.03 
 (0.22) 
     
ANXIOUS 
-0.39 
 (0.34) 
-0.21 
 (0.30) 
 0.26 
 (0.32) 
-0.01 
 (0.21) 
     
CONCERNED 
 0.25 
 (0.26) 
   -0.78** 
(0.23) 
  0.51* 
 (0.25) 
-0.19 
 (0.16) 
     
SATISFIED 
   0.62^ 
 (0.33) 
0.08 
(0.25) 
-0.24 
 (0.30) 
 0.10 
 (0.18) 
     
HOPEFUL 
-0.18 
 (0.26) 
  0.46* 
(0.21) 
 0.19 
 (0.24) 
 0.04 
 (0.15) 
     
FAVOR DWSD CHANGE 
-0.02 
 (0.19) 
     -0.29^ 
(0.17) 
-0.11 
 (0.18) 
 0.04 
 (0.12) 
     
TRUST IN GOVT 
 0.41 
 (0.27) 
      0.44* 
(0.19) 
 0.20 
 (0.25) 
   -0.38** 
 (0.14) 
     
SAY IN GOVT 
-0.15 
 (0.24) 
0.03 
(0.17) 
 0.06 
 (0.22) 
    0.36** 
(0.12) 
     
DWSD IMPORTANT 
 0.19 
 (0.19) 
      0.77*** 
(0.18) 
   0.49* 
 (0.18) 
    0.35** 
 (0.13) 
     
DWSD—OFF’LS CARE  
-0.02 
 (0.27) 
     -0.73*** 
 (0.21) 
 0.02 
 (0.25) 
 0.19 
 (0.15) 
     
DWSD—LOCAL INFL.  
 0.01 
 (0.24) 
-0.07 
 (0.21) 
 0.08 
 (0.22) 
-0.07 
 (0.15) 
     
DWSD—MY INFL 
 0.13 
 (0.28) 
 0.28 
 (0.22) 
-0.11 
 (0.25) 
 0.00 
 (0.16) 
     
DWSD OUTCOME 
 0.01 
 (0.27) 
 0.27 
 (0.20) 
 0.31 
 (0.25) 
 0.11 
 (0.15) 
     
PAPER 
 0.03 
 (0.18) 
 0.06 
 (0.08) 
-0.10 
 (0.09) 
 0.02 
 (0.06) 
     
N  104  121  104  121 
     
χ2 
  321.74 
 p=0.00 
   327.68 
  p=0.00 
   321.74 
   p=0.00 
 327.68 
 p=0.00 
     
RMSEA    0.22 0.20    0.22 0.20 
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Once again, both anger and satisfaction elicit marginally positive effects on black 
subjects’, direct immediate action. Meanwhile among white subjects, both anger and 
hope produce significant positive effects on direct action, while concern produces 
significant and negative effects.  
 Turning to Table 5.19, which presents the total and indirect effects of the 
opportunity treatment on participation (see next page), there is one instance in which the 
opportunity condition produces a non-null effect. Among whites, the opportunity 
treatment has a strongly positive indirect effect on letter signing through decreasing 
feelings of concern, which themselves are negatively correlated with direct action. 
Figures 5.20 through 5.23 are path diagrams displaying the direct and indirect 
effects of the respective treatments and emotions on subject participation, by race. These 
figures illustrate the dramatic departure of the findings of the attitude and efficacy model 
from those of the prior models. 
 In the absence of the efficacy factors, exposure to the threat condition produced 
both slight indirect mobilizing effects and moderately indirect demobilizing effects on 
black subjects’ direct immediate action on DWSD. But as Figure 5.20 reveals, when 
factoring in measures of efficacy, the indirect mobilizing influences of the threat 
treatment (through increasing anger—an emotion here marginally associated with action) 
appear to outweigh the demobilizing indirect influences (through decreasing 
satisfaction—an emotion here marginally associated with action) on black action.  
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Figure 5.20: Path Diagram–Direct & Indirect Effects of Threat on Action among Black Subjects, With Attitude 
& Efficacy Controls 
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Figure 5.21: Path Diagram–Direct & Indirect Effects of Threat on Action among White Subjects, With Attitude 
& Efficacy Controls 
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Figure 5.22: Path Diagram–Direct & Indirect Effects of Opportunity on Action among Black Subjects, With Attitude & 
Efficacy Controls 
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Figure 5.23: Path Diagram–Direct & Indirect Effects of Opportunity on Action among White Subjects, With Attitude& 
Efficacy Controls 
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Among white subjects an opposite pattern emerges, as shown in Figure 5.21. In 
prior specifications, threat produced a clearly positive indirect influence on direct action 
through increasing whites’ anger. But in the presence of attitude and efficacy controls, 
threat produces indirect demobilizing effects as well. By both increasing concern—which 
makes whites less likely to sign the letter, and decreasing hope, which makes whites more 
likely to sign the letter, the threat treatment appears to indirectly dampens whites’ direct 
action more than it bolsters it. 
Effects of exposure to the opportunity treatments are also altered upon inclusion 
of attitude and efficacy variables. As shown in Figure 5.22, the opportunity treatment’s 
marginal indirect mobilizing effects deriving from the increased feelings of satisfaction 
among black subjects appear to be outweighed by its marginal indirect demobilizing 
effects via decreased feelings of anger. Among whites, the opportunity condition 
produces a similar indirect demobilizing effect via decreased feelings of anger (see 
Figure 5.23). Yet, the treatment’s apparent indirect mobilizing effects—through both 
decreasing concern and increasing hope—appear to be strong enough to outweigh the 
demobilizing effect. 
 What to make of the fact that inclusion of the attitude and efficacy variables 
transformed two previously null effects—anger for African Americans and hope for 
whites—into marginal and significant effects, respectively? The strong effect of hope for 
whites in the efficacy model suggests that the efficacy measures play a greater relative 
mediating role for black subjects. In other words, there may be a stronger correlation 
between reported hopefulness among black subjects and their feelings of efficacy. As 
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blacks become more efficacious, do they tend to become more hopeful relative to more 
efficacious whites?  
 Conversely, the trends suggest that as whites become more efficacious, they 
tend to report more anger. The relationship between efficacy and anger appears to be not 
as strong for African Americans. The inclusion, therefore, of the efficacy measures 
uncovers a marginal anger effect for blacks, while accounting for a portion of the anger 
effect among whites previously found to be strong.  
Mediating effects of the efficacy measures fail to reach conventional levels of 
significance in Sobel-Goodman tests (not shown). In the absence of definitive empirical 
evidence, I can only speculate as to the how efficacy might mediate the impact of 
emotions differently for black and white subjects. But the concept of efficacy mediating 
distinct emotions for blacks and whites is worthy of further exploration in future studies. 
Scholarship has generally found a positive association between possessing 
efficacy and expressing anger at threat cues within the environment (Lerner and Keltner 
2001; Valentino et al 2009; 2011). Could this positive association be bound to whites? 
Would sufficient sample sizes of blacks uncover empirical evidence that efficacy actually 
associates with positive emotions such as hope for this group? Informed by the results of 
this study, I can prioritize this examination going forward. 
Discussion of the Findings 
Recall from the “Expectations” section of the previous chapter, that I aimed to 
explore the following from the experiment: 
 Whether racial differences emerge in the emotions reported by subjects in 
response to the policy threat and opportunity treatments 
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 Whether racial differences emerge in which emotions—particularly anger and 
hope—influence political participation among subjects 
 
 Whether racial differences emerge in whether subjects are more responsive to the 
threat or opportunity treatments with political action 
 
The experiment yielded findings that provide suggestive but illuminating insight 
on each of these areas. Regarding the first question, the experiment yielded no evidence 
of racial differences in the emotions subjects reported across treatment conditions. In 
particular, the anger deficit uncovered by the ANES analyses is not apparent from the 
experiment. Black subjects in the threat condition carried a high propensity to report 
anger over DWSD privatization. Overall, the experiment yielded no evidence to support 
the first and second racial pathways (Figures 2.5 and 2.6), which posit anger will not be 
aroused among African Americans due to the influence of their racial ideological 
worldview. 
But racial differences did appear to emerge in the translation of emotions to 
political action on DWSD. Anger reported among white subjects was generally the 
emotion most positively associated with taking up immediate direct action on the DWSD 
privatization issue. In contrast, reported anger among black subjects exhibited null effects 
on participation, at least in the absence of attitude and efficacy measures. In contrast to 
my expectations, hope virtually never mobilized action among either group. And in the 
one specification in which hope did elicit greater participation, the effect was limited to 
whites. To my surprise, satisfaction was the emotion most positively associated with 
taking up immediate direct action on the DWSD issue among black subjects. 
Because the threat treatment effectively increased both subjects’ anger, but anger 
only influenced action among whites (at least in absence of attitude and efficacy 
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measures), this treatment appeared to engender greater participatory responsiveness 
among whites relative to the opportunity treatment. Among black subjects, both the threat 
and opportunity treatments produced both mobilizing and demobilizing indirect effects. 
Among blacks, the threat treatment decreased satisfaction—which stimulated action—but 
also increased concern—which marginally increased action. In contrast, the opportunity 
treatment only slight increased satisfaction, while decreasing concern.  
Thus, the results were not consistent with my overarching expectations for 
African Americans. Neither the threat treatment resoundingly demobilized black subjects 
nor did the opportunity treatment resoundingly mobilize them. But the responsiveness of 
African Americans to the treatments proved nonetheless to be distinct from that of white 
subjects, thanks largely in part to the varying effects of anger on black and white 
subjects’ direct action taking. The discovery of varied racial effects on participation of 
the anger aroused by the threat condition is the major takeaway from this experiment. 
As one can reasonably expect, efficacy mediated the effects of emotions on 
subjects’ action, across race. As stated earlier, previous scholarship has found an 
empirical linkage between efficacy and anger. I found trends suggesting this linkage may 
vary along race lines, motivating future exploration of this dynamic. 
 Also contrary to my overarching expectations, no evidence was uncovered 
indicating a mobilizing role played by hope on the participation of black subjects. Yet a 
positive emotion was found to mobilize effectively African Americans while not 
exhibiting a similar effect for whites—satisfaction. As alluded to earlier, this could be a 
result of an issue regarding the operationalization or measurement of the constructs I 
labelled as satisfaction and hope. Or, it could reflect a need to revise my thinking about 
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precisely which type of positive emotion is made resonant by the black ideological 
narrative of salvation. 
Another surprise concerns the emergence of concern and its apparent influence on 
the participation of black subjects. Across all model specifications, concern enacted a 
positive influence on African Americans’ information seeking, making it conceptually 
akin to anxiety (which itself exerted no influence on either subject groups’ participation). 
Yet additionally, in the absence of attitude and efficacy controls, concern exerted 
marginally positive effects on African Americans’ direct action. Thus, concern exhibited 
influences on the participation of African Americans that conventional literature would 
ascribe to both anger and anxiety.  
Adding to the noteworthiness of concern’s influence on black participation is the 
absence of an analogous influence on the participation of whites in the sample. To further 
understand how race conditions the translation of affect to political activity requires 
solving the puzzle of concern. What does it signify for blacks and whites, respectively? 
And what precisely is the mechanism through which it translates to varying types of 
action among only one of these groups? In the next section I attend to this and the other 
most pressing questions raised by the experimental findings. 
Where To Go From Here: Addressing Emergent Questions and Next Steps for 
Future Inquiry 
The unique characteristics of the sample preclude me from drawing definitive 
conclusions from it. Yet the trends that emerge raise critical questions that carry 
meaningful implications for the theory of racialized responses to policy cues I seek to 
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develop. I address some of those questions here, and delineate possible ways I can 
address the questions empirically in future iterations of the project. 
 First, what is signified by the indicators that black subjects did not hesitate to 
report anger in the threat condition, but their anger did not stimulate direct action? The 
ANES analyses revealed black Democrats were significantly less likely than white 
Democrats to report anger under conditions operationalized as threatening; yet for black 
and white Democrats alike, anger was an effective mobilizer of political participation.  
Meanwhile, black subjects in the experiment’s threat condition were if anything more 
likely than white subjects to report anger over DWSD; yet anger often failed to 
materialize as direct action among blacks. 
 What differences other than characteristics of the sample might inform where 
the anger deficit manifested on the part of African Americans? One, the potential objects 
of respondents’ emotions differed across studies. The ANES sample directed anger 
toward individuals—Presidential incumbents. The experiment sample directed anger 
toward policy—the DWSD privatization.  
The findings from both studies might indicate a hesitance on the part of African 
Americans relative to whites to express anger toward individuals, as opposed to policies. 
Alternately, the findings may indicate that African Americans possess more resignation 
relative to whites in the domain of partisan politics. Due to the near universal adherence 
of African Americans to the Democratic Party, coupled with the widespread perception 
that Republicans represent the party of the conservative white male, individual blacks 
may share the deeply ingrained belief that Republican elites will always pursue agendas 
to the detriment of the black populace. This belief would preclude blacks from feeling 
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angry toward individual Republicans, as any perceived threat posed by Republican 
regimes is simply consistent with blacks’ longstanding expectations of how Republicans 
act toward African Americans. 
The action domains constitute another key difference between the ANES and 
experimental data. In the ANES study, respondents’ examined actions are limited to the 
domain of campaign activity—voting, campaigning and discussing the candidates with 
others. In the experiment on the other hand, actions are focused not on campaign activity, 
but on policy advocacy. Thus, the forms of activity measured in the respective studies fall 
under the distinct categories of electoral and governmental participation (Rosenstone and 
Hansen 1993).  
The emergent trends from the studies may indicate that anger translates to action 
as effectively for blacks as for whites in the domain of electoral activity, but not as 
effectively in the sphere of governmental participation. I see no obviously intuitive 
reason why this would be the case. Perhaps electoral activates such as voting or wearing a 
campaign sticker are perceived to be less costly and energy consuming than 
governmental activities such as signing an advocacy letter or contacting an elected 
official. Relatedly, perhaps African Americans’ general skepticism regarding the 
responsiveness to the political system is made more salient in the realm of governmental 
activity, thus exhibiting a stronger influence on their decision to act when angered by a 
policy threat cue, and steering them toward a modal state of inaction in response to the 
cue. 
 Whether any of my proposed reasons for the varying anger deficits are 
ultimately borne out, it is key to note that across the studies whites were consistently 
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angered by the imposition of a relevant threat, and their anger consistently and strongly 
translated to direct relevant action. So regardless of where and how the anger deficit 
manifests among blacks, it does indeed distinguish the participatory responses of African 
Americans to threat cues from that of whites. It is nevertheless important to pinpoint 
precisely under which conditions one can expect either type of anger deficit to emerge 
among African Americans. To address this, I can increase and vary both the potential 
targets of anger for black and white subjects in a study, and the action types available for 
subjects to take.  
How might such a plan be executed in the context of my existing experimental 
design? One way is through inclusion of additional threat and opportunity conditions that 
specify a specific elected official who is responsible for the DWSD privatization. 
Subjects in these additional conditions are asked to report both their feelings about the 
DWSD privatization and about the individual to which the privatization is attributed. This 
allows me to ascertain differences in black subjects’ willingness to report anger toward 
policies versus people.  
The types of immediate actions subjects are invited to take within the survey can 
also be broadened to include both governmental and electoral forms of activity. For 
example, subjects can be told that the official responsible for the privatization is up for 
re-election. Subjects can subsequently be presented with the options to donate money to 
the campaign of the official or his opponent, request a bumper sticker for the 
official/opponent, and request a template letter to send or email to their friends supporting 
either the official or his opponent. With a wider range of action types available to 
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subjects, I can better pinpoint whether and how the racialized associations between 
emotions and political activeness vary across differing modes of political participation. 
 The next key question revolves around the influence of concern on black 
subjects’ participation. This affective state appears to exist outside of the dichotomous 
anger-fear paradigm to which the scholarship on negative affect is usually focused, 
exerting influences on black participation akin to the effects of both anger and anxiety.  
 Because concern exhibits a stronger association with information seeking than 
direct action, it may be the case that the component variables comprising concern 
measure subjects’ anxiety more effectively than the component variables I actually 
labeled as anxiety. Yet even if this is the case, there remains the question of why this 
anxiety measure produced the intended effect for African Americans in the sample but 
not whites. Thinking through what differentiates hope from satisfaction raises similar 
questions 
 Inclusion of an affect induction component to the experiment may help to 
pinpoint what the states of concern, hope, satisfaction and other constructs are truly 
measuring, and why their effects differ across race. Subjects will be asked to take 
between three and four minutes to write about an experience that made them feel one of 
the following randomly assigned emotions: angry, fearful, concerned, happy, and 
hopeful.41 Immediately following this induction step, subjects will be exposed to the 
                                                 
41 The direct text of the prompt can come from the study by Banks and Valentino (2012): “Here is a picture 
of someone who is [CONCERNED]. We would like you to describe in general things that make you feel 
like the person in the picture. It is okay if you don’t remember all the details, just be specific about what 
exactly it is that makes you [CONCERNED] and what it feels like to be [CONCERNED]. Please describe 
the events that make you feel the most [CONCERNED], these experiences could have occurred in the past 
or will happen in the future. If you can, write your description so that someone reading it might even feel 
[CONCERNED].”  
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normal policy threat, opportunity, or neutral (control) cues, and then be invited to take the 
variety of immediate actions on the issue.  
Content analysis of responses to the induction prompts will allow me to ascertain 
what distinguishes fear from concern in the minds of the subjects. And analyses of the 
associations between induced emotions and participation will clarify the respective 
influences of anxiety and concern on subjects’ participation choice, both within and 
across race. 
 The experiment design allowed for distinct emotion states such as concern to 
be uncovered, but lacked a means by which to provide a precise operationalization of 
racial resignation. In Chapter 2, racial resignation was conceptualized as a resounding a 
sense of fatalism over impending policy threats, which is rooted in the pervasively 
skeptical ideological worldview of African Americans. I argued racial resignation can be 
primed alongside African Americans’ affective response to threat cues, inhibiting either 
the arousal or impact of anger in particular on blacks’ participation.  
The null and marginal effects of anger on black subjects’ participation could be 
suggestive of a sense of resignation uniquely possessed by blacks that inhibits the 
mobilizing impact of the anger they feel. Further, while concern itself does not act in a 
way that allows it to be identified as a proxy for resignation, its emergence and influence 
among black subjects may constitute additional suggestive evidence that something 
unique to African Americans is conditioning the translation of their reported anger to 
action on DWSD. 
 But these amount to mere speculations. In order to systematically account for 
the presence of resignation among blacks in the sample requires a proper 
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operationalization of the concept. It is best that resignation not be thought of as an 
emotion state itself, but rather as a cognitive valuation that conditions the emergence of 
affective states in response to a cue and the consequent influence of those affect states on 
participation. Additional closed and open ended questions can help determine whether 
this cognitive valuation is present among blacks in the sample, and how it impacts the 
association between their reported affect and action.  
For instance, once subjects report how likely it is that the DWSD issue turns out 
in their favor, they can be asked why they responded as they did. Also, in addition to the 
battery of questions gauging how subjects feel about the issue after receiving the 
treatment, they can be asked how they would feel specifically if the issue does not turn 
out as they desire. For this question, surprised would be added to the list of emotions.  
Inclusion of such questions can begin to provide a means of testing for the 
presence and impact of resignation among black subjects.  
Content analysis of responses to the open ended question regarding the likelihood 
of subjects getting their way can reveal varying degrees to which black and white 
subjects possess a sense of optimism or fatalism over policy outcomes. Comparing black 
and white subjects’ reported emotions if the issue does not turn out as desired can 
uncover relative mutedness in blacks’ emotion relative to whites over the prospect of 
losing out in the policy space. Taken together with the finding that black subjects’ anger 
does not translate to direct action as effectively as for whites, the data would now show 
multiple areas in which African Americans’ affect is impacted by a cognitive heuristic 
shaped by relevant racial narratives. This would constitute a stronger case for the 
presence of resignation among African Americans. 
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 The data from the experiment prevent assessment of how black racial 
consciousness impacts the associations between policy cues, affect and participation—a 
result of limitations in both the design and the data collection. Given the centrality of 
black narratives to the account I provide, possession of racial group consciousness among 
African Americans must be accounted for in future analyses. The extent to which African 
Americans possess black consciousness should affect the extent to which the narratives of 
black subjugation, resilience and salvation are accessible and salient when they encounter 
cues of policy change.  
Race consciousness has been demonstrated to be positively associated with 
political activity for blacks (see Chong and Rogers 2005 for review). Consistent with my 
argument, I contend race consciousness will exhibit varying influences on black 
participation, depending on the policy cue to which the black individual is exposed. 
Black consciousness should amplify the demobilizing effects of policy threat cues on 
black participation, due to the increased accessibility and salience of the narratives of 
black subjugation and resilience for highly conscious African Americans. I expect 
racially conscious blacks to show greater signs of resignation in the face of policy threats, 
which mitigates their likelihood of taking up direct action in response to the policy threat.  
In contrast, I expect that among racially conscious blacks, the mobilizing effects 
of positive affect will be stronger relative to less conscious blacks. Again, this is due to 
the increased accessibility and salience of the narrative of salvation among conscious 
blacks. 
One way to examine the effects of group consciousness is to collect enough cases 
to be able to distinguish between the effects of the treatments with and without implicit 
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racial group cues (see Chapter 4 for description of original treatment conditions). This 
allows me to examine how the interaction between an individual’s racialized perspective 
on politics and her affective response to a policy cue differ based on whether or not she 
perceives the prospective policy change as one disproportionately affecting her racial 
group.  
Additionally, the post-test should directly ask questions that measure the 
identification and political dimensions that comprise group consciousness.42 This allows 
for direct examination of the impact of racial group consciousness on subjects’ affective 
and behavioral responses to policy change cues. 
 The final question to be addressed concerns the generalizability of the 
experiment findings. As discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4, the samples are far from 
representative of the broader populations from which they were drawn, both in the 
Detroit metro area and beyond. But the fact that the black sample possessed greater levels 
of education, income, and political efficacy than the black population should make it 
harder for racialized differences in emotional and behavioral responses to emerge. That 
the race differences in effects of anger, concern and satisfaction emerged so clearly from 
analyses of the treatment effects indicates they capture fundamental race differences that 
transcend such confounding factors.  
                                                 
42 I adhere to the conceptualization of group consciousness offered by McClain et al (2009, p.476) that was 
previously mentioned in Chapter 2: “in-group identification politicized by a set of ideological beliefs about 
one’s group’s social standing, as well as a view that collective action is the best means by which the group 
can improve its status and realize its interests.” I adapt a set of questions from among those drawn from the 
National Black Election Study (NBES) by Chong and Rogers (2005) to assess the multiple dimensions of 
black group consciousness: extent to which subjects feel what happens to other members of the group 
affects them personally; how often subjects think about how much they have in common with other 
members of their racial group; degree of subject support for shopping at stores owned by members of their 
racial group; whether subjects believe most Whites want to see Blacks get better break, keep Blacks down, 
or don’t care; and whether subjects believe their group can improve their standing by working individually 
or collectively. 
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 The unique design elements of the experiment also aid the generalizability of 
the findings—specifically, having the treatments refer to an actual ongoing local issue at 
the time of data collection. Rather than expose subjects to a hypothetical issue in a sterile 
laboratory environment, subjects were engaging an issue of actual relevance and 
proximity to them. And their prior knowledge of and opinions on the DWSD 
privatization varied according to how attentive they were to this particular issue within a 
noisy and contentious political environment. In this way, the experiment design more 
effectively mirrored the real world context, in which people are surrounded by messaging 
about current and prospective policies, and choose the extent to which they pay attention 
to and receive those messages.  
Having said that, I acknowledge that in order to draw more definitive and 
convincing observations from such an experiment requires a substantially larger sample, 
with white and black subjects who are more representative of the respective population 
groups from which they are drawn. I reiterate a point made throughout; I view the 
findings from this experiment not as providing the final word, but rather as uncovering 
some potentially compelling trends that inform and motivate future inquiry. As a pilot 
study, this experiment provides more than enough incentive to continue developing and 
testing the theory of racialized emotional and behavioral responses to policy change cues. 
 Highlighted above are some of the ways the experiment design can be 
modified to address some of the most pressing questions and limitations present in the 
current iteration of the study. In sum, such actions include expanding and diversifying the 
targets of subjects’ emotions and the types of actions available for them to take, adding 
an emotion induction component, extending the questionnaire to further probe subjects’ 
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senses of skepticism over the prospect of losing out on the policy change, and including a 
battery of group consciousness questions.  
Exploring these questions and the possible ways to answer them constitutes the 
necessary first step in building on the research agenda established by this project and 
making greater contributions to our understanding of how race conditions the manner 
through which individuals process and formulate emotional and behavioral responses to 
policy change cues. 
Chapter Summary 
The purpose of this chapter was to comb through the survey experiment data to 
detect the presence of significant racial differences in the arousal of emotions, the 
influence of emotions on participation, and subject responsiveness to policy threat and 
opportunity cues. The emergent trends from this study should prove to be of interest to 
both students of politics and political actors alike. In contrast to the main findings of the 
ANES study, black experimental subjects were no less likely than white subjects to report 
anger when exposed to a cue of policy threat. Yet anger produced null effects for 
participation among blacks, while strongly mobilizing whites to take up direct immediate 
action. On the other hand, feelings of satisfaction exerted the strongest positive influence 
on black participation, while producing only null results for whites.  
The stark disparity in the affective motivators of action across race cannot be 
overstated. The negative emotion of anger was shown to boost direct action taking among 
whites, suggesting threat cues were the better mobilizer of white action than opportunity 
cues. But the positive affect of satisfaction boosted direct action taking among African 
Americans, meaning opportunity cues—to the extent they could actually engender 
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satisfaction—were potentially better mobilizers than threat cues. Inclusion of attitude and 
efficacy variables distorted this pattern, while potentially revealing additional noteworthy 
racial variations in need of further exploration.  
The experiment was not without its limitations. Chief among them are the size 
and representativeness of the samples, a lack of variation in the targets of subjects’ 
emotions, a limited range of actions available to take on the relevant issue, and the 
inability to properly measure resignation and racial group consciousness among subjects. 
Assessing these limitations lays the groundwork for future iterations of the study, which 
can provide more definitive word on whether the racialized patterns uncovered here are 
truly present.   
In the subsequent and final chapter, I attempt to situate the findings from this 
project in context of the current political environment. It is not sufficient for these 
findings to be labeled as valuable simply because they support my initial claims. Their 
value must be derived from their ability to reveal something illuminating about the actual 
political landscape being navigated—often precariously—by rank and file African 
Americans. How does the theory of racialized responses to cues of policy change better 
inform our understanding of black and white participation, from Occupy to the 2012 
election to the streets of Ferguson? And how does this theory better illuminate the path to 
more proportionate and effective action from African Americans in the policy sphere? 
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Chapter 6  
Conclusion 
The conceptual origin of this project can be traced back to the early autumn of 
2011, when thousands of protesters descended upon business districts, streets and parks 
nationwide to voice their discontent with perceived corporate injustice and demand more 
equitable treatment of the “99%” from the economic and political systems. The tone of 
the political environment at this time seemed best captured by the resounding rallying cry 
of “we’re mad as hell and we’re not going to take it anymore.”  
Yet many an inquisitive mind wondered what message was being conveyed by the 
general absence of African Americans from the national frontlines of protest action 
during this time. Perhaps the resounding message of black America in response to the 
present economic and political environment was indeed captured in the passage from 
Patton quoted here some 100-odd pages ago; “Nothing will change. We’ve been here 
already. It’s hopeless.”   
 The dominant narrative around the black experience in America is often 
tethered to stirring, impassioned rhetoric of uplift and overcoming, from King’s I have a 
dream to Maya Angelou’s And still I rise. But as the studies presented in this project 
indicate, the rhetoric that more accurately reflects the reality of African Americans’ day-
to-day navigation of the political environment may indeed be something more akin to 
nothing will change. We’ve been here already.  
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Given African Americans’ general perceptions that their political goods are 
uniquely vulnerable to political and social forces beyond their limited scope of influence, 
it indeed appears rational to respond to any of the constantly emerging policy threats in 
their environment with restraint rather than activism. But in the long term, the response of 
inaction is the destructive response. As these final pages intend to make clear, 
mobilization of direct black action in response to emergent threats in the policy space is a 
necessary and essential step if African Americans are to acquire meaningful reprieve 
from their perpetual states of vulnerability in the social, economic, political and legal 
spheres. The Occupy case was one of many examples highlighting the plausible reasons 
why African Americans would refrain from taking up intensive political action on policy 
threats. The cases below provides key examples of the inherent (and perhaps inevitable) 
danger posed collectively to blacks should they decide to not counteract such policy 
threats. 
 This project draws to a close in the context of a political environment in which 
thousands of people have once again taken to the streets, giving voice to their sense of 
injustice over a police culture perceived to be excessively violent and unequal in its 
distribution of force, and demanding equitable treatment under the law. This time the 
movement is mainly associated with African Americans, as evidenced by the name 
attached to it, “Black Lives Matter” (BLM).  
 At first glance, the BLM movement seems to contradict the argument at the 
heart of this entire project. The dominant image of the movement is that of thousands of 
rank and file African Americans across the nation—joined by empathetic members of 
other races and ethnicities—moved to anger by incidents from Ferguson, MO to Staten 
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Island, NY to Cleveland, OH. This anger has propelled them off of the sidelines and onto 
the streets, where they take part in political activity that makes them spiritual successors 
to the Black-led protests of the mid-20th Century.  
BLM seems to reveal anger to be both an easily primed and effectively mobilizing 
emotion among African Americans, which stands in stark contrast to all of the racial 
pathways modeled in Chapter 2. But subjecting BLM to more critical scrutiny reveals 
that it does not discredit my findings, but rather complements them. Further, scrutinizing 
the aims and targets of the movement underscores the need for African Americans to be 
rallied to act within the sphere of policy creation and change, which may prevent them 
from constantly having to act in reaction to crises that manifest from the policies that 
should have faced prior challenge.  
Unlike the cases this project examines, the BLM movement is not a participatory 
response to a prospective or immediate threat. Rather, it is a participatory response to a 
series of crises that highlight the marginalized status of African Americans in the eyes of 
the law. BLM is only the latest in a long succession of citizen action decrying incidents 
of excessive police violence against African Americans, including recent cases such as 
Aiyana Jones in Detroit in 2010, Oscar Grant in Oakland in 2009, and Sean Bell in New 
York in 2006.  
While each instance of action response to such an event elevates the conversation 
on policing in black communities to the mainstream discourse either locally or nationally, 
it is clear from the preponderance of these movements that they are not achieving long-
term shifts to either the culture or policy landscape. For instance, the protests over the 
police shooting of unarmed man Sean Bell and the acquittal of the officers on all charges 
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did nothing to stem the tide of the city’s “Stop, Question and Frisk” policy, which critics 
claimed allowed police officers to systematically racially profile black and Latino men. 
This policy’s de facto demise ultimately came at the hands of a ruling in a federal class 
action lawsuit in 201343. 
Relatedly, the protests over the shooting death of unarmed teenager Trayvon 
Martin in Florida in 2012 sparked national debates about “Stand Your Ground” laws, 
which relieve people of the responsibility to retreat when facing threat, and give them the 
legal right to use lethal force under imminent danger of physical harm. The Martin case 
appeared to strike a particular chord with African Americans around the country, 
sparking vociferous displays of opposition to the laws and pleas for the shooter, George 
Zimmerman, to face charges for the killing that spread nationwide.  
But in the aftermath of the protest action and the concurrent national discourse on 
the laws, zero out of 22 states repealed or ratified their existing Stand Your Ground laws. 
The movement elevated the conversation, but failed to affect policy. Within a year of the 
Martin killing, another controversial Stand Your Ground case emerged in Florida. Once 
again the case was centered on the death of an unarmed black youth—Jordan Davis—in 
an altercation with a white man. In this and subsequent incidents across the country—
notably Renisha McBride in Michigan—the recurrent question was Is this the next 
Trayovn Martin? (Sterbenz 2013; Wagstaff 2013)  
Had the original mobilization of African Americans in response to the Martin case 
actually focused on changing Stand Your Ground policies across states, either through 
mounting legal challenges, or vote referenda to remove the law from state ledgers, 
                                                 
43 Floyd v. City of New York. The court ruled the policy violated the Fourth Amendment for stopping 
individuals without proper legal basis, and the Fourteenth Amendment, for targeting blacks and Latinos due 
to their race. 
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perhaps the next Trayvon Martin could have been prevented. These examples highlight 
the critical difference between mobilizing around the threat posed by unfavorable policy, 
and mobilizing around events that make plain the consequences of that policy. 
I see here a critical disconnect between African Americans’ willingness or 
capacity to engage in the politics of response opposed to the politics of policy. 
Mobilizing impassioned responses to perceived crises or injustices such as the Bell and 
Martin shootings undoubtedly carries utility, but that utility stops short of 
institutionalizing the changes in practices that are necessary to prevent the same injustice 
or crisis from being repeated. Mobilization of action aimed at modifying, removing or 
preventing the implementation of threatening policies in the first place is what is needed 
to enhance or preserve the collective material outcomes of African Americans. Action 
aimed not simply at airing grievances or making generalized calls for justice. But rather, 
action aimed at achieving a precisely defined goal on a specific and concrete policy 
outcome in question, such as the restructuring and privatization of the city’s water board, 
or the imposition of body cameras on the city police force. 
It is such discrete policy-focused action that this project subjected to rigorous 
examination. Whether that action is as broad based as voting and campaigning for the 
Presidential candidate with the more favorable policy agenda, or as narrow as adding 
one’s name to correspondence pressuring the state legislature on a local water issue, my 
studies reveal that African Americans are systematically less likely than whites to take up 
such activity when facing cues of policy threat. Regardless of how the deficit in 
mobilizing anger manifests itself among African Americans (i.e. whether it manifests as 
fewer blacks than whites reporting anger, or as blacks feeling angry, but not taking up 
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action on par with whites who feel equally angry), the consequent deficit in black action 
to counteract these policy threats has deep consequences. Inaction in the domain of policy 
will inevitably force blacks to mount action in response to a crisis emanating from the 
policy they originally failed to challenge.  
I return to the BLM movement to illustrate how the process of black inaction on 
policy translates to black action in crisis response over time. The BLM website notes the 
movement’s attempt to broaden the conceptualization of state sanctioned violence against 
black communities beyond the police, labelling ills such as entrenched poverty as 
additional forms of state violence against blacks. But because BLM is attempting to 
mobilize around the crisis of poverty rather than specific policies that impact poverty, the 
potential impact of its efforts pales in comparison to the potential impact that anti-poverty 
mobilization carried two decades ago.  
As noted in Chapter 1, the political environment of the mid-1990s offered African 
Americans a critical moment to mount a mobilized challenge to a proposed policy change 
with the potential to exacerbate poverty, with particular reverberations felt by the 
economically marginalized African American community. If mobilized opposition to the 
PRWORA bill could not have prevented its passage, it could have at least lightened some 
of its more punitive measures and provided more safeguards to ensure fewer aid 
recipients were pushed deeper into poverty. But this moment was not met with any 
notable black-led efforts to pre-empt or modify the threatening legislation. Nearly twenty 
years later, the most prominent current black activism movement is decrying the very 
entrenched poverty that critics of PRWORA argued would only be intensified by its 
passage.  
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Would BLM’s forceful call to action around poverty as a form of state violence 
still be necessary if African Americans had first heeded the call to respond to the policy 
threat posed by PRWORA? This question does not have a definitive answer. But it is a 
question raised to point out the consequences of the context-specific form of black 
inaction uncovered and dissected in this project. All crises animating an impassioned 
black response, from state sanctioned violence against blacks to abject poverty to mass 
incarceration, are consequences of policies implemented at the local, state and federal 
levels. If the examples cited here are at all instructive, it is in showing that mounting 
responses to the crises themselves attack only the symptom but not the disease. Unless 
black oriented action efforts focus on preventing, altering or removing the policies that 
give rise to the crises in the first place, we will continue to see a vicious cycle of crisis 
and mobilized response failing to lead to substantive change. 
In laying out the theory of racialized responses to cues of policy change, I argued 
that we should expect to witness African Americans exhibiting a distinct participatory 
response to policy threats—one that is plausible, rational, and even predictable. As I 
apply the theoretical lens to the actual world of politics, I conclude that this distinct black 
response—or more appropriately non-response—is also undeniably harmful to African 
Americans. The distinction in how blacks and whites respond to cues of policy threat 
does not in any way reflect inherent deficiencies on the part of African Americans. But it 
nevertheless results in disadvantage for blacks, as their relative inaction to counter policy 
threats often manifests in implementation or continuance of policy that further erodes 
black economic, sociopolitical and legal standing.  
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The importance of the racial differences uncovered in this project derives not 
simply from the evidence of their existence, but from their potential for black outcomes. 
Political scholars of race, affect and participation should be joined by individuals and 
groups seeking to mobilize marginalized communities in parsing through the theory and 
evidence presented here—questioning it, refining it and testing its applications across 
contexts and groups.  
What factors determine when and how anger manifests among blacks, and when it 
will or will not stimulate black Americans to greater political action? Why does it appear 
easier for anger to be primed and motivating at the crisis stage than the policy stage? Can 
the mobilizing effect of anger at the crisis stage be effectively transferred over to the 
policy stage? Or is the most effective way to mobilize black action at the policy stage 
invoking positive affect? How effectively can one induce positive affect in a policy 
domain that can be framed as nothing but threatening? 
These are the types of questions that must be asked of scholars and practitioners 
alike, as the answers will inform the formulation of action recommendations aimed at 
closing the racial participation gap in the face of policy threats. It may be the case that 
varying the focus of the policy domain (i.e. emphasizing either an individual or an issue) 
or the type of action requested of blacks (e.g. electoral, governmental, or protest) affects 
whether African Americans engender sufficient anger to motivate a participatory 
response. Alternately, perhaps only positive emotions engendered among African 
Americans is sufficient to motivate action in the policy domain. These factors determine 
which contacting and framing strategies are most effective for mobilizing African 
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Americans to respond proactively to policy threats, causing political interest and 
advocacy groups to act accordingly. 
This project has added considerably to our understanding of the motivating effects 
of threat and opportunity on political action, and the associations between affect and 
action. Race exerts profound and distinct impacts on how individuals process and 
respond to cues of threats and opportunities in their political environment. The 
preponderance of evidence presented in this project points to a gap in black participation 
in response to cues of policy threat, with anger being the primary culprit. The absence of 
a mobilizing effect of threat cues for African American political action has significant 
consequences, as calls to action centered on countering policy threats are a constant 
feature of the political environment. Black inaction to counter policy threats leads to 
material outcomes that further marginalize black well-being. 
This project does not purport to provide the final word on the impact of race on 
individuals’ emotional and participatory responses to cues of policy change. But 
hopefully it adds to an ongoing conversation about how changes in the political 
environment provide people with varying motivation to take up political action. Indeed 
one critical element of this project concurs with previous work in the area; anger is an 
emotion state that carries unique potential to be harnessed to fuel political action. A better 
understanding of how this emotion is managed or mismanaged in attempts to mobilize 
African Americans can pave the way for identifying the conditions that propel African 
Americans into the frontlines of political action in the policy sphere—which may 
preclude them from having to take action in response to policy crises.  
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Appendix 
 
Appendix  A. Predicted Probability of Expressing Anger toward Incumbent by Race, 
across All Years and Party ID’s 
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Appendix  B. Effect of Expressing Anger toward Republican Incumbents on 
Respondents’ Likelihood of Political Action, by Race—across all years 1980-2004 and 
Party ID 
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Appendix  C. Democrats’ Forecasts for national Economy in Next Year, by Race and 
Year 
 
Appendix  D. OLS Regression—Effect of Race and Economic Status Indicators on 
Democrats’ Economic Evaluations 
 
Year 
Race  
effect 
Income  
effect 
Education  
effect 
Unemployed 
effect 
No. of 
obs. 
1984   0.10*** (0.03)   -0.15*** (0.04)  -0.06^ (0.03)      0.07**(0.03) 821 
1988   0.02       (0.02)   -0.06^      (0.04)  0.06^  (0.03)    -0.00    (0.03) 703 
1992   0.04*     (0.02)     -0.04        (0.03)  0.01     (0.03)     0.02     (0.02) 902 
2004  0.05^     (0.03)   -0.09^      (0.05) -0.02    (0.04)     0.01      (0.04) 457 
2008 -0.01       (0.01)   0.02         (0.03)  0.05*   (0.02)    -0.01     (0.02) 692 
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Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<0.10
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Appendix  E. Experiment Pre- and Post-Test Questionnaire 
Thank you for agreeing to take part in this brief (about 15 min) survey. The 
results from this study will be used in my dissertation. My goal is to learn how people 
react to issues that arise in local issues. If at any point you would like to skip a 
question, please feel free to do so. Thank you once again for your cooperation! 
 
1. Please answer the following: 
 
Age: 
                                    
Zip code of residence: 
 
 
 
 
2. Please check the boxes to indicate the following: 
  
Never 
A little of 
the time 
About half  
The time  
 
A lot 
All of 
The time 
How often do you think public 
officials care about what people like 
you think? 
     
How often do people like you have a 
say in how government handles 
important issues? 
     
How often do you trust government to 
make fair decisions on important 
issues? 
     
 
 
3. How fairly would you say American society has dealt with people from your 
background? 
 
Not at all 
fairly 
 
 
A little 
fairly 
Moderately 
 fairly 
Very 
fairly 
   Extremely 
   fairly 
 
 
 
4. How big of a problem is it if some people have more of a chance in life than others? 
Not at all 
a problem 
 
 
A small 
problem 
A moderate 
 problem 
Very much 
a problem 
   An extreme 
  problem 
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5. If people don’t do well in life, how much are they to blame themselves?  
Not at all 
to blame 
 
 
A little 
To blame 
Moderately 
 to blame 
Very much 
to blame 
   Extremely 
  To blame 
 
 
Before answering the remaining questions, I’d like you to view flyer on a local issue 
on the following page. The specific flyer you see was drawn at random from a group 
of flyers focusing on local issues. Again, if at any point you would like to skip a 
question, please feel free to do so. 
 
 
 
1. Please indicate whether you support or oppose the DWSD restructuring plan. 
Oppose  
strongly 
 
 
Oppose 
Somewhat 
Neither oppose 
 Nor favor 
Favor 
Somewhat 
   Favor 
   Strongly 
 
 
 
2. Different groups are writing letters signed by state residents that will be sent to the 
Michigan legislature asking members to either support or oppose the DWSD 
restructuring. Please indicate whether you would be willing to add  your name to 
either of these letters. 
 
YES, I would add my name to 
the letter opposing the 
DWSD restructuring 
YES, I would add my name to 
the letter supporting the DWSD 
restructuring 
   NO, do not add my 
name to either letter. 
 
3. Would you like to provide an email or mailing address to receive more information 
on the DWSD restructuring from the independent, non-partisan group Midwestern 
Commission on Water? 
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          Yes (please do so in 
         space provided here) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         No, thank 
         you. 
4. Please check the boxes to indicate your likelihood of taking the following actions: 
 NOT AT 
ALL 
LIKELY 
A 
LITTLE 
LIKELY 
MODERATELY  
LIKELY 
VERY 
LIKELY 
EXTREMELY 
LIKELY 
Discussing the DWSD 
plan with others 
     
Attending a meeting or 
forum on DWSD 
     
Contacting a public 
official about DWSD 
     
 
 
5. How important is the DWSD restructuring issue to you? 
Not at all 
important 
 
 
A little 
important 
Moderately 
important 
Very 
important 
   Extremely 
   important 
 
 
 
6. Please mark the boxes that indicate the following: 
 NOT AT 
ALL 
LIKELY 
A 
LITTLE 
LIKELY 
MODERATELY 
LIKELY 
VERY 
LIKELY 
EXTREMELY 
LIKELY 
In your opinion, how 
likely is that the DWSD 
issue will turn out the 
way you want it to? 
     
How likely is it that 
politicians care about 
what people like you 
think about this issue? 
     
How likely is it that 
people from your 
community are able to 
influence politicians on 
issues like this? 
     
How likely is it that 
YOU are able to 
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influence politicians on 
issues like this? 
 
 
 
7. How did you feel when reading the flyer about this issue?  Please mark with an “X” 
how much you felt each of the following emotions while viewing the flyer: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8. Without looking back at the flyer, would you be able to answer the following? 
 
a. What is the racial make-up of the people shown on the flyer? 
 
No 
photo 
All  
white 
Mostly 
white 
Racially 
diverse 
Mostly 
black 
All 
black 
 
No people  
in photo 
 
 
 
b. Which geographic region of Michigan is covered by DWSD? 
 
          East 
 
 
Southeast Northeastern Southwestern    Entire state 
 
 
c. Did the flyer support the DWSD restructuring, oppose it, or neither? 
 
Support  Oppose  Neither 
   
 
 
 
 NOT AT 
ALL 
A 
LITTLE 
 
MODERATELY 
VERY 
MUCH 
 
EXTREMELY 
Angry      
Anxious      
Concerned      
Delighted      
Distressed      
Enthusiastic      
Frustrated      
Hopeful      
Motivated      
Optimistic      
Outraged      
Relieved      
Worried      
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d. What is the name of the organization on the flyer? 
 
Michigan Urban 
Water Watch 
Michigan 
Water Watch 
Michigan 
Commission on 
Water 
Michigan Suburban 
Water Watch 
 
 
 
 
9. Please answer the following: 
 
Gender: 
 
 
       Male                              Female 
Race or ethnic group(s) that best 
describe you: 
 
  
    What best describes your current 
marital status: 
 
       Never married               Divorced 
 
       Widowed                       Married/Live-in partner 
Do you have any children, step-
children, or grand-children that live 
at home with you? 
       Yes                                No 
 
Are you a homeowner? 
 
       Yes                                No 
 
10. Please indicate the highest level of education you have completed: 
Grade/middle 
school 
 
 
Completed high 
school/GED 
 
Some college 
Four-year 
college degree 
Post-graduate 
degree 
 
 
11. How many days during a typical week do you watch, listen to, or read the local 
news from any source (whether it is television, radio, the Internet or a newspaper)? 
 
None 1 Day 2 Days 3 Days 4 Days 5 Days 
 
6 Days 7 Days 
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12. Please indicate the party label that best reflects you:  
 
Strong 
Democrat 
Not so  
strong 
Democrat 
Independent, 
Leaning 
Democrat 
 
 
   Independent 
Independent, 
Leaning 
Republican 
Not so 
strong 
Republican 
 
Strong 
Republican 
       
 
 Other (please specify): ________________________________________ 
 
13. How often would you say you attend a church or religious service? 
 
Never 
 
 
A few times a 
year 
Once or twice a 
month 
Nearly every 
week 
   Once or more  
   per week 
 
 
14. Please indicate how many groups or associations you belong to. This includes 
everything from labor unions to fraternal groups, to hobby clubs or sports teams, 
community and school groups, and groups working on political issues: 
 
Zero 
 
 
1 2 3    4 or more 
 
 
15. Please select the income group that includes the income your entire household had 
in 2012, before taxes: 
 
Less 
than 
$20,000 
 
 
$20,000- 
29,999 
$30,000-
39,999 
$40,000-
49,999 
$50,000-
59,999 
 
$60,000-
69,9999 
$70,000  
or more 
 
This completes the study. Again, thank you so much for your participation! 
 
Appendix  F. Treatments
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[CONTROL TREATMENT] 
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[NON-RACIAL THREAT TREATMENT] 
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 238 
[THREAT + BLACK RACE PRIME + NARRATIVE TREATMENT] 
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[THREAT + WHITE RACE PRIME TREATMENT] 
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[THREAT + WHITE RACE PRIME + NARRATIVE TREATMENT] 
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[NON-RACIAL OPPORTUNITY TREATMENT] 
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[OPPORTUNITY + BLACK RACE PRIME TREATMENT] 
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[OPPORTUNITY + WHITE RACE PRIME + NARRATIVE TREATMENT] 
[OPPORTUNITY + BLACK RACE PRIME + NARRATIVE TREATMENT] 
 
[OPPORTUNITY + WHITE RACE PRIME TREATMENT] 
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[OPPORTUNITY + WHITE RACE PRIME + NARRATIVE TREATMENT] 
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